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Abstract 
The amount of electronic data that is held about individuals and their activities is 
staggering. Tools enabling data recovery, believed deleted, vary in consistency and 
reliability of result. Data under review can be fed into investigative tools which also 
vary immensely in reliability, consistency, quality and indeed price.  
Conclusions and inferences drawn from the use of these tools can be morally, socially 
and commercially damaging for the individuals or entities being investigated. Often not 
purely because of the lack of experience of the investigator, but also because of the 
simplistic operation of the toolsets. 
Whilst prescriptive guidelines exist in the public sector for the proper handling, analysis 
and reporting of computer evidence, little commercially independent professional 
guidance exists in the private sector. This lack of guidance has led to a position whereby 
actors in the field of data forensics have few challenges as to their expertise or 
experience. Recent cases of incompetence and crossing ethical and professional 
boundaries provide strong support for a National, preferably International certification 
and training scheme for data forensic analysts, supported by clear ethical codes.  
This research in light of the above challenges, provides examples of failures in 
extrapolation, operator understanding and tool use; argues a proposal for a code of 
conduct to ensure correct and repeatable process is followed; along with a suggested 
outline for the creation of the supervision of conformity to that code in the private 
sector. The current forensics community and academic research body of knowledge, 
supported by the extensive experience of the researcher have been the major inputs to 
the work. The outputs of this work are intended to form a solid base for the furtherance 
of the Computer Forensics profession, and as such will represent a significant 
contribution to the advancement and knowledge base of that profession. 
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The spread of crime using computers was inevitable; the question is how much damage 
computer crime has caused and still may. (Meyers and Rogers, 2004, p. 1) 
 
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Plato, c380bc.) 
1 Introduction 
This chapter is designed to set the scene, it will lay out the histories in the professions 
that are related to the data forensics field as well as some simpler definitions of the 
needs and challenges of that field. It will outline current and past research calls for 
similar studies as well as some of the possible parallels between the public and private 
sector deliveries in the field. Most importantly it summarises the aims and objectives for 
the research, as a whole. 
1.1 Background 
The advent of computers into the everyday world has brought with it many benefits. 
There is hardly a profession that has not gained either efficiency or precision from the 
use of computers. Early predictions as to the value of computers to the masses and the 
incursion of the ubiquitous personal computer into our homes seem strange as we now 
look in retrospect, and these predictions may have helped delay the understanding of 
need for forensic investigative capabilities. The founder of the greatest computer empire 
so far, Thomas J. Watson, is reputed to have stated that "I think there is a world market 
for maybe five computers" (Carr, 2008, p. 1). The then second largest manufacturer of 
computers, Digital Equipment Corporation Chairman and CEO, Ken Olsen in 1977 
stood up and announced "There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their 
home" (Gatlin, 1999, p. 2), although there is some discussion that Olsen actually meant 
a computer to control a home (Gatlin, 1999; Rifkin and Harrer, 1988). 
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1.2 Aims and objectives of the research 
Whilst prescriptive guidelines exist in the public sector for the proper handling, analysis 
and reporting of computer evidence, very little supplier independent professional 
guidance exists in the private sector. This lack of guidance has led to a position whereby 
actors in the field of data forensics have few challenges laid against them as to their 
expertise or experience. No formal certification, that is supplier agnostic existed until 
very recently, nor is there a common criteria even between suppliers. Recent cases of 
incompetence and crossing ethical and professional boundaries provide strong support 
for a National, preferably International certification and training scheme for data 
forensic analysts. Ethical behaviour cannot be described as good or bad if it is not clear 
what is expected, so there is a need to support any certifications with clear ethical codes. 
Much of the referenced data has been drawn from the physical security world, where 
little tool agnostic guidance on how to properly conduct a data forensic investigation 
exists, certainly in the United Kingdom commercial sector. A common ethical problem 
is managing the discovery of confidential data that is irrelevant to the case at hand. 
Often wrong inferences are drawn not purely because of the lack of experience of the 
investigator, but also because of the simplistic operation of the toolsets. 
This research therefore provides examples of challenges in extrapolation, operator 
understanding and tool use; argues a proposal for a code of conduct to ensure correct 
and repeatable process is followed; along with a suggested outline for the creation of the 
supervision of conformity to that code in the private sector.  
1.3 Confidentiality and privacy 
The explosion of personal computer use in everyday life around the world has made 
people complacent and unfortunately usually ignorant, about the amount of sensitive 
information that is retained about their activities and most secret dealings. There may be 
an implicit expectation of privacy of that information; 
 “Do we have an absolute right to privacy, or only an expectation of privacy based on 
the circumstances?” (Lister, 2004, p. 1). 
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The trend towards mass information processing and storage growth is most startling in 
the corporate arena where a complete working day is spent in many cases creating and 
moving information around corporate computer networks, as well as the ubiquitous 
Internet. Not all this information is uniquely relevant to that work unit or person, and in 
many cases can be held to be of danger to that corporate where users abuse their 
privileges of access. According to Jahankhani (2007) even law enforcement is 
struggling to cope because of the amount of data involved. Jahankhani suggests a 
common belief that cybercrime is no different to more traditional types of crime, but 
does clarify that the perpetrators of cybercrime are increasingly remote to the scene of 
crime, and more importantly the victim may nowadays not be aware of the crime in 
progress. In a report in the industry magazine Security Management (Berrong, 2009) we 
are told that research by the University of Glamorgan in the UK, working with peers in 
the USA and Australia had some disturbing outputs. The research which involved 
recovering data from discarded hard drives, found data on individuals on 37% of the 
disks and commercially sensitive data on 46%. This same research also uncovered some 
very sensitive data surrounding the USA defence program, this particular item on a disk 
purchased on Ebay. 
The growth in calls for certification and peer review in the forensic market is being 
driven by the amount of litigation and incidents involving computer data (Sheldon, 
2011; Goodwin, 2006; Meyers, 2005). 
1.4 Dangers 
Knowing now, that the majority of homes in the industrialized world not only have 
access to a computer, but are also almost certainly connected to the Internet, it is easy to 
see that the aforementioned predictions by Watson and Olsen were so badly formed. 
What is abundantly clear, is that the phenomenal growth of the use of computers has 
brought with it some unwanted side effects. It is unfortunately the case that almost 
every scientific advance brings with it both a positive and a negative side. For example, 
the splitting of the atom, that absolute wonder of science brought us unlimited free 
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power, but also brought us weapons of mass destruction that had been unimaginable 
before the harnessing of atomic fission and fusion. The invention of the combustion 
engine, a practical solution to the needs of mass transportation, also brought a medium 
for movement of bigger and more powerful weapons than were previously able to be 
moved around. Finally, and one could draw upon many more similar examples, examine 
the wonders of the airplane, so efficacious in moving people and goods around the 
world, but also a significantly more efficient way to rain death upon remote populations. 
1.5 Good and bad 
As the power of computers grew, from the earliest tabulators, arguably those produced 
by IBM in 1924 - the Type IV, that for the first time could actually subtract values as 
well as add (IBM, 2008), to the Lyons Electronic Office (LEO) (Byford, 1999) which is 
also arguably the first real commercial business computer system, to the emerging cloud 
computing services (Knorr, 2009), where the amount of processing power and storage is 
potentially unlimited, the benefits to the good and the bad were equally predictable 
(Grimes, 2009). 
To understand the potential of a computer to offer itself to both good and bad ends, it is 
useful to understand the basic make-up of what we all take for granted. The computer is 
a collection of electronic parts that work together to store and process information in a 
predictable and repeatable fashion. The nerve centre of the operation is the Central 
Processing Unit (CPU) which provides calculations on information presented, at its 
most rudimentary. It does this by manner of a series of decision gates. The information, 
or input and output (IO) is channelled to and from the CPU down a series of pathways 
known as IO buses or in the case of personal computers, Basic Input/Output System 
(BIOS) (Grassrootsdesign, 2009). These buses (in the simplest terms) carry the 
information to either storage medium, visual display, or network connection. The 
decision as to where to send the information, and indeed what to do with it when 
presented at the various decision gates is controlled by operating system software. This 
software is common across all similar computer hardware setups and is usually 
maintained by either a systems specialist in a larger enterprise, or by a “user” in the case 
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of most personal computers. The ability of the maintainer to modify the actual workings 
of this software is usually very limited. Given a computer, with an operating system, for 
the machine to do useful work, it is necessary to use an “application”. An application 
may be for example an Office Management Suite, which provides for word processing, 
spread sheets, presentations and a simple programming interface. An application can 
also be more specific and singular in purpose, such as an Internet banking system, or a 
payroll calculation engine. These specialist types of applications are more likely to be 
bespoke to the task, and therefore more complicated in their maintenance and usage. All 
of the activities above, because of the nature of computers, can be expected to make 
some changes to data input, and therefore produce data output. It is this output that is 
the basis of value of the computing machine, and the focus of most nefarious activity in 
the realm of computing. 
1.6 Forensics 
As well as providing a background to computer systems, it is also worthwhile to provide 
a brief overview of the discipline of forensic science. Since man first walked the earth, 
he has used the skills of analysis and reasoning allied to curiosity and experience to 
better understand and explain the happenings in the world around him. We see 
representations of early cave men using animal tracks and droppings to understand if an 
animal was nearby and likely to be good for food (Clements, 2006). We are told of 
evidential deduction both fictitious and factual that lead to criminals being apprehended 
in the days long before formal police forces, such as the prefects system in ancient 
China (Dun, 1978). We see all around us people using facts and experiences to piece 
together a picture of what has happened in a particular situation, or in other words, 
forensic analysis. The science of criminal forensics has long been a specialization in the 
public police force. Forensic science now even has its own public sector regulator in the 
UK, to ensure the conclusions that are drawn by its practitioners are as sound as 
possible (Forensic Science Regulator, 2008).  
Operating systems and other programs frequently alter and add to the contents of 
electronic storage (as already outlined above). This may happen automatically, without 
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the user necessarily being aware that the data has been changed. This is an important 
aspect of the differences between traditional documentary evidence and computer data.  
One of the main advices is that in order to comply with the proper principles of 
computer based electronic evidence gathering, wherever practicable, an image should be 
made of the entire target device. Partial or selective file copying may be considered as 
an alternative in certain circumstances e.g. when the amount of data to be imaged makes 
this full copy impracticable. This Thesis also explores how the advent of new 
technologies brings different challenges to the problem in the current “always on” 
environments. 
In a minority of cases, it may not be possible to obtain an image using a recognised 
imaging device. In these circumstances, it may become necessary for the original 
machine to be accessed to recover the evidence. The advice of DCL (2009), reflecting 
general investigator practice, then goes on to provide;  
“With this in mind, it is essential that a witness, who is competent to give evidence to a 
court of law makes any such access. It is essential to show objectively to a court both 
continuity and integrity of evidence. It is also necessary to demonstrate how evidence 
has been recovered showing each process through which the evidence was obtained. 
Evidence should be preserved to such an extent that a third party is able to repeat the 
same process and arrive at the same result as that presented to a court” (DCL, 2009, p. 
5). 
1.7 Related Work 
There are many methodologies in use to provide basis and background to forensic 
science, but the one most pertinent here is the “Daubert test” (Daubert, 1993). Daubert 
states that any theory used to provide an opinion or conclusion in forensics must; be 
generally in use in the forensic community, have been peer reviewed and tested, and 
where specific, the predicted reliability and error rate is reported. There is also an 
important additional related theory of crime scenes that will become evident as to its 
importance as we progress. The “Locard principle”, (Chisum & Turvey, 2000) argues 
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that any person entering a crime scene will take something with them, as well as leaving 
something behind, and that every contact leaves a trace.  
 “Wherever he steps, whatever he touches, whatever he leaves, even unconsciously, will 
serve as a silent witness against him. Not only his fingerprints or his footprints, but his 
hair, the fibres from his clothes, the glass he breaks, the tool mark he leaves, the paint he 
scratches, the blood or semen he deposits or collects. All of these and more, bear mute 
witness against him. This is evidence that does not forget. It is not confused by the 
excitement of the moment. It is not absent because human witnesses are. It is factual 
evidence. Physical evidence cannot be wrong, it cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly 
absent. Only human failure to find it, study and understand it, can diminish its value" 
(Kirk, 1953, p. 4). 
The American Heritage Dictionary (2000) describes Forensics as, “the use of science 
and technology to investigate and establish facts in criminal and civil courts of law”. 
Another describes computer forensics as  
“… the analysis of information contained within and created with computer systems and 
computing devices, typically in the interest of figuring out what happened, when it 
happened, how it happened, and who was involved” (Hayley, 2002, p. 1). 
Hence from these descriptions we have a rudimentary understanding of the basic 
profession that this Thesis is attempting to provide a sequence of governance for. 
Another author outlines some useful theories into the evolution of the field:  
“Computer Forensics is a field that developed from the introduction of new technology 
which is readily accessible, affordable and heavily depended upon both in the home and 
businesses. The speed in which this technology has evolved brings both advantages and 
disadvantages to all. New crime developed which became a main disadvantage especially 
to law enforcement” (Taal, 2007, p. 62). 
Arguably, there is a message that Taal is trying to convey stating that the IT revolution 
has brought with it new crimes. Clearly this is not a generally accepted argument 
(Eurim, 2002; Standler, 1999), but may be a useful view to retain when looking at the 
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manner in which some old crimes are being committed using this new medium. This 
becomes especially relevant if we are to look, using the lens of the one of the questions 
the research has considered, that of how to consistently provide forensic support in the 
investigation of crime and nefarious activity in the private sector. 
1.8 History 
In the early 1990s, when is it generally agreed that the World Wide Web was in its early 
development stage, and its creator was working at the Centre for European Nuclear 
Research (CERN) in Geneva (Berners-Lee, 2010), there were already discussions taking 
place around the need for training investigators properly. Amongst others, there were 
calls for  
“ an educationally sound concept of incremental training in computer crime 
investigation, together with a suitable syllabus which has application on a national and 
international basis” (Stanley, 1991, p. 427). 
Arguing that the international nature of computing even then made the application of 
national boundaries a farce in the investigation of computer crime, Stanley then also 
called for a discussion of what exactly makes up a computer crime, and argued the need 
for a proper and commonly accepted definition of computer crime. It is worth 
remembering that this arguing is many years prior to most countries enacting computer 
crime legislation. Fay (1993) also called for a better definition of computer crime, 
arguing that the lack of such a definition adds to the difficulty of prosecuting it, 
suggesting that a starting point would be;  
“a computer is used in an act, or an act is committed against a computer to steal 
money, services, property or information for invasion of privacy, extortion and even 
committing a terrorist act” (Fay, 1993, p. 154). 
Further, this work also logically reminded us that when an investigation is being 
progressed, it helps to know who the criminals are. Unfortunately, we are offered only 
the following opinion without any supporting empirical evidence, which is unfortunate 
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as there were legion stereotypes of the hacker in those days, and the text below is a very 
neat summary of those beliefs at that time;  
“The average computer criminal is a well-educated, skilled professional. Generally the 
person is respected in the workplace and the community and has no record of criminal 
behaviour” (Fay, 1993, p. 156). 
It should be remembered that Fay is relating generally held public perceptions of 
computer criminals which were largely based on anecdotal evidence in the early 1990s, 
given the infancy of the computer crime research at that time, these do though reflect 
widely held opinion of that era. 
1.9 Research background 
Within the field of moderating reliability of commercial computer investigations in the 
United Kingdom there has also been seemingly little academic research. Much of the 
available published work stems from the United States of America. Meyers (2005) 
argued then that it is the responsibility of the general scientific community to assist in 
this endeavour, and yet we still see little progress in the UK. Whitcomb (2007) provides 
that this discussion has been raging since 1998. In an experience as expert witness in 
1989 for Digital Equipment Limited, it was clear to this researcher that the “day in 
court” was heavily weighted towards the side that had the best technology expert on that 
day. This is indeed the underpinning of the British legal system, wherein the Magna 
Carta drove the system to favour due process above fairness (Great Britain, 1297). 
There was, in the experience of this researcher, in the field of information security and 
albeit rudimentary data forensics at that point in the nineteen eighties, no expectation 
that any reproducible process had been followed in the gathering of evidence submitted. 
A great deal of this lack of expectation of procedure and rigour was arguably because 
the personal computer had not yet harnessed the power of the Internet via the yet to 
evolve World Wide Web. There was also a propensity of the senior members of the 
legal profession involved in such cases towards being less than sophisticated in the 
technologies being described to them. To amplify using a real example, the concept of a 
software license key was so complicated to the bench, in the Digital Equipment action 
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the researcher was supporting, that the case could only properly proceed by using the 
analogy of a house key and lock to ensure the legal community in the room had a 
rudimentary understanding of the technical basis of the case (CISCO, 2011). This 
perhaps lengthy description of one example of the delivery of forensic expertise to a 
civil action is provided to outline the fairly basic failure of the data forensics profession 
to actually recognize experience by examination or by certification of forensic 
practitioners. Whilst in this example, the researcher was arguably amongst the best 
qualified to provide expertise to that case, this Thesis will show later by use of a 
conflicting example (Warrren, 2007) that the case could just have easily at that time 
been informed by someone with absolutely no experience or expertise in forensics 
whatsoever. The legal profession at that time would have had no better challenge, 
because of the lack of certification or peer recognition in the profession.  
1.10 Commercial slant 
Not all computer forensics investigations result in, or are driven by a court appearance, 
but the methodologies used should be the same (Guidance Software, 2004). Kruse & 
Heiser (2004) do also affirm that in their view all cases should receive the same care 
and handling as if each one was intended to be presented in court.  Hayley (2002) gives 
similar advice; 
“…regardless of the situation, and whether the evidence will be used in a court of law 
or as the grounds for a letter of reprimand, the techniques, procedures, and 
methodologies used should be largely the same” (Hayley, 2002, p. 4). 
This Thesis will argue that this advice is often ignored in the private sector, and that 
evidential, moral, ethical and legal boundaries are sometimes overstepped. 
Mendell (1998) suggested that a case needs certain facts in order for it to be 
successfully pursued, calling these “solvability” factors. Listed amongst some of the 
seemingly more obvious were; knowing the name of a suspect; identifying the 
characteristics of a vehicle; a description of the suspect; or a known pattern or “modus 
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operandi”. Mendell also suggested that although none of the above would be obvious 
characteristics of a computer crime, the concept of solvability factors is appropriate.  
This Thesis specifically uses the word investigation at this point, rather than research as 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) present an argument that the word “research” is 
overused and as such diluted in its meaning. This researcher is in contention with the 
argument by Saunders et al., namely that unless there is a systematic process of data 
gathering, analysis and interpretation, the mere study of that data is not properly 
described as research. It could be argued, and is the belief of this researcher that by 
concluding that research is properly described as something that people undertake to 
uncover things systematically, and also arguing that the reasoning behind the research is 
to increase the knowledge of the researcher, Saunders et al (2003) bound the definition 
too severely. This Thesis would suggest that often the author has the base knowledge 
that is being presented for challenge, especially in the areas of professional research by 
mature researchers. It is, this Thesis contends, the process of considered arguing and 
analysis that qualifies and cements that knowledge, and therefore not always a 
systematic path to something that is uncovered. 
In simple terms then, the amount of data that is held about individuals and their actions 
on computer systems can be astounding. The majority of the data that is recoverable is 
generally believed to have been deleted by that subject. Forensics tools to enable the 
recovery of this supposedly deleted data are legion and importantly, vary in consistency 
and reliability of output.  
“Computer Forensics Specialists use powerful software tools to uncover data to be 
sorted through, and then must figure out the important facts…” (Basset et al, 2006, p. 
1). 
A suggestion therefore that not only technical, but also analytical skills are important. 
Jahankhani (2007) states that the techniques used by criminals and the knowledge of the 
technologies that can combat them are essential in the fight. Jahankhani also argues that 
only by dialogue between agencies, industry and researchers can a global examination 
of the issues and therefore a solution be found.  
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1.11 Certification and trust 
There were until very recently no tool-agnostic formally recognised private sector 
qualifications for investigators, computer forensic experts and the like. Even now in 
2012, if one is to delve deeply into the few companies offering such certifications, there 
seems to be little actual professional background to the certifications. The discussions of 
what are held to be professional and what certification means in the constraints of a 
professional organisation will be held throughout this Thesis, but for the understanding 
of the calls being made here at this stage, a professional certification must be one that is 
based on experience, trust and censure of peers and proven and tested knowledge of the 
subject being certified. This distinction then hopefully will clarify the feedback received 
thus far that there are indeed organisations such as GIAC (GIAC, 2012) and EC-Council 
(EC-Council, 2012) that offer certification. Both of these organisations are offering 
what can be described as course-based certification, in that if you attend the training 
course the last day involves certification. There clearly is an uptake for these types of 
certifications as GIAC claims a certified base of over forty six thousand in their twenty 
five different certifications since the year 2000, and EC-Council founded in 2001, by 
2011 had listed thirty eight thousand in their twenty three wide ranging certificate 
subjects. Whilst training is certainly important, being certified for sitting in a classroom 
is not in the basis of the calls being made in this Thesis, for “properly certified 
professionals”. If there is to be trust and sharing between actors with these skills across 
the public and private sectors, and importantly internationally, there would be immense 
value in having qualifications that are universally acknowledged and respected. There 
may be advantage in developing a baseline set of criteria for specific disciplines, 
possibly at different levels of competence within each, against which knowledge and 
experience can be measured. A balance needs to be struck between the introduction of 
formal qualifications, which will take time both to define and to introduce and may be a 
long-term goal, and the need for measures of practitioner competence to meet the needs 
for mutual trust and/or admissibility of evidence. It may well be that at least some of the 
latter can be organised rather more rapidly.  
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”a Computer Forensic Specialist (CFS) must follow a rigid set of methods to ensure 
that computer evidence is correctly obtained” (Basset et al, 2006, p. 3). 
In the experience of this researcher, having performed forensics captures and 
investigations for 20 years around the globe, rarely is the following of a rigid set of 
methods verified between peers working together on cases, or in the passing data 
between actors. An important example of where this should indeed have been the case 
may help in the understanding of the importance of the calls that Basset et al (2006) 
make. In 2002 this researcher became chief investigator and expert witness in what was 
then claimed to be the biggest investment or Ponzi (Wells, 2000) fraud on the Internet 
(USCA, 2006). This case transited the world’s courts, albeit mainly centred in the 
United States of America. At various points, depositions and counter-depositions were 
laid, against many actors in the case. At the heart of the majority of these challenges lay 
the data which the researcher personally had recovered from various implicated 
computer systems. In light of all these legal challenges, there should have been at least a 
rudimentary cross-examination of how the data was gathered and the tools and 
methodologies used in recovering and processing the data for the presentation to the 
various actors. Given that much of the data extracted and presented was extremely 
specific and incriminating, the fact that no challenge ever materialised was doubly 
surprising. Indeed even when the agents of the e-crimes section of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reviewed the case; 
there was no interrogation of the methodology or integrity of the tools used by the 
researcher. These two agencies were latterly involved as the case was reportedly 
deemed to have crossed both state and international borders as well as potentially 
violating the United States SEC regulations.  
This Thesis will attempt to understand and therefore explain why this implied trust 
exists between so-called experts without any pre-agreed standard of certification or code 
of conduct. 
Meyers (2005) argues that there have been many cited examples of litigation either 
failing, or being severely dampened by the lack of a formal code of conduct by which 
commercial investigators actions can be assessed (in the USA).  
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In contrast, there are many guidelines and restrictions for example within the United 
Kingdom Public Sector arenas (ACPO, 2007; HMRC, 2006). This confirms that a lack 
of formal discipline lies mainly in the private or commercial sector. This is recognised 
at least, for evidential submission, by the publication of a British Standards Institution 
(BSI) draft for comment in April 2008 on legal admissibility of forensic data (BSI, 
2008). The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee similarly made it 
clear that; 
“..training of expert witnesses in the general principles of presentation of evidence to 
courts and the legal process is essential” (STC, 2004, p. 3). 
1.12 Parallel experience 
In considering the make-up of a code of conduct, as well as possible certification and 
peer management against that code, it will be useful to parallel experiences of other 
professional bodies. Abrahams (2007) argues that certification allows for (in his 
example) translators to show they have met a certain professional standard. Barbara 
(2008) suggests that there are two reliability factors that should be explored, 
certification and accreditation, and devotes a whole chapter to how the two are 
sometimes confused, but do in fact differ. One organisation offering such a code is the 
British Institute of Management, which after achieving chartered status in 2002 evolved 
into the Chartered Management Institute (CMI). The code of conduct, updated in March 
2011, is extensive (CMI, 2011). Much of the intent that is in there is certainly a 
mainstay of the research for the eventual output of this Thesis. There are however, over 
three pages of words, made up of over thirty specific items that a member must agree to. 
Important issues like striving for excellence, are diminished by the amount of reading a 
member must do, including items such as advice on establishing business relationships 
properly. 
In contrast The British Computer Society, produces four concise sections, each 
containing a maximum of seven bullets, clearly something that would be somewhat 
easier to have pinned up in a cubicle, or at least within one’s subconscious. Rather than 
expand and wordsmith the code, filling page space and arguably detracting from the 
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main messages as is suggested the CMI code does, the BCS code offers an appendix to 
help interpret the code as needed (BCS, 2011). Clearly then more is not always better, 
and if there is a learning from this, it is surely that concise must be a watchword if a 
code is to persist and be upheld. 
The call for competence, and indeed how to recognise it is one of the basic challenges 
of this research. This Thesis argues also that, in an area that is so dangerously important 
to in many cases, the lives and careers of people it touches, that the lack of formal 
supplier independent education for the proper representation of forensic evidence in the 
private sector is noteworthy. Whilst this research had not set out to provide discussion 
on the proper educational processes required, the omission of such discussions from the 
final Thesis would have left an important part of the problem untouched. 
The aims of this research, therefore are clear. What follows is a summary of the 
objectives that were both designed in the inception of this Thesis, as well as have 
evolved during the research. These objectives will be revisited further in the Thesis 
within the appropriate sections. 
1.13 Summary of Objectives 
• Ensure that the final output provides appropriate background to the subject of 
Computer Forensics; 
• Analysis of related and non-related codes of conduct in similar professional 
evolutions; 
• Review of current similar training / certifications (added during research); 
• Provide that actual industry experience not just academic research is included. 
• Test viability of code with peers. 
This chapter has set the aims and objectives, it has laid out some outline histories in the 
professions that are related to the data forensics field as well as some simpler definitions 
of the needs and challenges of this field. It repeats current and past research calls for 
similar studies as well as some of the possible parallels between the public and private 
sector deliveries in the field of data forensics. 
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1.14 Document structure 
The Thesis is intended to provide a narrative of both the evolution of the forensics 
profession and the underpinning professional activities of forensic actors. It is structured 
to allow an understanding of the profession and the current failings, which build 
towards the goal of the research, the Code of Conduct (CoC) (Section 8.3; Appendix B). 
In this chapter we have related the historical aspects to the perceived failings, we have 
explored some of the basic activities involved in the profession which will be explored 
in more depth as the Thesis progresses. We have explored other research and activities 
which provide impetus for this work, and have set a series of objectives to ensure a solid 
measurable deliverable at the completion of this Thesis. 
In Chapter 2 we will explore the challenges facing this research project. The work 
draws heavily on extensive evidence from other societies and researchers in the areas of 
governance and professionalism. It looks at the questions set during the formulation of 
this project, as well as the indicators we should use to ensure the research was on track. 
Chapter 2 also sets out a series of commonly held definitions as well as some 
clarifications to ensure there is a commonality of understanding through the Thesis. 
Finally the chapter lays out some historical background to ensure we have a properly 
understandable evolutionary track to guide us forward as the Thesis builds. 
Chapter 3 builds upon the definitions and needs of the research project and provides a 
compendium of the work of a forensic analyst. It discusses and advises on not only the 
technical but also the governance aspects of the profession. It investigates previous 
advice to ensure a balanced view is achieved with an traceable outcome. It sets the 
scene to a review of the tools used in the profession as well as the way in which they 
can and have been used as well as misused. 
In Chapter 4, many of the questions around the use of tools and their make-up from 
previous chapters are clarified as we explore the world of data forensics tools. Looking 
at the free tools and commercial tools from sometimes similar but arguably differing 
requirements of operation, we cement some of the challenges that have been laid against 
operators in the field. The Chapter also investigates somewhat more in depth some of 
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the dilemmas professional and indeed non-professional actors are faced with in 
operating in data forensics sphere.  
Chapter 5 uses the previous building blocks to ensure that clear discussion of each of 
the issues previously presented is had. Much of the review is involved in the previous 
performance of the profession, and those claiming to be computer forensic operators 
also. The solid understandings of concepts and terminology provided in the Thesis so 
far are used to draw out the reasoning and arguing for the profession and later 
governance model. A forensics model for operation is discussed in detail as a prelude to 
ensuring any code of conduct, governance and training model proposed would operate 
properly. 
Having referred extensively throughout the Thesis to training being an underpinning of 
any such governance model, Chapter 6 lays out the outcomes of discussions and 
research as to what training is needed in the profession. It makes no claims to be unique 
or revolutionary, merely using the breadth of training currently available in various 
guises to provide foundation for a structured training curriculum. The value that this 
research brings therefore is clarity and structure, which draws from the work up to this 
point. What it does provide in unique terms is the need for certification in a sense of 
peer review and testing. The Chapter discusses in detail the various opinions and current 
deliveries in the field that have shaped the Thesis in this area. 
Having introduced the requirement for testing and certification to pre-defined level 
previously, Chapter 7 explores how that could be delivered. It uses other organisations 
that have delivered similar schemes to test the solutions offered. It discusses indicators 
of success and indeed failure that could be used to test the effect of implementing a 
governance model. It also acts as a test for previous chapters to ensure that the issues 
and challenges we have identified and warned are able to at least be monitored in such a 
scheme. 
Finally, Chapter 8 brings together the warnings, challenges and advices to set out the 
work of this Thesis, a model for the proper governance of Computer Forensics 
Professionals. It revisits the discussions on impersonation, censure and peer review 
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from previous chapters. The Chapter looks at the solutions that have been discussed and 
how they tie into the overall model. It reviews that calls for structure of previous codes 
and peer schemes to ensure all the input has been properly respected. Finally it provides 
the basic structure of the main aim of this research, The Code of Conduct, discussing 
how the implementation may be designed and critiqued should industry wish to 
proceed. The objectives, properly, are revisited to ensure we have a reminder of the 
journey that we took, and how we came to this junction in the road towards the 
professionalization of the forensics vocation. There are, as always, more questions than 
answers and the Chapter also lays out some challenges to future research  
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2  Research challenges 
In this chapter, we will review the questions, and direction used to perform the research 
as well as some of the guidance that has gone before in the area of governance, 
professionalism, and certification. We will explore the discussions on the emerging field 
and the various opinions that are shaping its future evolution. 
This Thesis is guided by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2003) in the search for 
supporting and opposing opinion. However, Saunders et al attempt to define research 
itself are interesting in describing research as systematic which is not the experience of 
this researcher in working on this Thesis. That deviation may relate to the difference in 
the subject matter of Saunders et al, and the chosen line of analysis for this Thesis. The 
premise that research is actually about finding out things, and that that this comes from 
having an initial direct question, or set of questions is one that could be more closely 
described as the drive behind this research. It also is the driver in joining the 
Professional Doctorate curriculum. It provides a medium to bring in personal and peer 
experience to benefit the overall research. 
In understanding where the outputs of the research were to be best applied (the 
profession), it was clear that a systematic review of what had gone before would not 
provide the strength of argument for the expected output, a code of conduct, of this 
research. At each significant milestone the research would have to pause and understand 
if the path was still: 
• Relevant 
• Timely 
During the literature review phase, it was agreed with the supervision team that a paper 
should be presented to fellow post-graduate researchers on the background and status of 
the research. This paper was then subsequently presented at the IT Security Conference 
for the Next Generation, in November 2009 at the University of East London, London, 
UK. The contents of this first paper are at Appendix A. 
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Towards the end of the research, the outcomes of the work were clarifying and it was 
felt appropriate to reach out to a peer audience both in a spoken and written form. 
Feedback on the viability of a code in the profession would be important if the 
published Thesis were to provide support to actors in the field. Given that the researcher 
was a regular speaker on various information security topics at an Executive level 
Internationally, it was then a matter of choosing a varied set of peers to ensure the 
feedback would be as valuable as possible. Finally, the decision was made to follow 
three avenues of formal publication and discussion of the research. Firstly, a 
presentation on improving forensic capability in the commercial sector was provided to 
the NetFocus (2012) annual Information Technologists Seminar series.  
“Net Focus UK is the forum where the industry's leading experts help solve the most 
critical situations facing businesses using the Internet. “ (Netfocus, 2012, p.1). 
A supporting text, in the most part reduced from the Appendix A submission was 
provided for the on-line Netfocus community discussions which continue during the 
year.  Secondly, being asked to speak at both of the MIS Trainers Institute CISO 
Summits in Prague and Abu Dhabi, (MISTI, 2012), the opportunity was taken to 
introduce round table discussion on the need for professional certifications and 
governance in the Computer Forensics profession. Finally, many members of the 
profession of Information Security have been discussing the need for a more formal way 
of sharing views than on un-moderated avenues currently available such as Twitter and 
LinkedIn groups, but arguably less structured and creativity restrained than traditional 
academic papers or professional journals. Focus of the new avenue is non-commercial 
and designed to cross between the electronic and the printed medium. Most importantly 
it is expected to create heated discussions within the community on many controversial 
topics. A paper, updated from the Appendix A paper has been submitted, and is being 
editorially revised for inclusion in this new publication (as at 24 November 2012). The 
funding and backing for this new venture is currently under discussion and as such is 
not possible to name at this time. Given the timing of this Thesis, it is hoped initial 
feedback will be available in Q1 2013, as the inaugural edition features the extracts of 
this research. This cross-section of sharing the data in this work provided much of the 
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feedback in honing areas such as training need and clarity of code. Much interest has 
also been shown via these avenues in working with the finalised Thesis, once published, 
to view how the proposals could be used in the commercial sector by many actors in the 
field. This interest has provided added impetus in finalising this work. 
This research then, initially set out a series of direct questions, laid out a structured path 
to document the answers, organised an audience prepared to review and challenge any 
outcomes, and still had a basic failure in the research efforts – where to actually start. 
Saunders et al help greatly, specifically in their review of Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe (2002), in particular  
“…the requirements for the research to have some practical consequence. This means it 
either needs to contain the potential for taking some form of action or needs to take 
account of the practical consequences of the finding.” (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002, p. 
94). 
Saunders et al (2003) further argue that then recent, in 2003 at least, discussion within 
the British Academy of Management focused on the trans-disciplinary nature of 
research. This underlines the premise that this Thesis is driven by, namely that for any 
research to be useful, it must consider each related area of the subject under question. 
This Thesis therefore in the process of properly pursuing a course of research for this 
seemingly narrow topic, has indeed needed to consider many related fields to properly 
provide a considered and informed response to the challenge the topic has posed. In 
outlining objectives at the very start of the research, it was clear that many parallels 
would be needed in order to provide sound conclusions for the code. Many 
organisations have codes of conduct, and a proportion of those actually censure 
members for transgressions. Censure then was one of the topics that had to persist 
through the research, otherwise why bother with a code if it had no teeth. 
Tranfield and Starkey (1998), are used by Saunders et al (2003) as examples of the 
modernist theory that ideas should be developed and related to practice, and that 
research should “complete a virtuous circle of theory and practice” (Saunders et al, 
2003, p. 4) in which the practice of a profession informs the research into that 
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profession. Saunders et al (2003) mesh the academic world and practical delivery in 
their arguing, which supports the underlying arguments of this Thesis, that Computer 
Forensics practice, and indeed other information security specializations must drive the 
need for considered academic research if they are to be considered a profession. It also 
seems to be the beginnings of the underpinning arguments for what is now being 
termed, the Professional Doctorate. By ensuring that practical experience of both the 
researcher and peers was used at various stages of this writing, there always was an 
underlying test mechanism to ensure that advice or outcomes were relevant and useful. 
Straying too far into the practical, however, has been an oft repeated mistake, and 
researching supporting, not opposing data for pre-formed arguments was one area that 
was difficult to prevent. This has been especially difficult in finding negative views on 
actually needing a code of conduct and governance, but there are examples in other 
professions that serve as test data for that code to ensure its usefulness. 
Exactly what defines a profession has been argued many times and in particular forms a 
large part of the writings of the “Security Journal”. The Security Journal is affiliated to 
the American Society of Industrial Society, which is arguably the first independent 
certifying organisation for security professionals world-wide (ASIS, 2009), providing 
supplier agnostic professional industry credentials. The specific discussion around 
computer forensics as a profession, similar to that argued by Manunta (1996) about the 
security “profession” as a whole, also affects the output of the research. The arguments 
presented by Manunta, centre around the manner in which traditional professions such 
as medicine and law have evolved, and what makes them a profession. It is suggested, 
that to be called a profession it should exhibit certain traits that are common across the 
peer group. Manunta argues that peer review, in one form or another is critical, stating 
that the acceptance of practicing professional status depends upon practitioners already 
in the field, and as such suggests that the quality and skill levels will be naturally 
maintained. It is not the intent of this Thesis to argue for or against his work here, 
merely to provide an awareness that in the eyes of Manunta, because of the lack of some 
basic characteristics of the community, security (in this case as a whole) may not call 
itself a profession. In providing the means by which, if accepted, the forensics 
community could be peer reviewed, certified and held to a code of conduct, this Thesis 
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will hopefully provide input to the discussion. Perhaps therefore suggesting that 
Manunta would have to look again at least at this particular branch of what indeed is 
generally called a profession. 
Button (2005) interestingly offers the suggestion of a “license to practice”, which few of 
the other calls for standardisation make. This is an important part of the later arguing of 
this Thesis, for if one were formally licensed, as this researcher strongly believes should 
be the case, then a license could be revoked for malpractice, as in the legal or medical 
professions. It would also clarify the semantics at play as discussed earlier as to what 
the term certification can be taken to represent. 
Returning to Saunders et al (2003), they present a conclusion to their chapter on the 
research process which argues research (in that case on management) needs to advance 
not only knowledge and understanding, but should help towards providing answers to 
business problems and practical management issues. This Thesis provides that this is a 
basic tenet of any research aiming to add value, and indeed the outputs of the research 
effort here must surely pass that test. By including seasoned professionals in the new 
Professional Doctorate streams, this experience is brought in naturally to the discussion. 
2.1 Practicality 
Comte (1877), one of the renowned sociologists of the 18th Century is quoted as having 
described;  
“the progression of knowledge as being one from predominantly theological or 
supernatural explanations of reality to metaphysical or philosophical ones and finally 
to scientific approaches” (Hagan, 1997, p. 7). 
So, even two hundred years ago, scholars were arguing what is being discussed here, 
which is that the output of research must have a practical edge for it to be considered 
complete. 
In considering the audience for this Thesis it was important to properly understand the 
potential effect that a positive outcome would have. As Hagan (1997) points out, an 
24 
 
author has reciprocity of trust with the respondents to any questioning; arguing that it 
involves an obligation to ensure that the information shared is not used in an 
inappropriate manner, or in a way which could cause harm or embarrassment to the 
subject. Hagan also argues that objectivity in the research process is paramount, 
warning that researchers should refrain from entering into research for which they have 
deep interest. The danger being they could deliver biased or tainted reports of data 
gathered or studies completed. Given that this researcher has a significant amount of 
experience and indeed an expected direction of outcome for this research, this would 
seem to be good advice. This will bear scrutiny to see if it was not properly considered 
when the Thesis is published and critiqued by peers. Hagan states a belief also that an 
author should not misrepresent their research abilities to augment the actual value of 
their data. It is the duty of the author of the work to ensure that the audience to which 
the outcomes are presented are professionally capable of judging and forming critical 
opinions based upon their own experience and theory. This is pertinent advice and does 
already form part of the delivery methodology of the research of this Thesis. Becker 
(1986) believes that researchers can become terrorized by the literature, that is there is 
an absolute mass of information to be pawed through, so much that the author just 
cannot get started into the dissemination into meaningful pieces.  
Hagan (1997) suggests that to limit the amount of information to review, an author 
should leave out popular literature and the mass media in favour of professional journals 
and previous research. In this subject, the majority of information actually sits in the 
popular press. The Thesis discusses practical failure and less than optimum deliveries in 
the commercial sector, and as such these tend to be reported in a different manner, if 
actually reported officially at all. 
2.2 Matthew effect 
One issue which this Thesis wishes needed to consider was the assumed intention of 
finding fault in other research in order to prove ideas and opinions offered in the 
research under way. This is presented in a discussion by Hagan (1997) in suggesting 
one needs not go too far to find some error. Further opinion is provided how various 
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researchers have focused only on the errors, but then usefully offers the test that errors 
should only be highlighted when they challenge grossly the accuracy of outcomes. 
Similarly, focusing on the conclusions drawn from the faulty data, is equally remiss. We 
are advised  research should not be scathingly attacked for what can be described as the 
sake of one-upmanship. Merton, as described in Hagan (1997) identified the “Matthew 
effect”, relating to a passage in the Christian Bible. This is loosely described as a 
tendency of those who are already published, to get further published. This outline of 
the effect also prescribes that there is a tendency in the research field to cite each other 
and exclude new ideas from people outside of the clique. This then devolves the 
scientists or in this case research scientists, into “a small circle of mutual admiration 
societies” (Hagan, 1997, p. 9).  
In continuing the comparisons of pure versus applied research, Hagan (1997) argues 
that pure research is concerned with the acquisition of new knowledge for the 
development of the field or the sake of science. Conversely, applied research should be 
used to solve immediate policy problems in that field. Hagan also poignantly informs us 
that the criminal justice field has always had conflict between the “common sense” 
applied research and the theoretical basis of pure research as can be expected from the 
academic community. Pure research would usually not be expected to add immediate 
value to the field but would probably add to the overall knowledge base and contribute 
to the advancement of the field (Hagan, 1997). James Stuart, previous Director of the 
US National Institute of Justice (NIJ): 
“Criminal justice research and practice is at an important stage in its development. 
Whilst still in embryonic form, criminal justice could evolve like the fields of health and 
engineering where those who conduct research and those who practice, essentially 
share similar paradigms, and look naturally to each other for information and 
guidance” (Hagan, 1997, p. 14). 
2.3 Previous work 
One of the most challenging parts of this research has been finding similar attempts to 
quantify the need for such a stringent code of conduct and ethics in the UK private 
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sector forensics community. Jankowicz (2000) strives to have us understand that the 
value of your work is only in relation to others efforts, and that knowledge does not 
exist in a vacuum. Further discussion results in the introduction of an interesting 
concept that seems to suggest there is no such thing as original thought. Saunders et al 
(2003) attribute Jankowicz as saying that the work of an author will only be significant 
to the extent that it matches or questions previous thinking. Again, could this be more 
evidence for the existence of the “Matthew effect” (Hagan, 1997), or at least some 
further arguments to work with. Mortman (2007) challenges that the majority of 
organisations that claim to have ethical standards actually are only using the word to 
bolster the apparent quality of the certification, calling this propensity a smoke and 
mirrors certification. Further, the only International Security organisation that could be 
claimed to require an ethical understanding is the American Society of Industrial 
Security (ASIS) as it appears in the curriculum for certification (ASIS, 2009; Mortman, 
2007).  
Much of the related research that does exist has skimmed around the part that law 
enforcement, and the law itself has played in the glorification of the forensic profession. 
Confusion abounds in the industry and indeed in academia whether forensics is a new 
profession or an extension of older, more established professions (Manunta, 1996; 
Simonsen, 1996). Even researchers cannot agree whether the activities, more commonly 
known as computer crimes or infractions are new or old, and therefore should require 
new professional responses or methodologies. This is quite clearly presented in the 
following extract: 
“There were no new laws to deal with the crimes or guidance as to how to tackle them 
but most of all the great lack of expertise to understand the intricacies of the crimes, the 
wide demographics it covered and most of all jurisdiction issues” (Taal, 2007, p. 62). 
This research has been unable to uncover any previous academic challenge to these 
perhaps controversial views expressed above on the lack of expertise in the industry. 
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2.4 Definitions and clarifications 
This section will align some of the basic terms and concepts that will be repeated 
throughout the Thesis. Whilst in some cases this would be classed as a bibliography, the 
evolution of the field and its embryonic state requires that we explore some of the 
discussion around the definitions of basic terms as well as the sometimes conflicting 
opinion of what definitions should be. Some of the legislations relevant to this Thesis 
may not be immediately familiar to the non-technical person, it is necessary therefore to 
provide some direct references for further analysis as needed. These are discussed in 
Section 7.2, related acts. 
2.4.1  Forensics: 
 “ the use of an expert to preserve, analyse, and produce data from volatile and non-
volatile media storage. This is used to encompass computer and related media that may 
be used in conjunction with a computer“(Meyers and Rogers, 2004, p. 1). 
Meyers in the following year (2005) further claims that computer forensics is a sub 
division of digital forensics and partially cites Palmer (2001) for some definitions. 
Palmer uses a list of specific terms to describe the analysis of digital data: “network 
forensics, virtual crime lab, remote forensics and cyberforensics” (Palmer, 2001, p. 5). 
In lay terms, one could regard forensics as the uncovering of data trails and files from 
information systems. These trails and files may or may not have been plainly evident 
prior to a forensic effort. 
2.4.2  Evidence: 
“either the state of being evident; something that makes another  thing evident: a sign 
and a statement of a witness, an exhibit which has bearing on or helps establish a point 
in question, usually in a court of law” (Sennewald, 1981, p. 117). 
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Again, in lay terms, this researcher offers a simplistic view that any data that has a 
bearing on the initial reason for the work in question (recovery or analysis) can be 
classed as evidence. Many argue that data that has been recreated can not be called 
evidence, but if voice data from a black box recorder in a crashed aeroplane can be 
recreated by a synthesiser and termed evidence, then surely similar recreations of 
computer data can also be thus termed.  
2.4.3  Ethics: 
 “Ethics is the practice of making a principle choice between right and wrong. Such 
principles are notions of behavior [sic] that are commonly accepted in society although 
different societies have different notions of what is acceptable” (Chadwick et al, 2007, 
p. 197). 
Ethics, relate to a series of beliefs. Every person has ethics, they stem from personal and 
societal values as accepted by that person. This makes the commonality of ethics 
difficult to define as each society and educational system will instil a different set of 
ethics. Whilst people may all have the same regulation, a common set of rules, their 
ethical values, that is what they believe rather than are forced to follow will differ. 
Hagan (1997) cited the need for researchers in the field to subscribe to a code of ethics, 
claiming that there is an assumption of three things; trust, ethicality and integrity by 
dedication to such a service or science. 
2.4.4  Professionalism: 
Hagan (1997) argued that professionalism is looking to show others that there is a 
reason to be deserving of the prestige and remuneration that comes with such 
aspirations. The evidence that the occupation has achieved this status can be such as that 
it will generate its own esoteric and useful knowledge. There are references throughout 
this Thesis to professional status and what that entails, so it will not be laboured here, 
suffice that bodies, traditionally understood to be professional, have certain defined 
characteristics that the Information Security, and therefore subset Computer Forensics 
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profession may not currently exhibit. Hagan also argued that regulation of conduct must 
be organized and indeed mandated from within the profession not by legislation or 
government bodies. 
2.4.5 Hacker: 
Previously, the term hacker was applied to someone with a patent curiosity in the 
workings of computer systems and the data that they generated. Usually exploration and 
access to these systems, albeit unauthorised had a non-malicious intent (Howe, 1995). 
The following statement of beliefs clearly outlines what was then understood by the 
term hacker: 
“1. The belief that information-sharing is a powerful positive good, and that it is an 
ethical duty of hackers to share their expertise by writing free software and facilitating 
access to information and to computing resources wherever possible.  
2. The belief that system-cracking for fun and exploration is ethically OK as long as the 
cracker commits no theft, vandalism, or breach of confidentiality“ (Howe, 1995, p. 1). 
Later, and it was the opinion between operators in the field when the Computer Misuse 
Act (Great Britain, 1990) was passed that the nicknamed Hacking Act was more a 
matter of political expediency than a considered path towards effective legislation. This 
act was to affect the need for expert data forensic testimony more than any other. The 
passing of the act was generally felt to have been necessitated by the inability to 
properly prosecute the much publicised outcome of what could now be considered a 
basic technological and commercial security failure, i.e. the hacking of a voice message 
box belonging to a member of the British Royal family (Cornwall, 1988). This rapid 
passing into law, which arguably was indeed overdue, has sometimes been questioned 
as to whether proper consultative process was followed. Given the visibility of the issue 
and the personas involved, the prior lack of any relevant legislation to prosecute, clearly 
brought the term hacker into the greater public vernacular, perhaps for the wrong 
reasons. Whatever the motivations, the term hacker from that point forward could be 
regarded to have taken on a new meaning. 
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 If the failure to prosecute in the mailbox hacking case above that which was obviously 
a criminal act, suggests a lack of expertise was available to understand or tackle the 
“new” crimes, then the points Taal (2007) presents on this are ratified (Cornwall, 1988). 
It is however, suggested by this researcher that the expert fight against cyber-crime had 
actually been running for a long time before that one great burst of publicity both in the 
public and private sector (Cornwall, 1988). We may however, have to thank this widely 
publicised Royal security breach for speeding up the larger discussions on computer 
crime and therefore data forensics. 
2.4.6 Hacking 
The author of this Thesis was heavily involved in the prosecutions of two similarly high 
profile, but much more sophisticated computer hacking activities, which by reference 
should give evidence that expertise was indeed available to prosecute such crimes. 
Firstly, the Computer Chaos Club of Hamburg, (CCC) which described itself as a 
Galactic community of life’s beings. Formed in 1981 it is probably most publicly 
famous for hacking into the German Bildschermtext system, arguably one of the first 
on-line banking systems (Anderson, 2008). Their published aim was to investigate how 
computer systems could support the German Greens party. It is generally held they were 
scavenging around various military and commercial systems, selling secrets to the 
highest bidder, sometimes hacking into specific systems to order (Anderson, 2008). In 
1989 five German nationals related to the CCC were arrested and convicted of 
espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Anderson, goes on to relate that much later in 
1995, the CCC attempted to disrupt the national infrastructure in France, in particular 
the telecommunication provision by hacking and effecting changes to the activities of 
critical software, this was reportedly in protest to French nuclear testing. Evidence then 
that by uncovering these attempts, data forensics was even if in a state of relative 
infancy, actually at play. 
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2.4.7 Social engineering 
The other highly visible activities that support the challenge that computer forensics is 
not as new a profession as we would be led to believe are those of Kevin Mitnick. 
Mitnick was probably the first of what we are now calling computer hackers in a 
malicious vernacular. His criminal exploits against Digital Equipment Corporation 
(DEC) and other companies and agencies are loosely described in a work titled “The art 
of Deception” (Mitnick, 2003). Essentially Mitnick used a subversion technique now 
generally coined as “social engineering”. Social engineering is best described as a 
technique whereby someone (not necessarily for criminal intent), will use knowledge 
already gained to either manipulate someone into doing something they would not 
otherwise have done, or gain more information to enable actions to be performed at a 
later date to achieve a similar result. A relatively recent, much repeated example of 
social engineering with malicious intent is to suggest a contract with someone claiming 
to have something they need, but the sender will not be able to release that item without 
confirmation from the target of a further item of information. Usually this item will be 
significantly more useful such as bank details or billing addresses. The newly divulged 
information can then be used to obtain funds or advantage, criminally. Only by using a 
process of data forensic investigation can the overall intent of the effort be truly 
understood. This style of social engineering includes what is now being coined as 
“Phishing” when done via email, which is a way of getting deeper information from 
someone than you initially hold, usually purely an electronic mail address. By 
presenting an initial level of familiarity, phishing is sometimes also used as a means by 
which to download malware onto a Personal Computer, to be able to gather information 
at a later stage at will. Again, generally it will require a proper data forensic analysis to 
be able to truly interpret the intent of the activity in the absence of a guilty party. 
2.4.8 Denial of Service 
In what is still claimed to have been, somewhat implausibly an accident, Robert Morris, 
the son of a prominent security expert (who was engaged by the United States 
Government) released onto the commercial networks of the time, what we now know as 
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a worm. In 1988 Morris wrote, reportedly as an intellectual exercise, a computer 
program which would gauge the size of the then Internet, i.e. the number of systems 
connected by that common network grid. The tool supposedly misfired and essentially 
brought commercial and, although unconfirmed, some restricted military networks to a 
standstill. This effectively created the first “Denial of Service” attack, or one which 
fatally interrupts the normal flow of traffic to a network site.  
2.5 Network forensics 
It is suggested that some knowledge points are to be taken from the experiences of the 
European Union (EU) (Rosenberg, 2007). To provide some background, we had been 
presented with claims that the network forensics profession was in need of standards 
and standardised tool sets. In 2003 the EU released the first global network forensics 
standards, which it intended at least all EU nations to implement. It argued that these 
standards were clearly presented and strongly promoted, but claimed that they were 
unsuccessful, concluding that the computer security community within the EU appeared 
to have rejected or ignored these forensic tools. Similarly the EU body claimed a 
complete indifference to the call to use them (Rosenberg, 2007). Unfortunately there is 
no associated evidence as such, or research presented in the Rosenberg work, or indeed 
any details of the standards themselves which would support the description of them 
being network forensics standards. 
Asking how this happened, Rosenberg suggests, rhetorically, that the answer could lie 
with the standards themselves, finally providing us a better hint of the standards under 
review by suggesting:  
“The EU's recommended forensic applications were Web-based freeware, written in 
XML. This design was well intentioned and practical, given the EU member nations' 
varying rules of evidence. However, XML is slow, and quickly has become outmoded; a 
Web-based application's value depends on its browser and network connection; and as 
a way to gather evidence in a high-stakes judicial case, freeware is a dicey solution” 
(Rosenberg, 2007, p. 1).  
33 
 
What we then gather is that the proposed tool set for network security is in fact what is 
being termed network forensics standards, and “resounding” call for clarity in the field 
in that work would seem even is clouded by the arguments therein. There is nothing 
here that this researcher would suggest is not happening around the industry. Terms and 
jargon are being reused in many arguments without proper definition, so no one use of a 
term can be classed as wrong merely because it does not reflect the understanding of the 
other person. The argument is carried in so much as that without clear definition of 
terms and expectations, confusion will continue. Neither is this any different from other 
Information Technology specialisations. In a paper released on the 15th April 2010, the 
Security Awareness Special Interest Group (SASIG) and the Information Security 
Awareness Forum (ISAF) launched their paper on convergence, designed to help people 
in the security profession understand the convergence of risks across traditional and IT 
security fields. In summary, a paper designed to help clear up confusions (ISAF, 2010). 
In this paper Information security was then variously called, “Digital Security, IT 
Security, Data Security, Intangible Assets” (ISAF, 2010, p. 1). Clearly, no such 
promised clarity of definition even in the Information Security profession, and hardly a 
success in clearing confusions.  
Rosenberg expands criticisms of the EU suggestions by discussing the fact that 
companies may not want to pay for tools when they do not use them, which would seem 
to be a sensible challenge. The extensive referrals to the United States National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) could suggest that there is a bias to present the 
NIST work as a worldwide standards accreditation body, and therefore no need for any 
other country to go to the effort. To continue with a further extract of the article; 
“ Commercial network forensic and analysis tools are common now, and need not be 
highly elaborate or expensive to provide users with complete and easy-to-understand 
data. Manufacturers of forensic and visibility tool kits should partner with standards 
bodies such as NIST, to create functional and lasting standards for network forensics. 
Network forensics is growing more important. Standardized tools and methods will ease 
the job for network researchers and expert witnesses, and will be an improvement to the 
judicial system itself“ (Rosenberg , 2007, p. 1). 
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It is relevant to take the page space to relate exact wording here as it is important for the 
Thesis to remind that there are also sometimes national interests at stake in the proper 
functioning of data forensics as a profession.  
2.6 Early forensics work 
Without expertise in forensically tracing the intricacies of the Morris worm, neither the 
eradication of its effect or the prosecution of its creator would have been possible. 
Perhaps the arguments that Taal (2007) presents of not having the expertise available, to 
understand the intricacies of the crimes, at least in this case, would seem to be opposed 
by the evidence presented here. Therefore, this Thesis will not rely heavily on the 
outcomes of that research, but will of course consider some of the very interesting and 
pertinent challenges presented, along with the respected opinions of that researcher in 
that paper Taal (2007). 
Long before the World Wide Web was in general use, and before most countries had 
legislation to formally handle computer crime or hacking, there was already a need to 
gather information on nefarious acts in the commercial sector. The need was to 
understand, and therefore mitigate, weaknesses in the increasingly rapid adoption of 
newer technologies and methodologies of computer use. The arguments and challenges 
this Thesis is referencing from earlier research in the 1980s and 1990s are unfortunately 
therefore just as valid and current as those from this decade, little seems to have 
changed therefore in the area of commercial sector governance of data forensics. 
The further reason for extending the detail of these three early examples of computer 
forensics here (CCC, Mitnik, Morris) is to rebuff many arguments that computer 
forensics skills are new and relatively unavailable. By reviewing the cases above, it is 
clear that we must have had properly experienced experts available. They were able to 
understand events, gauge the impact of the activities on systems, and importantly 
decompose evidence found on systems into understandable chunks. Only by this 
expertise could prevention, remediation and prosecution have occurred. This is then 
variously known as computer, data, system or network forensics. This Thesis contends 
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that these skills have been available almost as long as the infractions have been 
occurring, and yet the systematic professionalism of these skills is still under discussion. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the questions, and direction used to perform the research as 
well as some of the guidance that has gone before in the area of governance 
professionalism, and certification. It has explored the discussions on the emerging field 
and the various opinions that are shaping its future evolution. The definitions hopefully 
will serve as the discussion continues and more detail is added to the need for 
governance in the sector. 
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3 Crime Scene, Evidence, Laboratory, Presentation 
One of the basic challenges outlined in the thinking for this research, and indeed in the 
experience of this researcher was how to sensibly provide for proper evidential 
procedure in the private sector during the forensically sound acquisition of forensic 
data. This chapter explores some of the shortcomings of current practice, outlines some 
of the more critical mistakes that have been publicised, and importantly considers recent 
guidance that is growing in how to correct the situation. 
“The Association of Chief Police Officers is expected to announce new guidelines 
informing businesses how they should store and treat information they believe will be 
used in computer crime cases; and the Institute of Information Security Professionals 
says that it will be announcing long-awaited plans for a registration scheme within the 
next two months” (Warren, 2007, p. 2). 
This above extract summarises the basis of the evidence section that follows. The 
private sector, whilst perhaps sometimes being on the forefront of the forensic 
profession in terms of investment and tools, is almost always behind the public sector in 
the area of governance and controls. The Thesis explores the rapidly changing computer 
landscape, and how the forensics profession is having to evolve just as quickly to keep 
pace, even without the benefit of strong controls and guidance. This chapter also 
outlines some of the challenges that are presented to investigators, and having laid out 
the possible errors that can be made, will open up avenues for discussion in later 
sections as to how to control or rectify these errors. 
The laboratory section explores in some depth the actual workings of forensic 
investigations. It reviews in detail some of the areas that an investigator is required to 
possess knowledge of, and explores some of the basics of data manipulation on 
computer systems that forensic investigators rely upon to be successful. It challenges 
some thinking around the level to which an investigator should be experienced and 
provides for some suggestions, to be followed up in the training section about how these 
knowledge requirements could be met. 
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Finally, the presentation section explores an area that is largely ignored in current 
technical forensics research, the presentation of outputs. Whilst research tends to be 
specific and focused on a particular area of forensics such as recovery algorithms, bad 
disk areas and suchlike, the broad nature of this Thesis requires that the profession of 
forensics be reviewed as a whole and the integrity of the profession be provided with 
guidance and suggested controls as part of the conclusions. An investigator must be able 
in some manner to present the outcome of an investigation in a professional and concise 
manner in order that the basic challenges against that output, and understanding of the 
conclusions can be made. 
Whilst it has been a repeated statement that this research is aimed at the provision of 
support to a code of conduct and governance around private sector investigations, it is 
relevant to detail the excellent prior work in the public sector in documenting their 
suggested procedures. 
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is tasked with providing good 
guidance and best practice in the UK criminal policing sector.  
The four ACPO forensics principles (ACPO, 2009) are outlined here to understand the 
perceived basis of need.  
Principle 1: No action taken by law enforcement agencies or their agents should 
change data held on a computer or storage media which may subsequently be relied 
upon in court. 
Figure 1 ACPO Principle 1 
 
Principle 2: In exceptional circumstances, where a person finds it necessary to access 
original data held on a computer or on storage media, that person must be competent 
to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of 
their actions. 
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Figure 2 ACPO Principle 2 
 
Principle 3: An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer based 
electronic evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third party 
should be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
Figure 3 ACPO Principle 3 
 
Principle 4: The person in charge of the investigation (the case officer) has overall 
responsibility for ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to. 
Figure 4 ACPO Principle 4 
(ACPO, 2009, p. 6). 
Data Clinic Limited (DCL), a commercial forensics service offer what is probably the 
most succinct explanation of what the ACPO principles are aimed to deliver (DCL, 
2009). In presenting an explanatory view of the principles, DCL argue that computer 
based electronic evidence is no different from text contained within a document. DCL 
conclude that for this reason, the principles in fact state that the computer forensic 
evidence is subject to the same rules and laws that apply to documentary evidence. 
The ACPO guide, is written to provide guidance on public sector forensics, and DCL 
explain;  
 “the doctrine of documentary evidence may be explained thus: the onus is on the 
prosecution to show to the court that the evidence produced is no more and no less now 
than when it was first taken into the possession of police” (DCL, 2009, p. 3). 
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3.1 Privacy 
Investigators in corporates, in general, rely upon the widely held premise that the 
company owns, or at least has a right to monitor and manage, all the data on its 
associated systems. This is an understandable but controversial argument (Livio, 2010; 
Wesche, 2002; privacy.org, 1993). If an entity hires a painter, provides a canvas and 
nourishment and remunerates the painter to paint a scene, it can be assumed that the 
painting belongs to the entity to do with it as it sees fit. Similarly, if a reporter, working 
for a newspaper provides a ground breaking story, it is usual to assume that the 
newspaper and not the reporter owns the copyright to that story. These arguments cover 
the ownership of intellectual property. Similarly, discussions around the coffee machine 
or in a hallway traditionally have been regarded as private and personal, and rarely 
would there be an expectation of any commercial enterprise monitoring and recording 
such conversations. With data on a computer system however, it can be argued that it is 
not that easy to define the boundaries of privacy and intellectual property. Data has 
many forms and is gathered in many ways. Because of the nature of computers, and in 
particular so called Personal Computers, there are activities that are sometimes 
performed by the employee or office user that may be regarded as personal or indeed 
secret. Analogies abound, but this Thesis suggests that in an office environment, if an 
employer were to act upon, or monitor discussions that are held in the canteen or coffee 
areas, totally unrelated to the work activities then the basics of personal privacy can be 
held to have been breached.  
What is not so clear is the recording of telephone calls for example, to meet legislative 
requirements. These calls are often difficult to separate from personal calls that are often 
tolerated to some degree by organisations. Only by opening the call record can the 
contents be understood, and by then it can be claimed that personal privacy has already 
potentially been breached. The discussions around why employees should have 
expectation of privacy in the workplace are legion, and more rigorous than simplified 
here (Livio, 2010; Boren and Gates, 1994; privacy.org, 1993). Suffice to relate that 
many companies do hold that any data created on systems provided by them to perform 
work activities is “fair game” to review in an investigation, irrespective of the 
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provenance of the data. The most notable challenge to this was by Innamoroto and 
Krulewicz (2009) in a review of a case in the San Francisco court system, where they 
successfully challenged the right of an employer to read private, or non-business related 
email. It is worth noting here that throughout, the Thesis is aimed at the private sector, 
and its forensic activities. Companies exist to make a profit, and part of that profit 
making in rounded terms involves the taking of risk. One of the risks that this Thesis 
suggests is that companies are not always properly advised in the exact boundaries of 
legal and illegal behaviour in the analysis of systems that may hold personal or private 
data. In some cases, the experience of this researcher is that even if an investigation 
crosses legal boundaries, companies may condone the continuance of the activity to 
ensure an outcome of the investigation, perhaps better paraphrased as hoping not to get 
caught.  
3.2 Ethics 
Ethics, relate to a series of beliefs. Every person has ethics, they stem from personal and 
societal values as accepted by that person. This makes the commonality of ethics 
difficult to define as each society and educational system will instil a different set of 
ethics. Whilst people may all have the same regulation, a common set of rules, their 
ethical values, that is what they believe rather than are forced to follow will differ.  
As discussed above, once an investigator strays from the narrow focus of the primary 
investigation, for whatever reason, investigators have been seen to act with questionable 
moral or ethical boundaries in the pursuit of information gathering against a target. For 
example, this may involve. the expansion from reviewing what is clearly company data 
to perhaps personal and private data and therefore straying into potentially unethical or 
even illegal activities, 
“An existing corporate client telephoned our offices late one Friday evening requesting 
an urgent meeting due to the fact that he suspected that his business partner was using 
their offices, facilities and finance to launch his own business. International Intelligence 
Limited were tasked to carry out an in depth investigation into this individual, his 
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personal finances and to obtain intelligence via investigation and electronic 
surveillance in order to obtain leverage to force a resignation or face prosecution. We 
were able to obtain information from our client’s computer and telephone system, thus 
providing recordings of conversations and also emails proving that the target was 
indeed going into competition with his (at the time) business partner. As a result of our 
investigations we were able to provide enough evidence to force the Director to resign. 
He willingly took that option rather than going through lengthy legal channels” (IIL, 
2009, p. 1). 
Clearly, in the IIL example, there were no expectations of the investigator that the 
Director of the target company would be granted any privacy on his computer system, 
or telephone system. As is generally expected in such cases, or at least in the experience 
of the researcher, instead of reverting to the powers of law, in what could arguably be 
classed as a case of computer hacking, if not simply a breach of privacy, the target 
folded and ran. Grobler & Louwrens (2006) poignantly argue that not all investigative 
actions that are clearly legal can automatically assumed to be ethical. Commercial 
investigations are often based on a hunch, suspicion or sometimes plain curiosity. This 
Thesis suggests, that this driver is in vivid contrast to a police (magistrates) search 
warrant in the UK for example, which specifies exactly the boundaries that any 
investigation must remain within and the justifiable reasons for the search. Any stepping 
outside the boundaries and scope of the agreed search warrant can, and often has, 
caused a failed prosecution, even in the face of blatant guilt. Once again, this relates to 
the British (criminal) justice systems overarching desire to follow due process, 
sometimes at the detriment of truth and justice, previously mentioned in Section 1.9 
(research background). 
 
3.3 Crime scene 
In traditional forensics terms, a crime scene is usually able to be physically segregated 
and cordoned off until the investigating officer is confident that enough evidence has 
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been gathered, or that there is no further value in segregating the area. We imagine 
things like shootings, suicides, armed robberies and bombings as crime scenes, all well-
defined areas bounded by assumed relevance to the criminal event. The crime scene a 
computer forensic investigator is faced with is rarely so well defined. Usually an 
unexpected failure or interruption will cause either a suspicion or claim that data may be 
available on a computer system, to prove or disprove the particular event, or series of 
events. A first responder in a computer forensic investigation is generally the computer 
user or system operator of that system. To provide a parallel, it is not dissimilar to the 
victim of a violent crime being asked to cordon off their particular understanding of the 
crime scene in case evidence of the crime be available. In the case of such computer 
crimes, the first responder (the user) can in some cases also be the miscreant, and this 
has to be taken into account when managing computer forensics cases. This is the first 
area that has evolved in this research, namely if proper evidential procedures are 
expected to be followed, and indeed they must if proper investigative procedure can be 
depended upon, then it is clear that evidential first responders absolutely must have 
proper and relevant training, and also must be properly selected. This training would 
encompass the proper seizure of computer systems, relevant media controls and 
evidential triage.  
3.4 Seizure  
Any device that is used to capture data evidence must be certified as free from 
contamination. Just as in traditional crime forensics where the scene of crime responder 
would use gloves and sterile receptacles to gather evidence, so should any data devices 
or containers used in computer forensics also be sterile. In some cases, where electro-
magnetic interference is a concern, such as in areas of high voltage or microwaves, then 
Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) shielded carriers may need to be used. Properly trained 
and aware first responders would be fully au fait with the need in such cases. 
Traditionally, when computer media was delivered from the factory, it was contained in 
anti-static bags to ensure that any on-board electronics could not be contaminated by 
static or other electronic discharges. It is accepted good practice to maintain this method 
43 
 
of transport for any media that could possibly be affected by static or other discharge to 
prevent any such issues. 
3.5 Media 
 In most forensic captures, there will be the potential to make either a search based 
extraction, for example from a large server farm, or in the case of a single or small 
system, full disk capture. The media used should be certified clean and malware free, 
and there are discussions as to what this would entail (Guidance Software, 2004). 
Whilst this research has not concentrated specifically upon targeted malware, as this is a 
different subject area, it would be certainly a very useful research area. Brand, Valli and 
Woodward (2010) presented a paper on the subject in Perth during the Edith Cowan 
Digital Forensics conference, offering an interesting analysis methodology. The paper 
concentrated more on the intent of the malware however, importantly the background 
information and supporting research was very enlightening. Another area of current 
research is that of looking at methodologies for future use to properly certify media as 
being as free of contamination as is as reasonable to expect. In discussions with 
involved researchers, it is apparent that the University of Glamorgan is already doing 
extensive research into the verification and clarification of these challenges 
(Glamorgan, 2010). 
3.6 Triage 
 As we will see in the training and certification chapters (Chapter 6, Chapter 7), the aim 
of the first responder is to categorise evidential capture in the most effective manner. 
This can be in the form of urgency for example where data is likely to change or be 
overwritten, or in some cases where the devices are in a state of decay. It also should 
classify any reasoning for using search techniques to selectively extract relevant data in 
the cases described above. Triage has the same effect in computer forensics as in any 
other use of the word. It uses a methodology, usually based on urgency, perceived 
importance and viability of item to ensure that effort is expended in the most efficient 
and productive manner possible. Obviously, just as in an emergency accident situation 
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where an on the scene doctor would triage victims for survivability, then a forensics 
analyst will triage artefacts during acquisition to ensure the best outcome of the effort. 
3.7 Solvability factors 
Mendell (1998) offers a comprehensive list of solvability factors. These factors have 
been in use by many operators in the field, particularly in the USA for a long time and 
these arguably should be considered before the evidence capture process is begun. In the 
absence of any other checklist, they form a basis on which an analyst may be given 
hints as to how and where to triage, if not concentrate search efforts: 
3.7.1 Modus Operandi (MO) 
“A unique Modus Operandi speaks from the crime scene or from the fact pattern 
surrounding the scene.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
Given that the majority of forensic analysts, presented with a crime scene, or tasked 
with a data recovery will have had prior experience, it is proper to expect them to apply 
previous knowledge and experience in assessing the viability of effort. For example, in 
the relatively early evolution of the Internet, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), 
then the second largest computer manufacturer held user symposiums yearly for their 
current and prospective purchasers. The Digital Equipment Users Society (DECUS) was 
provided with the facilities to review new versions of operating systems, try out 
prototype systems etc., usually under non-disclosure, but in many cases open access to 
front ends of systems. There were also many presentations by DEC specialists as well as 
DEC users on various subjects, for example DECUS Cannes, France in 1992 (DECUS 
1992). The Digital Equipment Security teams would be supporting the event, ensuring 
that disruption of these systems by malfeasants was kept to a minimum by monitoring 
keyboard activities on the floor of the exhibits. Quickly, year after year it became very 
easy to spot the body language and activity characteristics of those who had come to be 
other than curious. This is one example where a known MO was used to identify a need 
for forensic (or other) intervention. 
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3.7.2 Persons 
“Only one person or a limited number of people could have committed the computer 
crime.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
In many situations where closed offices are involved, inexperienced analysts will jump 
to a conclusion that door entry records or building control records are adequate to assign 
a specific body to a place and time. In many cases this has been the avenue to total 
waste of effort, and sometimes wrongful accusations. The factor above is as much 
around understanding how multiple people could NOT have committed as much as 
COULD have. Access cards can be stolen and swapped, passwords shared and 
compromised, keys forged and doors left open. Certainly the challenge of integrity of 
passwords and therefore used to prove who had access has long been dismissed as 
useful by most analysts. In specific situations where physical controls prove that system 
access was only possible by named individuals, such as in a the case of a disconnected 
computer, can an analyst use presence as sole indicator. 
3.7.3 Physical 
“Strong physical evidence found at the crime scene.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
This factor in essence speaks for itself. If evidence is appropriate to the investigation 
and suggests a sound theory of culpability, then it would be appropriate to proceed with 
the investigation, expecting a solution”. 
3.7.4 Software 
“Software or software tools discovered in unauthorised hands.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
In most modern societies, software theft is a criminal offence, if not just a copyright 
issue. Given that an analyst is aware of software seemingly stolen or misappropriated, it 
is in most cases reasonable to expect a probability other evidence of non-conformance 
to societal rules. If the investigation (as most are) involves uncovering miscreant 
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behaviour, then stolen software would seem to be one good indicator of character either 
of the user or owner of the system under review. 
3.7.5 Honeypot 
Activity occurs on trapped files (latterly known as a honeypot). (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
Honeypots have been in uses since the very earliest attacks, including some of those 
mentioned earlier (Mitnick, Morris, CCC). There are various types of honeypot, at least 
in terms of computer security, and most are very well detailed by Spitzner in a 2003 
paper (Spitzner, 2003). Essentially the aim of a honey pot is to perform activities using 
a simulated environment that purports to be a real system or application. It is intended to 
mimic the actual target of a malicious attack, fool the operator (system or person) 
enough to continue the effort and gather enough modus operandi on the attack to be 
able to dissuade, prevent or defend in future. 
3.7.6 Selling 
“Offers to sell proprietary information to third parties. “(Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
Where commercial activities are under threat from loss of intellectual property (IP) or 
more recently disclosure of personal or financial data, a great deal of forensics 
investigations are concentrated on data loss investigations. Often companies are less 
aware of the value of their information than some of their less trustworthy employees, 
or criminals that hack into their systems. An indicator of the potential for an 
investigation to succeed is if there is real evidence that data has in fact been 
compromised. One of the most obvious ways to uncover this is if a third party offers 
indicators that they have been approached. Caution is to be applied though, as many 
data leak sources are never uncovered, owing to the ubiquitous nature of many elements 
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3.7.7 Malicious code  
“Malicious code or spam that has a traceable return path.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
Again, caution could be applied, and it is in that the prevalence of network address 
spoofing was very much less prevalent when Mendell was writing these factors than 
today. Essentially any network address in the current Internet protocol (IP) V5 range 
can be spoofed with relative certainty, and there are discussions of whether even IP V6 
in its current form will resolve the issue. Spoofing is a fairly technical concept and is 
properly outlined by Farrow (2000). Essentially when a packet or message is sent, it 
carries a sender and return address. That address can be altered either by the sending 
actor, or intercepted and altered in some cases to point to a location other from which it 
originated. This can be worked to the extreme where victims can be at both ends of the 
attack, the spoof address can sometimes be attacked unwittingly by receiver of the 
primary attack in supposed retaliation, causing an escalation of traffic both ways, 
making analysis even more difficult. 
3.7.8 Code altered 
“Unauthorized alteration to code that can be tracked back.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
Later, in Section 3.19 we will discuss in more depth, the use of Metadata by programs 
and some of the challenges hasty conclusions using that data can bring. Suffice at this 
point to highlight that most modern application suites contain supporting log and 
snapshot evidence to show when data files have been altered. In most cases, such as 
word processing and spread sheet programs these are to ensure recovery in the case of 
accidental or catastrophic deletion of work, they are also there for audit purposes where 
records are required to be kept for example in a financial services environment. Often 
successive versions of data files will be resident whether in a visible or forensically 
recoverable state, to help show certain file changes were made on a specific system. 
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3.7.9 Cause and effect 
“Losses or incidents tied to a specific time or event. A cause and effect relationship 
exists.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
Most commercial forensic tool suites carry a timeline viewer to enable the analyst to set 
out recovered artefacts in a chronological view. Very rarely is a computer failure or 
breach the result of one specific action, it is more usual that a succession of failures 
leads to a failure or breach. By plotting the various failures, activities of actors and 
recovered artefacts against the timeline, it is often easier to build a proper picture of the 
event leading to the incident in question. As we will see later in Section 6.9 (data 
presenter), pictures are very useful in producing compelling evidence of failures for lay 
persons. 
3.7.10 Accounts 
“Unexplained system or user account changes.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16).  
In many investigations, the best indicators of untoward activities on systems is in the 
area of user accounts. Malware creators have realised over time that to gain value from 
their actions, they have to recover or retrieve data (assuming theft, espionage or 
blackmail). To enable this in the simplest manner, creating an account or modifying 
access to one already in existence as part of the attack provides this facility. Another 
avenue is where a password to an account has been altered or revoked, depriving the 
owner of that account their rightful access, an sometimes providing for impersonation of 
that person. 
3.7.11 Mail traffic 
“The sudden receipt of a large amount of abusive mail or spam.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 
16). 
This indicator is one that is not immediately apparent in some aspect. Certainly the most 
obvious case is where a system is under attack such as a denial of service. Less obvious 
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is where the user of the system, where that is the suspect actor has been more active on 
other sites, and as such has attracted attention. 
3.7.12 Media contaminated 
“Malicious code in media received via a delivery service.” (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
Again, given the dating of the excerpt, media was as likely to be the method of transport 
for data as the Internet, and as such there was likelihood that media carried malware. 
This indicator could be modernised looking for malware in the delivery of code via a 
download service for example. 
3.7.13 Internet talk 
“Malicious statements on the Internet attributable to particular sources.” (Mendell, 
1998, p. 16).  
As social media permeates almost every part of commercial enterprise and the 
propensity of people to speak their mind goes on unabated, the number of investigations 
involved in recovering, analysing and reporting social media infractions against persons 
or enterprises will surely grow. This is indeed a very topical indicator in 2012 when we 
look at the furore around people making what they claim to be innocuous asides on 
Twitter in the Newsnight paedophile accusations. 
“The Tory peer has asked users who posted malicious claims in the wake of the BBC 
Newsnight investigation, and who have less than 500 followers, to apologise and donate 
to Children in Need” (Evans, 2012, p.1).  
 
3.7.14 Associated intel 
“Strong intelligence leads which identify likely suspects”. (Mendell, 1998, p. 16). 
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This is relatively self-explanatory, but does leave the investigator with a choice to make 
as to what defines “strong”. Once again we have to hope that the experience of the 
investigator and the performance of investigations leave him with a gut feel (Ball, 
2004), this gut feel is discussed later in Chapter 7.  
3.8 The Evidence 
Traditional forensic (scene of crime) evidential procedures and computer forensic 
procedures exhibit similar needs. O’Hara (1994) argues that any evidence presented in 
court should be in practically the same condition as when it was found. This can be 
properly extrapolated into computer evidence where it should be shown to be 
reproducible (if copies are used) to the same state as when it was first gathered. O’Hara 
concludes that evidence should be properly protected from the first gathering to the final 
production in a case in court or archiving at the end of an investigative process. This is 
supported by a statement from a governmental committee, the Select Committee on 
Science and Technology (SCST, 2006) that was set up to oversee the formulation of a 
watchdog body for public sector forensics in the UK. 
 “We recommend that the Government establish a cross-departmental group, bringing 
in experts from industry and academia, to develop a more co-ordinated approach to 
data collection in future. This should include a classification scheme for recording the 
incidence of all forms of e-crime. Such a scheme should cover not just Internet-specific 
crimes, such as Distributed Denial of Service attacks, but also e-enabled crimes—that is 
to say, traditional crimes committed by electronic means or where there is a significant 
electronic aspect to their commission” (SCST, 2006, p. 3). 
3.9 Legitimacy 
O’Hara (1994) argues that courts, whilst not usually predisposed to take into account 
opinion, in the case of specialists such as forensic investigators, are more likely to be 
swayed by the opinion of such a specialist than they would by the average layman. 
There is considerable discomfort in professional circles around the power that this 
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brings as well as the accountability that is forced on the investigator by default because 
of this phenomenon. 
Mendell (1998) suggests that computer systems themselves embody authority, and that 
an illusion of legitimacy is created by the technical knowledge associated with them. 
Mendell also states that investigators should not let that illusion cloud their judgements, 
simply because the information is there in a digital format does not make it genuine or 
authentic. Similarly, the authentication of a message should not be assumed to be 
genuine without other collaborative evidence as to the originator. Further people often 
assume new personas in cyberspace, offering further challenges to the provenance of 
data:  
“Cyberspace offers many masks to hide behind” (Mendell, 1998, p. 46). 
The popular press has been particularly active in the furthering of ideas that a person 
can immediately be identified because of data in a particular stream. These current ideas 
would seem to stem from the so-called experts who have rushed to capitalise on this 
frenzy of litigation. Take the aggressive press release statements presumably jointly 
formed between the lawyers and experts working on the McAlpine case of 2012. 
“Lord McAlpine has hired a team of experts who have collated a “very long list” of 
people and their offending messages, even those that have been deleted…More than 
1,000 original tweets and 9,000 retweets have already been identified. We have been 
watching people who have been taking down what they put on Twitter. We already have 
all the information. We have found a couple of firms of experts who have produced 
pretweets, post-tweets, the effect of the tweets and the retweets. What starts at one ends 
up as 100,000 in some cases.”  (Evans, 2012, p.1) 
At this point (late November 2012) there have been no related civil or criminal cases 
where an accused person has defended against tweet allegations using arguments such 
as the Trojan claim (Leyden, 2003). This whole discussion around the Newsnight / 
McAlpine issue may indeed prove to be very valuable for the forensic profession as a 
whole as it may help to dispel some of the black magic reputation of data forensics 
sometimes held (Evans, 2012; Ball, 2004). 
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3.10 Identity and persona 
This assuming of another identity, or indeed multiple identities on the World Wide Web 
is a normal activity, and recently greatly extended in the personas found in virtual 
environments such as Second Life. Second Life is a virtual reality world where real 
people design a complete persona, wardrobe and social background for their chosen 
virtual character (Linden Research, 2010). Reality and virtual reality blur in many cases, 
and there are examples that defy comprehension without understanding the depth to 
which people become attached to their virtual personas. Japanese police arrested a 
woman in 2008 for reportedly murdering her virtual husband (Parry, 2008). In the USA, 
a woman murdered her real world partner after finding he was having a virtual affair 
using his persona with another virtual body (Stanage, 2007). The first Second Life dollar 
millionaire was crowned in 2006 who was selling what is in effect non-existent land that 
has a temporary state purely in the electronic memory of a computer system somewhere 
(Hof, 2006). Importantly, none of the Second Life assets are backed by any real world 
funds. It could be argued that similar activities in trading networks create non-existent 
funds such as stock markets or forex trades, but these are intended eventually to 
translate back to real world funds, whereas Second Life assets are not. We must never 
assume that any persona we uncover in data is bone fide (i.e. believable) or correlates to 
a real person. As a scientific investigator at a crime scene, we would then be dragged 
into the world of opinion should we resort to such a conclusion. 
3.11 Data gathering 
All data gathered during an investigation has value of some kind. It is the duty of the 
investigator to provide reasonably argued conclusions as to the relevance of the data 
being presented. Data moves around computer systems in different forms at different 
times, but usually will be in a reproducible and recordable format when it is on a data 
storage medium of some type. Dependent upon the type of device, this may be a one-
time copy that the investigator is presented with, as in the case of a volatile media such 
as solid state memory (PCMAG, 1996) or even a snapshot stored to disk as in the case 
of network traffic. It is important to the investigative process that wherever possible, the 
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original or primary data not be used for any analysis, but an exact copy be used. This 
has two benefits, if the investigation has to be restarted, to follow a different path, then 
the slate can be wiped, but also in cases where there is a defence party, the defence 
investigation team has exactly the same underlying data to work from as the challenger. 
Again, to be clear here, this Thesis presents the term challenger to try to retain the 
concept that this work is about the civil or commercial investigative process, not the 
public prosecutor. Due evidential process is central to all the challenges that this 
research is presenting, no matter which area is the intended outcome, civil or criminal. 
What constitutes due process has to be properly defined and agreed by interested parties 
before any evidence collection or triage is performed. 
It is widely accepted that any data device prepared for investigative capture should be in 
the most reasonable state of acquiescence possible (Carvey, 2007a; ACPO, 2007; 
Guidance Software, 2004). Traditionally this has meant for hard disks or drives that the 
system in question was either idled, or physically powered off. Systems that have power 
applied cannot be ever assumed to be truly acquiesced as error management routines as 
well as system clocks still continue to function. This can be provided by means of 
batteries on board the machine, or by trickle power such as in a standby state that (as a 
representative example) most audio-visual devices generally have. Public sector 
guidelines, as for example, the ACPO guide (ACPO, 2009; ACPO, 2007) or FBI guide 
(FBI, 2007) therefore have, in the past, instructed first responders to immediately shut 
off all external power supplies and / or disconnect hard drives from the system 
motherboard to ensure no contamination or further data loss be possible. As systems 
have evolved to using more intelligent disks, and indeed memory chip only devices that 
lose their contents when power is removed, guidelines are having to be revisited. 
Overall, the advice now must be reformulated to provide triage at first entry, rather than 
an encompassing all power-off as in the past. Of course, triage takes time, and time is 
not always available. At the recent (October 2012) IT Security Forum in London where 
the researcher was presenting alongside the respected Professor P. Sommer described as 
Digital Evidence & CyberSecurity Expert the opportunity was taken to discuss this 
Thesis. In particular the aspect of acquiescence of systems in the current environment 
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was discussed and centred around the triage of potential evidence, and of course copious 
notes on the process of the investigation.  
Extreme, but nonetheless interesting visualisations of the gathering challenges faced are 
the semi fictional movie sequences of computer hackers and evil enemies “zapping” 
disks in microwave ovens and degaussing (high powered magnetic force to reset the 
iron filings on data surfaces) pads being run up and down the front of systems in the 
movie War Games (1983), memories being erased by intelligent “bugs” in The Matrix 
(1999) or blasted by electron bombs in Gamer (2009). Reality is very often far from that 
presented in the movies, but the examples are poignant enough to bring the speed of 
triage point across, action must be taken quickly and thoughtfully. This also properly 
introduces a challenge that this research is presenting, the validity of evidence presented 
should be based on physical proof or testimony. In a perfect world, any evidence 
presented to a deciding authority which is in the case of the private sector as likely to be 
a business manager as a judge, would be safely stored in Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) 
protected containers, copied in a bit stream copy that can be replicated as many times as 
needed without recourse to the original. Corresponding original files or data entities 
presented would be in their original readable state.  
The unfortunate reality is that most systems in the current information era are “always-
on”, in that the ability to shut them down, or indeed interrupt their operation is very 
limited. Therefore a first responder has to make an executive decision, whether before 
the evidence is seen, or at first sight, as to what data could safely (in the legal sense) be 
gathered to support the case under investigation. Having decided this, the training 
referred to in Section 6.2, will help that person in becoming singular minded in 
gathering what data is needed for that task. A qualitative view can be presented of any 
ancillary data that may be relevant, and most importantly the proper recording of the 
exact circumstances of the capture will also be necessary. If one accepts that many 
systems just cannot be physically accessed and therefore acquiesced, usually because 
they reside in a different town, or in many cases, continent, then the data gathering has 
to be very carefully bounded with supporting data that can be used to properly frame the 
circumstances of that capture. To provide an analogy, the first responder, may, in the 
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case of these newer computing technologies, never be able to produce what is 
colloquially known as the smoking gun or indeed a dead body, to prove the event in 
question actually took place Doyle (1893). There may however, be enough 
circumstantial data in evidence to argue a reasonable case that the suspected activity 
was committed. It is this understanding that is critical for any further discussion on 
evidence, the problem of placing a person or a computer in a certain series of events 
with reasonable and arguable certainty. Again, to provide an analogy, with no witnesses 
to a car hit and run crime, the only evidence that will sometimes be available is that 
there is a body (the victim), fragments caused by the collision that will point to either a 
particular type of car, or if the car is found, a specific car. There may also be a 
reasonable series of circumstantial arguments about the habits of the owner or regular 
driver of that suspect car. Other circumstantial evidence can then be researched to 
narrow down the potential of improper conclusion. Computer forensics evidential 
procedure, and scene of crime triage is moving further towards snapshots of live data. 
As such these cannot be reasonably reproduced because of their inherent transient 
nature, therefore any investigation that depends upon the skills of the data gatherer to 
properly capture and store relevant facts is deeply reliant upon the professional qualities 
not only of that gatherer, but the training and expertise he brings to bear at that crucial 
point. 
The following comments on relatively recent digital disclosure legislation in the US, 
suggest that in all civil litigation it is the;  
“duty of the parties to preserve the evidence just as police freeze the scene in a criminal 
investigation” (Kelman, 2009, p. 1).  
Kelman also argues that a decade ago, calls for evidence preservation in commercial 
prosecution or contractual litigation cases used to mean purely looking at computer 
networks and checking that clients had back-up tapes with a regular back-up cycle. 
Widening the scope of the challenge is the fact that today, communication can also be 
using Blackberries, E-mails, Instant Messaging and Texting. Some of the challenges 
introduced by growing automation are issues such as the fact E-mails may be responded 
to without user intervention. The advent of routine automation provides that transactions 
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relevant to the prosecution of a particular case may sometimes be made without actual 
human intervention – such as automated downloading materials from a website after 
completion of a web form. Kelman repeats the argument which many investigators 
know well, that multiple iterations, and therefore versions, of single documents will be 
captured as they go through their various stages of editing. It is the duty of the 
investigator to understand which version they are dealing with. Consider the more 
complicated example of the leaked dossier produced by the Cabinet Office in the Iraq 
war during 2002 which showed who had contributed to it and where the information 
came from (Washington Post, 2005). This example introduces the concept of Meta Data 
- the underlying signatures and data trails that exist in compound data sets. The 
arguments presented by Kelman (2009) firmly underpin a major theme that this Thesis 
is presenting, that evidential capture and preservation is no longer, if it can be argued 
ever to have been, an exact science. The continuing argument is that it will always be 
open to challenge as to the voracity of the process in any case involving the production 
of forensically acquired computer data. Peer review and common criteria then are the 
basis of moving forward. In the experience of the researcher, the Encase Certified 
Examiner examination process best mimics what is being called for (ENCE, 2010). The 
candidate attends a series of courses, or studies against a set curriculum to gain a certain 
level of expertise against the product set and methodologies. The candidature has to be 
supported by similarly experienced professionals, and in most cases is allocated an 
already certified peer as support. The candidate, having qualified against the experience 
and study requirements is provided with a test environment and a time frame in which 
to complete a report and a series of predictable forensic discoveries. The report is then 
submitted to a peer board and if successful the candidate is awarded the Encase 
Certified Examiner designation (ENCE, 2010). This certification is renewed by proving 
continuing study and / or experience across a three year period in a related subject, 
again peer reviewed. 
3.12 Contamination 
Evidential contamination is the single most worrisome and widely misunderstood trend 
in computer forensics. Because of the simplistic nature of the various tool sets and the 
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lack of certification or accreditation of their use, any private sector investigator 
providing evidence to any degree should be challenged as to the sterility of the evidence 
work bench that is in use. Data devices can be re-used multiple times to provide work 
areas for various investigations a practitioner will perform (Curley, 2010). Data that has 
previously resided on these devices can “bleed” into a newly commenced investigation, 
and as such seriously contaminate the evidence, potentially invalidating the case. It is 
good, and indeed arguably required, evidential procedure to reset the target data media 
contents to a predicted pattern, usually “1010” or “–FFFF”,  to ensure this 
contamination cannot possibly occur (DoD, 2006). Good practice further requires a peer 
investigator, who understands the challenge, to formally confirm the work area is thus 
cleaned before evidence is loaded for investigative review (Guidance Software, 2004). 
3.13 Calibration 
Prior to using any tools on the target data, the expected outcome of a series of 
calibration tests should be applied to the performance of the tool set. This is usually a 
search on a known environment as well as an extract and recovery of known-state data 
points. This effort also provides a final check that the tools about to be used are still 
repeatable in effect. Any outputs of tools that cannot be verified by a secondary check 
should never be relied upon as the sole means of evidence. Tool users that do not have 
an understanding of, for example, the file system that the tool set is rebuilding or 
extracting from should not be allowed to provide evidence that has not been verified by 
properly experienced peers (Curley, 2010). 
So once again we should explore the concept of selective data gathering for first 
responders, that is the capture of data, that according to their or collective experience, 
would be relevant and useful to the investigator. It is critical that the investigator 
understand that process, and also that there is sufficient handover of intent between the 
gatherer and investigator, to ensure that the methodology of thinking be understood 
(Curley, 2010; Ball, 2004). The disparity of data devices available to the investigator in 
the field to capture from and on to requires that a reasoned and methodical thought 
process has to be applied. This thought process applies both to the eventual need to 
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verify the integrity of the evidential trails and also to perhaps warrant the reliability of 
device. This activity will dissuade challenges of unsound practice, and therefore 
credibility of capture is not brought into question (Curley, 2010; Ball, 2004). Many 
researchers have quoted the Nintendo forensics methods, where analysis of forensic data 
is done with a Common Off The Shelf toolset (COTS) and conclusions and inferences 
are drawn by the output of the tool that are arguably outside of the actual knowledge 
boundaries of the investigator (Jones, 2008; Carvey 2007a; Ball, 2004). Whilst it is clear 
that an investigator should not rely solely on a tool to draw inferences or conclusions, it 
is difficult to suggest a more expedient solution in the current commercial investigative 
environment. Whatever underlying systems and mechanisms are used to provide 
support to the investigative process, the forensics community will always be on the edge 
of innovation, performing actions with systems and data that were never in the initial 
design specification (Marcella and Menendez, 2008). Recovering deleted files for 
example in the Microsoft Windows environment is a pertinent example. A simple file 
delete by a user merely shifts the file pointer to the wastebasket, something that we all 
have given thanks for at least once in our journey with the delete key. To properly erase 
a file record you need to use the shift delete (or equivalent) function, which destroys the 
pointer from connection to a directory. Because file operations are expensive, or time 
consuming in terms of efficiency in computer operations, the recorded data though is 
simply just left where it is, not actually cleaned or erased.  
3.14 File systems 
This is by necessity the simplest clinical and non-technical description of file deletion 
operations on Microsoft Windows and whilst this simplistic description probably begs 
more questions than answers, this Thesis is not about Microsoft Windows files systems. 
It is therefore not useful to expand further here on the relative designs of modern file 
systems, but suggest that for the purposes of discussions around file recovery the 
description suffices. Continuing, the fact that the actual data within the file is still, at 
that point in an undisturbed state, we can also expect many artefacts that accompany the 
file to be also similarly undisturbed, creating a nirvana for the recovery of surrounding 
events. Again, to refer back into the early stages of computing evolution, hard disks 
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were originally very small in relative terms, so on disk data areas would be overwritten 
relatively quickly as they were freed up. As such operating systems programmers did 
not have to worry about swathes of data being left around to be recovered either 
maliciously or forensically. As hard drives and other storage mediums grew larger, the 
expectation of data being overwritten dropped exponentially. As outlined in this 
example, the Microsoft Windows system is actually designed to use the largest 
contiguous piece of unallocated disk space for performance reasons. Smaller files, in 
many cases the very ones we look for as linking evidence, had very low probabilities 
that they would be overwritten. There is actually a side field of disk forensics that 
performs the analysis on residual magnetic patterns of hard drive data, or data 
remanence. This specialisation is generally known as magnetic force microscopy, and 
experts claim the ability to potentially enable data recovery in some cases after data file 
areas have been overwritten up to five or more times (Nanoscan, 2006; Gutmann, 1996; 
Veeravalli, 1987). There are also counter claims that this is purely urban myth, but in 
either case, this is so specialised it would be a distraction for this Thesis to explore in 
detail (Feenberg 2011). It is nonetheless important in the knowledge bank or tool chest 
of anyone attempting a critical recovery. As computer systems followed Moore’s law 
and multiplied consistently in size, the rotational speeds of disks did not keep up 
(Moore, 1965). The platter densities significantly did not correlate to the need to allow 
equivalently more data to be written on the same surfaces, therefore the hard disks in 
computer systems became severe limitations of processing speed (Mellor, 2009). This 
compound limitation is more correctly termed latency, i.e. the time it takes to bring the 
required data area on the disk to the read / write mechanism. 
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Rotational speed 
[rpm] 
Average 
latency [ms] 
15000 2ms 
10000 3ms 
7200 4.16ms 
5400 5.55ms 
4800 6.25ms 
Figure 5 Table of Latency to Speed Ratios 
To give some idea of the relative timings of these innovations, the first 10,000rpm disk 
was released in 1997 by Hitachi which can read 85Mb a second. Maxtor released their 
7000 series disk in 1991, rotating at 3500 rpm, which was then declared to be able to 
only require 37 seconds to read 26 Megabytes (sequentially). To put these two into 
context, the latest solid state disks, those that are made purely from solid state memory, 
typically have read speeds of 250+Mb per second. 
3.15 The streaming challenge 
Creatively, operating system designers decided that to enable faster writing to disks, 
instead of continually asking for small reserved chunks of data areas to fill, they would 
retrieve one large area and just stream data down into it in a contiguous fashion.  
The concept of streaming is in itself important to understand, as data can reach the disk 
surface, or at least the electronics in charge of writing to the surface, at different times 
from different processes (Bhat et al, 2007). This often means that different pipelines of 
data have to be held until the next slice of data arrives from each process large enough 
to warrant a flushing and writing to disk. The concept of that holding area is named 
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cache, as in an arms cache or suchlike (AMD, 2010). At points in the forensics analysis 
process it can be very important to understand if cache has been flushed to disk before 
capture of evidential data or not. Various complex algorithms evolved to optimise the 
allocated size of pre-arranged free area against the possibility of unwritten, and 
therefore wasted platter space. An investigator has to understand the workings of such 
algorithms and accordingly be able to predict whether not only if data belongs to a 
particular process stream or not, but more importantly if it is new or old (Hamilton, 
2009). As in many advances, this optimization and trade off of speed versus unwritten 
disk areas created what is arguably another basic branch of data forensics and recovery 
known as file slack (Hamilton, 2009). Slack space describes the end unused data area or 
file, reserved by a program in pre-arranged slices or chunks, but as yet unwritten. Data 
is written into that reserved area until the program has finished whatever operation it is 
undergoing. An end of file command is then properly dispatched to the writing 
application or system software (Hamilton, 2009). Immediately (in data pipeline terms) 
acknowledgement is sent back to the program that the cache for that process has been 
flushed or written to the device, the file end marker has been properly written and any 
other unused pre-allocated extents (or chunks) of disk are returned to the operating 
system for future use. Obviously, in this simplistic description we have not allowed for 
an error to be returned, but we will assume this is understood here as not particularly 
pertinent to the description. It is then and only then the file is marked as properly closed. 
If the program has not completely filled up the file extent allocated, data from the 
previous use of that disk area is then captured in time until a properly authorised 
program or application deletes that new reserved file and the pre-allocation cycle is 
restarted (Hamilton, 2009). Whilst this is a simplistic explanation, similar effects can be 
found in volatile memory - chip or random access memory (RAM) in other words, and 
as such the concept of slack space can be applied to any memory usage situation in file 
systems that exhibit the pre-allocation of fixed size extents (Garden, 2010). The extent 
to which this Thesis has gone to provide an understanding of this concept, perhaps more 
than other computer concepts, is because it is an important outline of the deep 
knowledge an evidence analyst or computer forensic investigator absolutely needs to 
possess. When an investigator is challenged to describe for example, why a telephone 
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number found in a seemingly non-connected file directory structure, or memory 
location, could in fact be contributory proof of a particular event, this expert knowledge 
will support any such statement. In all probability all a Nintendo tool set (Carvey, 
2007a) would state is that it found the number in file slack, with no supporting data. If 
the toolset is particularly advanced, it may also helpfully describe it as linked to a 
previous incarnation of a file that may have been in a relevant area to the investigation. 
Relevance can only be introduced by the investigator having a very deep understanding 
of the dénouement of the investigation.  
 “Having preserved all the evidence does not mean that all the preserved evidence is 
disclosable. Much of it will be duplicated and irrelevant” (Kelman, 2009, p. 1). 
Kelman is obviously well versed in computer or data forensics. The professional 
experience of this researcher strongly underpins the statement from Kelman. A way to 
explain this in lay terms is by having a general understanding of the methodologies of 
designers of operating systems attempts to increase the effective operation speed of the 
data storage device, usually known as, hard disks.  
 
Figure 6 Physical Characteristics of a Hard Disk 
Hard disks can in very simple terms be described as mechanical  as opposed to optical 
data storage devices made up of one or more rotating horizontal platters coated in iron 
filings (Hamilton, 2009). A read/write (R/W) head skims the surface of the platters as 
they spin, usually at 5600 or 7200 rpm, which have been consistently proven to be the 
optimum aero dynamic speeds for such applications (Mellor, 2009).  
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Electrical impulses or signals, timed to coincide with a particular filing passing under 
the head, set it positive or negative (thus altering the magnetic alignment). The head 
moves in and out towards and from the centre of the disk to align ready for the next 
write signal (Mellor, 2009). It is clear therefore that there are without doubt some 
physical limitations of the equipment that at a certain time become barriers to increased 
speed of data access. 
3.16 Data positioning 
It has been shown that rotational speeds cannot be arbitrarily varied with success 
(although in the first incarnations of hard disks there were attempts) because of the 
aerodynamics of the mechanical parts. The speed at which the arm moving the head can 
be operated in and out has some physical limitations but is generally predictable, so pre-
positioning the data write heads is possible with extreme accuracy (Hamilton, 2009).  
The outcome is that data writes are queued up to be written at the optimum place for the 
positioning of the head, and the prediction of the next read operation. Clearly, reads are 
much quicker than writes and as such leave a little spare time for positioning 
predictions. Add all this complexity to the file extent estimations above, and one can 
quickly see that the data has very little chance of ending up on a location on the disk 
close to the related file data written earlier.  
 
Figure 7 Fragemented files on disk platter 
 
This fragmentation then becomes a challenge when the data is being read back in to a 
program, as the read and write heads would be jumping all over the platter, and often in 
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multi platter hard disks, across platters. File system technologists therefore came up 
with algorithms to optimise the placement of data after it had been written when the 
system was not busy, and the concept of defragmentation was created (Darcy, 2002). 
3.17 Defragmentation 
Defragmentation does exactly what it says, it takes separate fragments of files and joins 
them back together, or more importantly, actually places them in consecutive read areas 
on disk, which is not always the same. During this optimization operation, 
defragmentation routines take a copy of the data and move it to its new position 
(Kleiman, 2006). It is important to remind that file systems do not actually routinely 
erase expired or released data in modern file systems. Therefore any data that was 
moved to a new location for performance purposes, the primary copy, or the area on 
disk from whence it came, still exists until some other process overwrites it. Of course, 
links to what activity first wrote it are in all probability destroyed, but the data in its raw 
form still exists as potential evidence. This means that in many cases, a defragmentation 
exercise can easily create up to four or sometimes more copies of the same data. This 
for example could be by the defragmentation process using a staging area to rebuild file 
integrities, whilst upon completion, only one of those copies is actually held to be 
current and structurally sound by the file system. 
3.18 Fuzzy search 
If one then postulates on an application driven file operation that for example does 
something as innocuous as changing the date on a memo and then prints it, the potential 
for tens of copies of that very similar data to exist is high. The “not disclosable” 
(Leyden, 2003, p. 2) argument is a key driver to calls for proper training in the use of 
tools in this Thesis. Although the data may exist, and contain something as 
incriminating as “I stole thousands”, unless it exists in a properly recoverable state, with 
original file links intact and audit trails in use supporting a reasonable suspicion, then at 
best we can say we have uncovered a string of data that is readable. Again, a Nintendo 
forensics attitude this researcher suggests, would be to run a search utility, mark out a 
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fuzzy search on such strings, provide a positive result, and the target would be in a very 
difficult conversation, even with very little actual evidential cause to back up the 
claimed situation (Jones, 2008).  
A fuzzy search could be best described as an estimate of things I would like to be 
shown, but in this case I am not sure exactly how they would be described in text. 
Complex algorithms have been developed to deal with the uncertain nature of such 
searches, (Galil & Apostolico, 1997). In this case the search command could be  
{match stole and thousands or words similar with up to two characters missing or 
transposed, show resultant strings up to four words before and after}. 
 The search would also therefore potentially return results such as like “You stops the 
sands”, or “I spole thou shards”. The dangers of such powerful search tools is clearly 
outlined by these examples, simplistic though they must be in nature because of the 
focus necessary here. Figure 8 shows the simplistic nature of the search string entry 
screen. 
 
Figure 8 Example of search tool 
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3.19 Evidence preservation 
Anything that is gathered during evidence acquisition should be kept in a proper 
evidential format, no matter whether it is indeed usable, or used in the case;  
“All preservation means is that the material is available should, at some stage, a court 
require that it be produced to deal with an issue – such as a costs issue arising after a 
trial when one party is seeking payment for counsel’s fees for approving a draft witness 
statement” (Kelman, 2009, p. 3). 
Kelman firmly outlines the arguments that the triage of evidence is critical and also the 
capture and storage should be properly documented, both requirements called out later 
in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 as part of formal training. 
3.20 Presentation 
Whatever the skill level of a forensic investigator, analyst or researcher, it is highly 
probable that the results of their efforts will have to be presented either to a peer 
community or a panel of deciding actors for example, judge, manager or public 
prosecutor. The strength of their conclusions, analysis and reasoning of their outputs 
will be a critical factor in the value of their work and indeed the positive conclusion of 
their intended goals. Most, but not all investigations are begun because there is a 
reasonable suspicion or circumstantial evidence of a nefarious event that is having, or 
has had negative effects on the current desired state (Guidance Software, 2004). Most 
data forensic investigations involve many hours of painstaking analysis of data, long 
question sessions with peers around alternative theories, and most importantly, 
challenges both in the defensive sense as well as the credibility of methods used to 
provide a conclusion to some authoritative body (Jones, 2008; Daubert, 1993). It is 
unfortunate then that there is not a common methodology or even a prescribed format 
for presenting private sector forensic investigative outputs in the UK. This may be 
because the profession has grown in separate efforts from each company seeing a niche 
in the market and delivering services against a perceived need. Arguably it may be that 
the formalisation and governance that is experienced in the public sector is not 
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appropriate to the entrepreneurial spirit that abounds in the private sector information 
security arena. Even more worrisome is that there is no agreed data forensics industry 
standard to describe the investigative process in use, or indeed support the varied 
methodologies used. This research has found that many supposedly watertight 
conclusions of relatively simple evidential analysis have been properly dismissed. This 
has variously been because of improper presentation of facts, less than professional 
drawing of conclusions, or blatantly simple misunderstanding of the proper 
investigative process (Curley, 2010; Livio, 2010; Ball, 2004). To explore the concept of 
potential misunderstanding, an example is the description of the use of Metadata. 
“Metadata is data about data – hidden data which provides information which about 
other data [sic]” Kelman (2009, p. 1).  
Kelman offers the somewhat technically questionable, but nonetheless useful example 
that if a barrister says that he took three hours to review and revise a draft witness 
statement supplied in Microsoft Word, a check of the metadata stored within the 
document can show precisely how long the activity actually took. An experienced 
forensic investigator would of course be able to support only the argument that the 
document was open for a length of time and that during the editing session some 
changes were made. Whether the reviewer went off for a coffee, or took a train home 
from the office and reopened the laptop at home (assuming this was a portable 
computer), could both be challenges any opposing party could make as to the actual 
length of time that review and revisions actually took.  
Another example of the use of Metadata; 
“in confidential information cases the examination of the metadata in a Blackberry 
handed in by a leaving employee may reveal that it has been backed up to a home 
personal computer, showing that the employee has kept a complete list of his 
employer’s confidential contacts and correspondence which he has not divulged at his 
leaving interview” (Kelman, 2009, p. 1). 
Normally, at in presenting such evidence gathered, a forensic investigator could not 
make such conclusive statements at least not without some form of additional data log 
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to support such assumptions providing corroborating evidence from other sources. 
Whilst Kelman is obviously using the example in isolation to make this point, such 
statements are unfortunately commonplace from many supposed forensic experts, and 
because of an assumed mantle of expertise, are believed as to actually have been 
produced from the evidence (Curley, 2010). The salient point here being that in the 
absence of counter discussion, such statements become matters of record and without 
challenge can severely affect the outcome of an investigation. Even by inclusion here, if 
the statements were quoted from this Thesis out of context, it could be argued that this 
string was agreeing with the statements made above by Kelman as to how much may 
actually be uncovered from a Blackberry activity log, which it certainly is not intended 
to. As an important lesson, presentation is about focusing audience attention, but for a 
forensic investigator, it absolutely must be done with a supportable argument if it is to 
remain credible (Daubert, 1993). 
To provide a further analogy, there is, in most areas of post graduate study, a formal 
course requirement to undergo research and presentation or report writing modules 
before a student can be admitted, or indeed begin study. At best, evidence must be 
provided of proper academic arguing previously completed or past academic outputs 
that have been peer reviewed. This ensures that the student is at least aware of the 
power of argument as well as the requirement to properly attribute arguments and 
document facts (UEL, 2010). Even in light of this compelling argument, the 
presentation skills training module proposed in Section 6.6, will however, be best 
offered as an optional module, being given its’ own certification. It should be 
considered that not every investigator will either be comfortable or be required to 
actually present or argue results. This area is the one piece of research that has strikingly 
different aims to that of the forensic regulator (Forensic Science Regulator, 2008). For 
the public sector investigator, the presentation of evidence is rarely a work of 
persuasion. Public sector cases are almost always a pure presentation of facts, which 
will be interpreted, in most cases by another expert. This interpretative expert can 
sometimes represent the defence, but more often prosecution (Leyden, 2003). The 
private sector investigator however, is usually in a position where they are expected to 
produce a factual recount of the activities performed, a factual description of the data 
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recovered or reviewed, and then provide an expert opinion as to the relevance and 
importance of items presented.  
 
Activity / Delivery Public Private 
Gathering of data The data can only be gathered 
under warrant 
Data can be gathered with 
permission of system owner. 
Analysis of data Data must be analysed under 
strict procedures, with specific 
suspicions. 
Data can often be analysed in 
a general manner with no 
specific suspicion. 
Presentation of data Full evidence trails and 
methodologies must be 
presented. Any data extracted 
must be presented to the defence 
also. 
Presentation can range from 
a simple email to a full 
commercial report, but rarely 
requires evidential procedure 
to be presented. 
Opinion of data 
extracted. 
Opinions are usually restricted 
to the reliability if data, not the 
event under investigation. 
Often an opinion of the 
probable “guilt” of the 
subject is provided, based on 
“experience”. 
Figure 9 Comparison of Delivery Styles 
The training for presenting then is by necessity massively diverse, and detailed further 
in Chapter 6. Formal presentation of detailed facts and the ability to answer questions 
based purely on those facts and not embellish with any level of opinion is a difficult 
skill to teach. This research suggests it is one that is not generally available as a taught 
module anywhere in the related private sectors. This then is an area that has required 
detailed experience and case analysis before the research was able to confidently predict 
that the methodologies and skills chosen to drive the training will have the desired 
outcomes. Further, being able to offer an analytical walk-through of artefacts in an 
investigation, draws upon not only presentation and oratory skills, but also underlying 
technical knowledge or at least understanding of the system or application under review. 
This research has determined that this is one area that, whilst critical to the proper 
execution of an investigative process, measurement and teaching of these skills can be 
best handled elsewhere. For example through Microsoft system training (Microsoft, 
2010) Oracle database administration training, (Oracle, 2010), ISC2 information security 
training (ISC2, 2010) etcetera.  
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“The next issue to be determined is format for disclosure. Should information be 
disclosed in static electronic formats (Adobe PDF files and TIFF files) or in a native 
format such as the format of an e-mail client like Microsoft Outlook” (Kelman, 2009, p. 
3). 
This extract suggests that there are arguments to support both directions. Kelman first 
proposes that static formats exactly match the conventional lever-arch file systems and 
therefore documents can easily be organized in folders. A suggestion that this maybe 
more palatable or understandable for someone more used to a traditional filing system, 
conceding though that in a very short time the volume of data usually overwhelms the 
disclosure process in static format. Kelman further suggests that disclosure in a 
computer email format is much more complicated since special software has to be used 
to access the disclosed documents, allowing that it provides very neatly for reviewers to 
electronically search the disclosures and also provides some additional MetaData 
(which we have already discussed). The conclusion presented is that it is a relatively 
speedy effort then to produce accurate time based analysis. Whilst the example of the 
Blackberry earlier in this section does not automatically support his final conclusion, 
given that it may be in need of other supporting information, it serves as a good outline 
of the reporting expectations for forensics. This specialised formatting and presentation 
is suggested to be the only way in which information can be intelligently handled. We 
are also offered an extended example of trial in the fuller text. Although public sector 
prosecution is not a stated avenue of this research,  it is useful to review those thoughts 
on how the court and trial judge, in the case cited, must also be prepared to accept and 
use the data in the native format. Kelman does concede that this may however require 
special software to be loaded onto the laptop or desktop of the presiding judiciary. This 
change in the artefacts in use in the courtroom brings with it the assumption that the 
actors in and around the case have a modicum of information technology training, and 
access to the specialist tools and systems that the presenters of facts do (Ball, 2009). 
The research for this Thesis suggests this is a dangerous assumption (Yorkshire Post, 
2007). One compromise position Kelman offers is that it has been suggested that the 
presenters of fact disclose in native formats and some middle man function use this to 
produce digital bundles in static formats for the trial. This Thesis also supports the 
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arguments that not all investigators would need presentation skills and strongly supports 
this conclusion with detail in Section 6.6. 
O’Hara (1994) reminds us that when we are discussing evidence, crime scenes differ, 
and in particular those involved with information crime. An experienced (fraud) 
investigator knows that crimes such as forgery and embezzlement need no particular 
physical activity in their commission so usually allows that traditional evidential 
methods would not be appropriate. It is suggested also that this has to be taken into 
account when presenting evidence as traditional methods may indeed be expected, such 
as in a court trial (O’Hara, 1994).  
“The investigative report is no place for speculation, hypothesis or opinion (the 
investigator’s judgment or prejudices). If the reader of the report engages in any of the 
above, as a result of the facts presented, that is his prerogative” (Sennewald, 1981, p. 
159). 
The research underpinning this Thesis suggests that this is excellent advice. Arguably in 
the commercial sector, there is in many cases an expectation that the investigator will 
present an expert opinion. As long as this opinion is clearly annotated as such, then it is 
right and proper to include as part of a formal report of the outcomes of particular piece 
of investigative work. 
 “This is not to say that the investigator should not have opinions or engage in 
speculation. But any such subjectivity should not be included or reflected in the report 
itself” (Sennewald, 1981, p. 159). 
This is one area of this seminal work where this researcher and others find a 
disagreement with the fixed style suggested. It is not possible to have a one size fits all 
in the commercial world, but it is advised where opinion is presented it should be clear 
that it is that, an opinion given as a basis of experience and expertise applied to the data 
and artefacts reviewed (Ball, 2009). 
O’Hara (1994) reminds us that evidence should satisfy certain requirements of quality, 
trustworthiness and logical sufficiency. Further in the work we are presented with a 
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description of the whole evidential procedure in exacting detail, which is not timely to 
relate here, but does indeed support the claim of familiarity with the process. A 
conclusion is given that the whole must be presented in an orderly and logical fashion. 
This clear closing argument supports the stream of this chapter, that is; without an 
orderly delivery of the relevant data and a logical argument of the facts surrounding the 
data, it would not be possible for any like-minded person to examine the conclusions 
presented and challenge any part of that arguing process. O’Hara (1994) finally suggests 
that we establish the basic elements of the offence in order to round off the process of 
proof. 
One of the basic challenges that was outlined in the thinking for this research, and 
indeed in the experience of this researcher was how to sensibly provide for proper 
evidential procedure in the private sector during the acquisition of forensic data. This 
chapter explored some of the shortcomings of current practice, highlighted some of the 
more critical mistakes that have been publicised, and importantly reported recent 
guidance that is growing in how to correct the situation. 
The private sector, whilst perhaps sometimes being on the forefront of the forensic 
profession in terms of investment and tools, is almost always behind the public sector in 
the area of governance and controls. The chapter described the rapidly changing 
computer landscape, and how the forensics profession is having to evolve just as 
quickly to keep pace, even without the benefit of strong controls and guidance. The 
chapter also described some of the challenges that are presented to investigators, and 
having laid out the possible errors that can be made, suggested avenues for discussion 
later as to how to control or rectify these errors. 
3.21 Review 
We reviewed in some depth the actual workings of forensic investigations. We looked 
in detail at some of the areas that an investigator is required to possess knowledge and 
explored some of the basics of data manipulation on computer systems that forensic 
investigators rely upon to be successful. We challenged some thinking around the level 
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to which an investigator should be experienced and gave some suggestions, to be 
detailed later in Chapter 6, about how these knowledge requirements could be met. 
The presentation skills argument traversed an area that is largely ignored in current 
technical forensics research, the delivery of outputs. Current forensics research tends to 
be specific and focused on a particular area of forensics such as recovery algorithms, 
bad disk areas and suchlike. The broad nature of this Thesis requires that the profession 
of forensics be reviewed as a whole and the integrity of the profession be provided with 
guidance and controls as part of the conclusions. An investigator therefore must be able 
in some manner to present the outcome of an investigation in a professional and concise 
manner in order that the basic challenges against that output, and understanding of the 
conclusions can be made. 
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4 Tools 
A large part of the research and discussion in the public sector has been towards the 
provision of and verification of supporting forensics tools. There are many examples of 
tools being used without proper forensics knowledge, and as shown earlier in this Thesis 
mainly in Section 1.3, the outputs provided have sometimes been frankly fabricated in 
real terms. Derogatory terms such as Tyke and Nintendo have been variously used to 
describe these tendencies, as well as some very public challenges to the integrity of the 
industry leading tool sets. The chapter attempts to balance these concerns with the 
activities that the tools are being asked to perform. It attempts to show that by working 
at the “bleeding edge” of computer systems data recovery, these tools can be expected 
to have higher failure rates than traditional robust computer applications. 
4.1 Evolution 
Previous research concludes that of all the common forensic tools they reviewed, none 
were without failings that could easily impede and sometimes disqualify the basis of an 
investigation (Arthur et al, 2004). This is a most worrying conclusion, but is surprising 
to anyone practicing in the forensics field (Livio, 2010; Sapphire, 2007; Ball, 2004). 
Take for example the product Encase (figure 10), one of the market leading tools in the 
commercial and public sector, arguably the market leader (Guidance Software, 2004).  
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Figure 10 Encase Tool 
The tool was born from an evolutionary process preceded by many other similar tools, 
and in this case a call from serving police officers in the USA for a better tool set, than 
ILookPI (figure 11), the proprietary and copy protected forensics tool of US law 
enforcement (Perlustro, 2010).  
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Figure 11 IlookPI tool 
The closeness of the Guidance Software delivery organisation to the user community 
has been both the success as well as an arguable future commercial survival challenge, 
one that forces continual decision between a structured and defendable business plan, 
against a need to support the changing landscape that the current user base are working 
in. Most mature software applications on the market today go through extensive testing 
and structured development processes to ensure that they both meet the needs of the 
buyers as well as removing as many failures from the underlying application code as 
possible (Crispin & Gregory, 2009). In such commercial environments software goes 
through multiple iterations until the producers are confident that optimum, but not 
necessarily perfect service level has been achieved and then the software is released as a 
thoroughly tested product. Forensics software applications in general do not always 
have this luxury of time or quality, and Encase is a prime example.  
The release schedule for a mature software product, in the experience of this researcher 
is aimed at quarterly or half yearly update. Conversely, on 30th March 2010 Encase 
version 6.16 was released, on 6 April version 6.16.1 was released, then quickly followed 
on 14th May by version 6.16.2. Both of these subsequent releases fixed significant flaws 
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in the major version 6.16 release. Version 2 of Encase was debuted at the IACIS 
conference in 2000 (Prince, 2000), so it is evident that even after more than ten years of 
evolution the product is not what could be called stable. Indeed, as late as 2007 there 
were serious arguments being played around the Internet after iSEC, a respected US 
security forum reported fundamental integrity and reliability flaws in the Encase version 
at that time (Sheldon 2011; Prince, 2007).  
To provide some background as to why this may not be so serious as it first seems it is 
important to understand the challenges faced by forensic tool writers. Many operating 
system manufacturers will not release the exact details of how software is built, what 
the links and hooks are to various system areas, and importantly how user activities are 
recorded. In 1998 for example, Microsoft Corporation was challenged by a US District 
judge to release source code for its proprietary operating system Microsoft Windows. It 
challenged that action and made an analogy that if Coca-Cola were made to reveal its 
secret syrup formula, then its business would be destroyed. Similarly if Microsoft were 
forced to reveal its intellectual property then it would be severely disadvantaged 
(Newman, 1998). Therefore, because there is no requirement to release source code, the 
forensic software writers are at a disadvantage in understanding exactly how 
applications and operating systems really work. Exact data tolerances and interfaces are 
never shared for the system architectures, so any software that is trying to automatically 
analyse these areas will be testing the limits of the software and hardware it is using and 
reviewing. It is clear that there is still a logical propensity for the Encase developers to 
provide timely solutions to problems that government agencies in the US may be 
encountering (the largest customer base). It is therefore predictable that the Encase 
product and others like it will be constantly evolving and potentially never stable. This 
would seem to be a challenge for the Daubert “repeatable” test as mentioned earlier in 
Section 1.4, as well as the stability that would be expected from newer versions of 
software (Prince, 2007). Within the forensics community, instability of software and 
chance unreliable results all compound the challenge of professional production of cases 
(Sheldon 2011; Livio, 2010; Jones, 2008; Ball 2004). Simply, if a defence challenge in 
a civil suit was to ask if, in this case, Encase was a reliable and stable tool, and could be 
depended upon to produce the same results on the same input data from different release 
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versions, arguably then the case would be under threat, or at least the results from the 
investigation severely in question. Is Encase any different from any other tools - in the  
experience of this researcher, definitely not, and Encase is in all probability, what could 
be called the leading edge tool in terms of reliability and quality of result. The important 
conclusion here is that any case or opinion that depends solely on the output of a tool is 
by the arguments above, probably flawed (Jones, 2008; Ball, 2004). The need for a 
forensic analyst to be able to show how the same results can be produced manually, 
albeit on a sampling basis for expediency, is paramount to the credibility of that 
expertise, and should go a long way to challenge the Nintendo or Tyke tags (Sheldon, 
2011; Carvey, 2007a; Ball, 2004). 
4.2 Free tools 
To go some way in understanding the complexity and extent of the growing Nintendo or 
Tyke environment, it is useful to list here a plethora of free from subscription tools 
available to the forensics community (as well as anyone with access to the Internet). 
Continuously updated versions of this list can be found at ForensicControl (2012), many 
other sites carry similar lists. The ForensicControl version of the list has been split into 
areas of interest. Before exploring the boundaries of this significant list of tools, it is 
important we maintain a caveat to our review. Whilst in itself, the use of as free tool is 
not an irrefutable indicator that the operator be coined a Tyke or be known as someone 
operating in the Nintendo forensics medium, the sole use of free software to perform  
forensics has inherent dangers, as discussed later in Section 5.5 (tool reliability). 
Disk and imaging tools (figure 12) are used in either setting up the forensic work areas, 
or in mounting or recovering file systems and disks that are to be used in data analysis. 
Some of the more specialised abilities include repairing otherwise unreadable data areas 
and rebuilding fragments of files as recovered by the operator. 
79 
 
DumpIt-Generates physical memory dump of Windows machines, 32 bits 64 bit. Can run from USB keys 
Encrypted Disk Detector-Checks local physical drives on a system for TrueCrypt, PGP, or Bitlocker 
encrypted volumes 
FAT32 Format-Enables large capacity disks to be formatted as FAT32 
FTK Imager-Imaging tool, disk viewer and image mounter 
Guymager-Multi-threaded GUI imager under running under Linux 
HotSwap-Safely remove SATA disks similar to the “Safely Remove Hardware” icon in the notification area 
P2 eXplorer*-Virtually mount drives & forensic images 
Tableau Imager*-Imaging tool for use with Tableau imaging products 
VHD Tool-Converts raw disk images to VHD format which are mountable in Windows Disk Management 
Figure 12 Disk and Imaging Tools 
Email analysis tools (figure 13) are useful to enable structured and unstructured analysis 
of Email files that may otherwise need connection to the master file server, or in some 
cases require password access in their native form. 
EDB Viewer-Open and view (not export) Outlook EDB files without an Exchange server 
Gmail Parser-Parses various Gmail artefacts from cached HTML files 
Mail Viewer-Viewer for Outlook Express, Windows Mail/Windows Live Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird message 
databases and single EML files 
OST Viewer-Open and view (not export) Outlook OST files without connecting to an Exchange server 
PST Viewer-Open and view (not export) Outlook PST files without needing Outlook 
Figure 13 Email Analysis Tools 
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The general tools section (figure 14) includes various utility tools that forensic analysts 
(and others) have found useful over time to support the analysis process. 
Agent Ransack-Search multiple files using Boolean operators and Perl Regex 
EvidenceMover*-Copies data between locations, with file comparison, verification, logging 
FastCopy-Self labelled ‘fastest’ copy/delete Windows software. Can verify with SHA-1, etc 
File Signatures-Table of file signatures 
Forensic Test Images-Collated forensic images for training, practice and validation 
HashMyFiles-Calculate MD5 and SHA1 hashes 
MobaLiveCD-Run Linux live CDs from their ISO image without having to boot to them 
Mouse Jiggler-Automatically moves mouse pointer stopping screen saver, hibernation etc 
Notepad ++-Advanced Notepad replacement 
NSRL-Hash sets of ‘known’ (ignorable) files 
Quick Hash-A Linux & Windows GUI for individual and recursive SHA1 hashing of files 
USB Write Blocker-Enables software write-blocking of USB ports 
Windows Forensic Environment-Guide by Brett Shavers to creating and working with a Windows boot 
CD 
Figure 14 General Tools 
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File and data analysis tools (figures 15-16) are by far the most populated set of tools in 
use. This genre of tools could be argued, especially in their free of charge guises to be 
the greatest provider of Nintendo forensic analysts. This list includes some tools that are 
real time in nature, that is, data can be recovered as it is being produced, in most cases 
with no visible effect on the systems under review. The display is split for readability 
only. 
Advanced Prefetch Analyser-Reads Windows XP,Vista and Windows 7 prefetch files 
analyzeMFT-Parses the MFT from an NTFS file system allowing results to be analysed with other tools 
Audit Viewer-Viewer used with Memoryze (see below) 
DCode-Converts various data types to date/time values 
Defraser-Detects full and partial multimedia files in unallocated space 
eCryptfs Parser-Recursively parses headers of every eCryptfs file in selected directory. Outputs 
encryption algorithm used, original filesize, signature used, etc 
Encryption Analyzer-Scans a computer for password-protected & encrypted files, reports encryption 
complexity and decryption options for each file 
Forensic Image Viewer-View various picture formats, image enhancer, extraction of embedded Exif, GPS 
data 
Highlighter-Examine log files using text, graphic or histogram views 
Live Detector*-Collects volatile data; account & password identification; browser artefacts, user 
behaviour; and Microsoft Windows System info 
LiveContactsView-View and export Windows Live Messenger contact details 
RSA Netwitness Investigator-Network packet capture and analysis 
Figure 15 File and Data Analysis Tools -A 
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Memoryze-Acquire and/or analyze RAM images, including the page file on live systems 
MFTview-Displays and decodes contents of an extracted MFT file 
NetSleuth-Network monitoring tool, with covert “silent portscanning” 
PsTools-Suite of command-line Windows utilities 
Shadow Explorer-Browse and extract files from shadow copies 
Simple File Parser-GUI tool for parsing lnk files, prefetch and jump list artefacts 
SQLite Manager-Firefox add-on enabling viewing of any SQLite database 
Strings-Command-line tool for text searches 
Structured Storage Viewer-View and manage MS OLE Structured Storage based files 
TimeLord-Time utility; timezones, BIOS times, decode computer time formats, etc 
16 File and Data Analysis Tools - B 
The MacOS operating system (OSDP, 2012a) has many differences in operation and 
architecture to the Microsoft Windows operating system (OSDP, 2012b). As such, there 
is a genre of tools (figure 17) that are specific to the recovery and analysis of data in that 
sphere. 
Disk Arbitrator-Blocks the mounting of file systems, complimenting a write blocker in disabling disk 
arbitration 
Epoch Converter*-Converts epoch times to local time and UTC 
FTK Imager CLI for Mac OS*-Command line Mac OS version of AccessData’s FTK Imager 
IORegInfo-Lists items connected to the computer (e.g., SATA, USB and FireWire Drives, software RAID 
sets). Can locate partition information, including sizes, types, and the bus to which the device is connected 
Mac Memory Reader-Command-line utility to capture physical RAM from Mac OS systems 
PMAP Info*-Displays the physical partitioning of the specified device. Can be used to map out all the drive 
information, accounting for all used sectors 
Figure 17 MacOS Tools 
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A relatively new area of data forensics is that of mobile devices. Earlier mobile phone 
analysis tools concentrated on SIM cards, call records and text messages sent and 
received by handsets that were simplistic (in terms of models available latterly) in 
operation. As Handsets evolved into devices designed to receive and transmit structured 
messages, such as electronic mail, and also to send and receive data files, tools were 
needed to analyse this data (figure 18). Proprietary operating systems designed for these 
devices had to be reverse engineered in the same way that PC operating systems had 
been to allow the analysis of that new source of forensic data. 
iPhone Backup Browser-View unencrypted backups of iPad, iPod and iPhones 
iPhone Analyzer-Explore the internal file structure of Pad, iPod and iPhones 
Rubus*-Deconstructs Blackberry .ipd backup files 
Figure 18 Mobile Device Tools 
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In the list of data analysis suite tools (figure 19), we find the type of tools that would be 
used, generally in a non-commercial investigation to speedily access data and recover 
information. Commercial tools that have significant cost in most cases, usually include 
the majority of the facilities listed below in a combined package. These commercially 
available (at cost) tools are discussed later.  
Autopsy-Graphical interface to the command line digital investigation analysis tools in The Sleuth Kit (see 
below) 
Backtrack-Penetration testing and security audit with forensic boot capability 
Caine-Linux based live CD, featuring a number of analysis tools 
Digital Forensics Framework-Analyses volumes, file systems, user and applications data, extracting 
metadata, deleted and hidden items 
OSForensics-Windows application to carry out wide range of forensic tasks. 
P2 Shuttle Free*-Remote disk mounting, network RAM capture, search tools. Limited version of P2 
Shuttle Pro 
Paladin*-Ubuntu based live boot CD for imaging and analysis 
SIFT*-VMware Appliance pre-configured with multiple tools allowing digital forensic examinations 
The Sleuth Kit-Collection of UNIX-based command line file and volume system forensic analysis tools 
Ubuntu guide-Guide to using an Unbuntu live disk to recover partitions, carve files, etc. 
Volatility Framework-Collection of tools for the extraction of artefacts from RAM 
Figure 19 Data Analysis Suites 
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File viewers, in the main are produced by commercial software vendors so that receivers 
of file produced using their tools (figure 20) can successfully read the data in those files 
in the format as written. As the mobile media devices increase, it is generally expected 
that native viewers of proprietary application sets in use on those devices will also be 
released. 
Microsoft Excel 2007 Viewer-View Excel spreadsheets 
Microsoft PowerPoint 2007 Viewer-View PowerPoint presentations 
Microsoft Visio 2010 Viewer-View Visio diagrams 
Microsoft Word Viewer-View Word documents 
VLC-View most multimedia files and DVD, Audio CD, VCD, etc 
Figure 20 File Viewers 
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One of the most rapidly growing set of freeware tools is that of Internet and Web 
Browser history data retrieval and viewing (figure 21). This is not surprising, given that 
the majority of personal electronic mail and communication is arguably now taking 
place across the Internet. 
ChromeAnalysis -Analysis of internet history data generated using Google Chrome 
ChromeCacheView -Reads the cache folder of Google Chrome Web browser, and displays the list of all 
files currently stored in the cache 
FoxAnalysis -Basic analysis of internet history data from Firefox versions 1, 2 and 3. 
IECacheView -Displays various details of files in Internet Explorer cache; number of hits, last accessed 
times, etc 
IECookiesView -Extracts various details of Internet Explorer cookies 
IEHistoryView -Extracts recently visited Internet Explorer URLs 
IEPassView -Extract stored passwords from Internet Explorer versions 4 to 8 
MozillaCacheView -Reads the cache folder of Firefox/Mozilla/Netscape Web browsers 
MozillaCookieView -Parses the cookie folder of Firefox/Mozilla/Netscape Web browsers 
MozillaHistoryView -Reads the history.dat of Firefox/Mozilla/Netscape Web browsers, and displays the 
list of all visited Web page 
MyLastSearch -Extracts search queries made with popular search engines (Google, Yahoo and MSN) 
and social networking sites (Twitter, Facebook, MySpace) 
PasswordFox -Extracts the user names and passwords stored by Mozilla Firefox Web browser 
OperaCacheView -Reads the cache folder of Opera Web browser, and displays the list of all files currently 
stored in the cache 
OperaPassView -Decrypts the content of the Opera Web browser password file, wand.dat 
Web Historian -Reviews list of URLs stored in the history files of the most commonly used browsers 
Figure 21 Internet History Analysis 
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Registry and user analysis tools (figure 22) tend to focus on the more popular operating 
systems such as Unix and Windows, and can be used to understand changes made to 
systems. They also can be used to understand the make-up of a particular system 
environment at the point the data was captured. 
ForensicUserInfo -Extracts user information from the SAM, SOFTWARE and SYSTEM hives files and 
decrypts the LM/NT hashes from the SAM file 
Process Monitor -Examine Windows processes and registry threads in real time 
Registry Decoder -For the acquisition, analysis, and reporting of registry contents 
RegRipper -Registry data extraction and correlation tool 
Regshot -Takes snapshots of the registry allowing comparisons e.g., show registry changes after installing 
software 
USB Device Forensics -Details previously attached USB devices on exported registry hives 
USBDeview -Details previously attached USB devices 
UserAssist -Displays list of programs run, with run count and last run date and time 
Figure 22 Registry Analysis 
The application section (figure 23) tends to cover chat, file share and messenger 
applications.  
KaZAlyser -Extracts various data from the KaZaA application 
LiveContactsView -View and export Windows Live Messenger contact details 
SkypeLogView -View Skype calls and chats 
Figure 23 Application Analysis 
88 
 
On most tools listing sites there is an area where tools that have been useful in the past, 
and may or may not now work as expected are kept. Some of these can be useful in 
helping investigate older operating systems or applications. 
CaseNotes* -Contemporaneous notes recorder 
Exif Reader -Extracts exif data from digital photographs 
Fragview* -View recursive HTML, jpg and Flash files 
GigaView* -Parses exported GigaTribe chat logs, results can be imported into Excel 
Live View -Allows examiner to boot dd images in VMware. 
VideoTriagee* -Produces thumbnails of video files so that the whole video doesn’t need to be watched 
Figure 24 "Abandonware" (old / unsupported) 
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4.3 Commercial Tools 
Encase, produced by Guidance Software, is an internationally available tool and is 
generally acclaimed to be the market leader. It exists in stand-alone form (figure 25), as 
well as a multi node, central command console form, known as Encase Enterprise 
Edition (figure 26).  
 
Figure 25 Encase Professional (field) Edition 
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Figure 26 Encase Enterprise Edition 
There are also optimised versions available for agencies operating in specialised fields, 
but these are generally unavailable to non-agency actors so not listed here. Guidance 
Software offer the Encase Certified Examiner course and certification. 
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ILOOK, (figure 27) is a tool available only to agencies in the Public Sector (Military, 
Police, Intelligence etc.). It is included here as the extent of use over the evolution of 
forensics mean that many forensics professionals have at least come across it, or 
derivatives produced to enable Public-Private sector cooperation in investigations. 
 
Figure 27 IlookPI Tool 
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FTK, or Forensics Tool Kit, produced by AccessData is claimed by many to be the 
second and sometimes equal, in terms of performance to Encase. Many experienced 
forensic investigators will use FTK (figure 28) as a second opinion on critical evidence 
analysis performed by other tools such as Encase. Accessdata offer the AccessData 
Certified Examiner training and certification. 
 
Figure 28 FTK Tool 
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Paraben’s P2 commander software (figure 29), is claimed by many to be a more readily 
useable reporting tool for providing easily readable outputs needed on routine data 
analysis. It also maintains a price point that makes it affordable a san entry level 
commercial product for forensic analysts. Paraben offer a Paraben Certified Forensic 
Examiner course and certification. 
 
Figure 29 Paraben P2 Commander Tool 
COFEE is a set of tools that have been gathered together, in the main by Microsoft 
Corporation fraud engineers, and until very recently was a proprietary tool kit (that is 
the make-up rather than the ownership of all the tools). This tool kit was made available 
under strict license to enforcement agencies by Microsoft, but in 2009 copies of the tool 
set were leaked onto various sharing sites on the Internet. There was much discussion 
about the set containing back door access to Microsoft software, but in the main, 
opinion seems to have been that the set was just a gathering of tools that anyone could 
94 
 
have provided, in this case the work of gathering together and providing a simple menu 
had already been performed. Given that there are some discussion still running as to the 
legality of opening the leaked toolset, even to produce a screenshot, only the 
distribution package outer screenshot is able to provided here as verified by the 
researcher (figure 30).  
Figure 30 COFEE Tool Distribution 
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Included additionally, (figure 31) to clarify perhaps the arguments that this secrecy may, 
as claimed by Cohen Associates (Cohen 2009), merely be an attempt to keep private the 
outdated and basic nature of the tool is an unverified screen shot supplied during 
training courses in 2009 by J. Wykes of the National White Collar Crime Centre [sic] in 
the USA. 
 
Figure 31 COFEE Forensics Tool 
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FIT (Forensics Investigation Toolkit) is produced by Decision Group, a Taiwanese PC 
option card manufacturer. It is a specialised option of a multi-product toolkit that has 
following in the industry specifically for its ability to analyse network level traffic and 
network related artefacts (figure 32).  
 
Figure 32 FIT Tool 
4.4 Use of tools 
The lack of experience and expertise challenges are supported in the main by Thomas et 
al (2008) in their claim,  
“It is essential not only to have the required knowledge when completing a computer 
forensic case, but also the necessary toolkit in order to assist you in providing reliable 
evidence. A computer forensic investigation needs stable tools that offer versatility, 
flexibility and robustness. A forensically sound tool is intended and designed to make 
the work of a forensic examiner a lot easier by allowing them to perform structured 
investigations and improve the quality of their results” (Thomas et al, 2008, p. 5). 
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To further outline the absolute ease that one can set out on a discovery process with 
little or no experience or expertise, we should consider the review of an IT journalist, 
published in electronic form on “TechRadar.com”, a well-read IT community forum and 
magazine. The review was of a tool named “BackTrack”, described in the article and 
screenshots (figure 33) as containing “a formidable array of hacking tools” (Thompson, 
2010, p.1). 
 
Figure 33 BackTrack Forensic Tool 
“Logging into a Windows system is easy using Backtrack, even if you don't know any of 
the usernames or passwords that have been set up. That's because you can use a utility 
bundled with Backtrack to remove the password on any Windows account, including 
administrator accounts.” (Thompson, 2010, p.1) 
The statement that the tool can remove any password from any account is troubling at 
best. Some could see this as a treatise to break into an account without permission, thus 
98 
 
contravening the hacking laws of most countries. It is a clear indicator, of at least the 
seeming understanding of the author of this article, the forensic capabilities of the tool 
set are to be primarily used to bypass system controls. To provide balance, there are 
occasions, as all experienced analysts are fully aware, that require the copy of a system 
to be used in a native, or running state to try to retrieve data otherwise unreadable 
(encryption, solid state disks and other). 
The article also presents another indicator that inexperience does not necessarily mean 
that tools cannot be used for data analysis, and again perhaps in an illegal manner, in 
this case potentially breaching privacy as well as accessing without permission;  
“….These make it extremely useful to network security specialists and police forces, as 
well as anyone interested in knowing exactly what's happening on their own networks 
and any second-hand machines they've bought.”  (Thompson, 2010, p.2). 
Finally, the call to arms of the Tyke community, another extract from the article; 
“Backtrack is loaded with all the obscure little utilities used by professional security 
consultants. Many of them are fiddly command-line programs, but a lot have graphical 
front ends that make them simple to use….. There are plenty of commercial computer 
forensics systems around these days, but many of them cost serious money or are only 
available to the police. However, the open source community has a solution in the form 
of a special Linux distribution called Backtrack 4.” (Thompson, 2010, p.3). 
Given such widespread distribution of such articles, as well as the simplistic installation 
and use of the free tool distributions above, it is not difficult to see how the expansion of 
forensics into uncontrolled territory has taken place. Control is a strong word to use in 
describing the difference between a professional environment and one without 
boundaries, but it is the very element of peer pressure and criticism that defines the 
credibility of professions. Again, to maintain a balanced argument, merely because a 
tool has been purchased, rather than acquired for free, does not mean that the purchaser 
has any better skills merely by virtue of those invested monies. 
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Hayley (2002) presents a vivid example of how a prosecution expert used a simple tool 
to provide evidence of hundreds of searches from a browser. The defence then 
successfully totally dismissed the evidence, purely by exposing the prosecutions lack of 
knowledge of the tool used. In that case that the defence found “reams” of mail that the 
prosecution did not, purely because the prosecution did not know how to use the tool 
properly (Hayley, 2002). The challenges between legal, technical and forensic experts 
will abound no matter what the quality of training, or cost of tool (Livio, 2010; Ball, 
2009; Jones, 2008). What is then needed is a code of conduct or practice, as this Thesis 
is suggesting. This provides for the case such that if two like-minded practitioners of 
data forensics were set off against each other in a discussion of the merits of data in an 
investigation, at least the validity of the results would not be brought into question. 
Whilst ever the credibility of the outputs of the forensic process are able to be 
questioned, proper technical discussions are impossible. Whether then lawyers or 
corporate council, or management of an entity decide to present legal, semantic or 
procedural challenges working on nuances of meaning or law, at least the process of 
data forensics will not be in question (Kelman, 2009).  
“When conducting an analysis in computer forensics, the “expert” utilizes tools to 
examine and extract information pertaining to the crime. However, an area of 
contention is whether one can be considered an expert solely based on his ability to use 
a tool or software package, without the ability to clearly define how the tool works or 
reviewing the source code. The majority of the tools and software used in computer 
forensics is proprietary and copyrighted, thus negating the ability to access the source 
code” (Meyers et al, 2004, p. 5). 
It is abundantly clear from this passage that the user of a tool should be able to 
reproduce at least the methodology that a tool is using to do an analysis or 
reconstruction. Further, even if the amount of data is so great that it would be 
impossible to perform the whole review manually, a sample should be possible to be 
created to support the validity of the output of the tool. Finally, it is argued that by 
analysing the source code, a forensics practitioner would be able to determine its true 
functional validity (Meyers et al, 2004). There is an intellectual challenge in this 
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expectation, in that the size of forensics software applications at this point in their 
evolution, and the number of coding experts or application programmers involved in 
their creation, such a review process is surely both nugatory and oversized. An expert in 
forensics will generally be able to determine how a tool works by its actions and 
outputs, and that is done on a regular basis by peers in the industry. It is for this reason 
that forensic tool user groups exist and how different review bodies can be confident in 
the outputs of analytical processes (Prince, 2007). 
Meyers et al (2004) later state that when conducting an investigation an expert will use 
tools, this of course is obvious. We are properly presented with further suggestions that 
concerns should be raised if the expert cannot describe the expected functioning of that 
tool or a knowledge of the associated program code. This could be problematic, as the 
code is generally kept secret from the user of the tool in most circumstances owing to 
proprietary information secrecy. Again, some research would seem to have us believe 
that a forensic expert is going to be an expert programmer, or systems designer (Meyers 
et al, 2004). It would seem that to even expect each forensic analyst to be able to write 
application code, even less understand how someone expert in that branch of 
information technology has written code, is a less than realistic outline of the reality of 
current day forensic application usage.  
4.5 Summary of tools chapter 
We have seen here that the provision of and verification of supporting forensics tools is 
under discussion constantly. This Thesis has related examples of tools being used 
without proper forensics knowledge and reported proof that the outputs provided have 
sometimes been frankly fabricated in real terms. Derogatory terms such as Tyke and 
Nintendo have been variously used to describe these tendencies, as well as some very 
public challenges to the integrity of the industry leading tool sets. Hopefully this chapter 
has related these concerns to the activities that the tools are being asked to perform, and 
attempts to show that by working at the “bleeding edge” of computer systems data 
recovery, these tools can be expected to have higher failure rates than traditional robust 
computer applications. 
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5 Drivers for Action 
This chapter provides deeper discussion around some of the underlying concerns and 
challenges in the profession today. It explores the sometimes poor performance of some 
forensics investigators to date. It challenges some of the dependencies upon the tool sets 
currently in use, and more importantly attempts to amalgamate the often contradictory 
advices from the various experiences in the field.  A very important recurring theme in 
this chapter is that the profession is now being challenged from many sources and the 
sometimes slipshod manner in which investigations have been performed, as will be 
evidenced in the chapter, arguably can no longer be allowed to continue. In further 
drawing out arguments from previous chapters, it explores by the researchers own 
experience and of others, how the profession is evolving rather than being designed 
from scratch. It provides learning from many sources in the build towards that 
evolutionary process.  
There are extensive references included of the ground-breaking book by author Charles 
A. Sennewald, “The Process of Investigation”. First published in 1981, this is still today 
used as a primer for the American Society of Industrial Security Certified Protection 
Professional (CPP) qualification (ASIS, 2010), and provides pertinent and current 
support to many of the arguments in this Thesis. The insight that this text provides is 
invaluable as it predates most data forensics, and yet the underlying investigative 
themes are recurring in this emerging profession. 
Once data has been gathered either from its current visible form, or as a deleted 
(recovered) state, it can be fed into investigative tools which vary immensely in 
reliability, consistency, quality and indeed price. Arthur and Ventur (2004) propose a 
triangulation (figure 34) between complexity, cost and functionality which inevitably 
leads to a biased weighting towards one of the three. Consequently, where cost 
minimisation is a major factor, they suggest complexity will increase and functionality 
decrease, leading to the potential for even less reliable output or conclusive results. 
Complexity can be diminished by adding more cost, functionality can be enhanced by 
adding more cost or increasing complexity, cost can be lowered by reducing 
functionality or adding complexity. 
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Perhaps this can be best visualised as follows: 
 
Figure 34 Cost versus Complexity versus Functionality 
Conclusions and inferences drawn from the use of data forensic tools can be morally, 
socially and commercially damaging for the individuals or entities being investigated 
(Curley, 2010; Livio, 2010). This is an argument that can be applied to many 
professional issues. In the case of computer or data forensics, the scarcity of expertise to 
challenge these conclusions, as well as the propensity for data forensics experts to be 
automatically held in awe presents little opportunity for informed argument (Curley, 
2010; Thomas and Peterson, 2008).  
5.1 Distraction 
“…consequently, there are many ethical dilemmas that a CFS [computer forensic 
specialist] must be prepared to deal with during an investigation. The most common 
ethical problem is managing the discovery of confidential data that is irrelevant to the 
case at hand” (Basset et al, 2006, p. 3). 
In setting out on this path of research it was clear to the researcher, based on experience 
as practitioner and tutor, this relevancy problem is one of the fundamental challenges 
that would be at the root of answers that would need to be provided. Clearly the 
propensity of the untrained investigator to become distracted during review of evidence 
is very high given the mountain of data that is initially made available in most computer 
Cost Functionality 
Complexity 
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forensic investigations. It is the experience of the researcher that the tendency to veer 
off course during data review is such that the outcome of an investigation can be 
severely jeopardised by not following a structured methodical path to the final 
disclosure of pertinent information. The sheer magnitude of data and history of user or 
program activities on any data device that has been used for any length of time is such 
that a clear path must be set prior to entering into any review of evidence.  
“..complexity and role of forensic evidence are ever increasing” (STC, 2004, p. 2). 
5.2 Trust 
Thomas and Peterson (2008) make the suggestion that computer forensics, in this case 
the performing of such, has gone from being a fairly new technology, to something that 
is now frequently relied upon as a method of establishing factual information as 
evidence in a court of law. This Thesis would argue, that it is not in fact a technology 
but a skill. Whilst such sematic arguments do indeed reflect a common divergence of 
opinion, the overall message does support the industry experience that data forensics is 
seen to be domain of knowledge that only the select few are privy to. Thomas and 
Peterson confirm such experience by relating that because of their new found 
importance in “today’s criminal environment, [sic]” (Thomas and Peterson, 2008, p. 2) 
people can often put absolute trust into computer forensic tools and processes. The 
underlying causes perhaps due to a belief that the evidence obtained is absolutely true, 
purely because it was obtained using forensic tools or methods (Curley, 2010; Carvey, 
2007a; Ball, 2004). This Thesis would challenge that Thomas and Peterson (2008), in 
the use of the term criminal environment create an oversimplified reflection of the 
forensic landscape. It is arguable that not all forensic work has an outcome based on 
criminal drivers. In support of the requirement to understand and therefore be able to 
challenge the emergence of the black magic art of forensics (Ball, 2004). Thomas and 
Peterson do provide strong supporting opinion to this theory. It is also generally argued 
that that there is too much dependence on automated computer forensic tools (Ball, 
2009; Jones, 2008; Carvey, 2007a). A clear statement to support these arguments; 
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“computer forensic analysts don’t actually know just how effective these tools are” 
(Thomas and Peterson, 2008, p. 3). 
Such claims strongly underpin what some may see as disparaging remarks in the 
description of inappropriate tool use as Nintendo Forensics (Carvey 2007a). Sennewald 
(1981) argues in his seminal text, that the level of experience and quality of an 
investigator even then was questionable. His challenges are still as valid today. 
Accordingly, thirty years later, in 2011 his writings are still used as a primer for the 
American Society of Industrial Security Certified Protection Professional (CPP) 
qualification (ASIS, 2010).  
“Regrettably, the range or spectrum of talent, from superior to marginal or poor, is 
broader in the private sector. There are still a large number of unprofessional, 
unsophisticated and unskilled “investigators” in the security industry. And where the 
general public may never hear of the genuine achievements of the professionally trained 
and qualified private investigator, they will certainly be made aware of the illegal, 
immoral or sloppy work of the unprofessional practitioner” (Sennewald, 1981, p. 15). 
5.3 Professionalism 
Sennewald goes on to make the following observation and sets an interesting challenge.  
“On balance, then, the mantle of professionalism is much more generally worn in the 
public sector, without question. But time and trends are shifting that balance. It would 
be interesting to reconsider this question in the year 2000” (Sennewald, 1981, p. 15). 
Accordingly, we are now in the next millennium and the statements made are still 
resounding as pertinent questions and challenges being discussed. The call to challenge 
the professionalism of investigative practitioners is timely to explore here. If the society 
that the investigator delivers services into does not have absolute trust of the ability of 
that professional to deliver the service as described, then any decisions or inferences 
made as a result of the data presented will inevitably be held as potentially unsound 
(Curley 2010; Livio 2010; Yorkshire Post, 2007). Rowlinson summarises a call for 
better e-crime [sic] prevention and states that;  
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“ The need for scrupulous digital forensic investigations has meant increasing number 
of [sic] people from both the public and private sector have now been trained in, and 
can undertake, digital forensics. This wider understanding and use of digital forensics 
has led to the need for enterprise forensic readiness as a mechanism to facilitate 
investigations and deter e-crime” (Rowlinson, 2007, p. 81).  
Whilst, taken slightly out of context as this passage is, it could be argued that by having 
an ability to describe a crime, we automatically prevent it. In the broader passage 
Rowlinson goes on to review the power of forensic investigations as a tool to deter the 
actual crime itself. A suggestion that the advent of electronic crime has surged unabated 
because the abilities to properly investigate and prosecute it just were not there in the 
early days of the emergence of computer based criminal activity. 
In many cases wrong inferences are drawn not purely because of the lack of experience 
of the investigator, but also in many cases because of the simplistic operation of the 
toolsets (Jones, 2008).  
One description of the traits of the investigator:  
“Crimes are not solved by ingenious and clever super sleuths but by hard working men 
and women who universally share one common denominator: perseverance…. 
Perseverance is the one overriding human trait or characteristic among the many 
deemed necessary, or at least highly desirable, for investigative work” (Sennewald 
1981, p. 19). 
5.4 Diligence and ethics 
“computer forensics requires a well balanced combination of technical skills, legal 
acumen, and ethical conduct“ (Bassett et al, 2006, p. 4). 
The dilemma facing forensic specialists is the acknowledgment that they may have 
made errors in their capture or review of the data (Basset et al, 2006). The suggestion 
that the propensity of a forensics specialist is to continue with an investigation, even in 
the face of what by accidental erasure or other effect on a file system could be classed 
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as evidence contamination at best, or evidence tampering at worst. The view presented 
that forensics specialists have difficulty admitting mistakes is seemingly generally held 
to be true. Given that the specialist would, in the view of Basset et al rarely be 
challenged on such issues, the ethical debate would seem to carry significant importance 
in the future operation of data forensics. Without a professional conscience or ethics, 
and little scrutiny of actual activities, it is not difficult to extrapolate the accidental data 
tampering to intentional in order to support a pre-expected outcome of a case.  
Whilst such sweeping suggestions cast doubts on the professionalism of many 
investigators, suggesting by inference that investigators routinely tamper with evidence, 
it should be clear that the intention is indeed to describe the simplistic activities of some 
forensic investigators and the none too obvious ways in which evidence contamination 
can occur. Basset et al (2006) in their obviously experienced recollections of forensic 
data activities, may have made their work clearer by actually using the word 
contamination. It is so relatively simple for an investigator to make what may seem to 
be unimportant mistakes in the process of forensic investigation which can have 
disastrous outcomes on the conclusions of that investigation (Curley, 2010; Livio, 
2010).  
This Thesis has already explored the possibility of evidence being contaminated by data 
areas used in the investigation not being properly cleaned before use, in Section 3.12, 
and also suggested that the careless handling of data devices during the triage process 
can seriously affect the quality of data available to the investigation (Livio, 2010; Ball, 
2009). What has not yet been explored is the ability of tools themselves to contaminate 
the evidential work area.  
5.5 Tool reliability and mismanagement 
Forensics tools have at their heart in most cases the ability to recover data that has been 
marked for deletion by the user or application. In very few cases can a forensic 
investigator gather enough knowledge of the circumstances of the life of the data device 
to be absolutely sure what set of activities have been performed on that device before it 
was forensically captured. Just as has been previously discussed in Chapter 3, that 
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forensic work areas can be contaminated by prior activities, so can user devices that are 
captured for investigation (Meyers, 2005). Tools that perform automated recovery 
functions will attempt to recover any deleted files and associated data links, and in some 
cases these can relate to previous incarnations of files, or users. With the inexperienced 
investigator, files automatically recovered will all seem to pertain to the current case 
and as such reported and reviewed in the same light (Carvey, 2007a). Experienced 
investigators will always retain a pure work area for reference to ensure that only 
relevant file links are recovered as required, knowing that automated recovery can cause 
such challenges (Leyden, 2003). 
Also worth considering here in some detail is a worked example of what has been 
coined the Nintendo effect (Carvey, 2007a). A tool set designed to aid the forensic 
analyst will attempt, in order that it is seen as being useful, to recover files and outline 
user activities. Using a body of knowledge that has gone before it will also attempt to 
interpret that data for the analyst. This body of knowledge will include reverse 
engineering of systems and applications by forensic analysts and software engineers in 
the past. Most program internal workings are held to be proprietary to the software 
company and thus never disclosed. Therefore, in doing this reverse engineering the tool 
has to make assumptions about the file system, operating system and application. As 
these develop and evolve, the linkages they have and the areas in which they store data 
can change. Whilst the expectations in the profession are that the tool should be 
intelligent enough to understand which version of a system or application it is dealing 
with, it is still incumbent on the tool user to verify the outputs of and the workings of 
that tool set.  
As an extremely simple example, of how data could be retrieved and wrongly used to 
produce an inference, take what is today known, by trial and error, to be the last written 
date field of a database file. To illustrate, if this field description is changed by a new 
software version release to now actually reference the last viewed field, the tool should 
understand and deal with this program change correctly. Any tool that does not only 
confirm the actual application version, but also understand the difference and warn the 
reviewer of this modification can provide incorrect results or evidence claiming the 
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contents to be the last time the file was changed. In a case where it is important to show 
specific action by a user, this could be critical. Reading a field can often be done for 
many system maintenance reasons, but changing the contents of a field, usually requires 
intentional actions by the user, or by the application on behalf of the user.  
Just to be clear, there is no suggestion that any software producer would intentionally 
cause this level of problem, but as most of the application workings for most 
commercial software is proprietary, and forensics software can sometimes involve 
educated guesswork, the situation is not unusual. Whilst necessarily simplistic so as to 
reduce the amount of page space, this example is not so far from occurrences that 
routinely happen as computer systems and applications evolve (Sheldon, 2011). 
 “and the very last thing forensic examiners want is for lawyers to understand the 
process well enough to conduct an effective cross examination” (Ball, 2004, p. 2). 
This suggests that there is an implied secrecy in what is being delivered. Ball also uses 
the title of tool tyke, with a description of; 
“…poorly-trained experts rely on software tools without much understanding how they 
work” (Ball, 2004, p. 2),  
also proposing; 
“…just as not every doctor is qualified as a coroner, not every systems administrator is 
a forensics expert” (Ball, 2004, p. 3). 
These expertise arguments abound in the data forensics arena, and in many cases for 
good reason. As discussed in Section 1.7, there is significant availability of tools that 
provide instant recovery of deleted files, rebuilding of images and claimed historical 
analysis of web usage. This means that relatively inexperienced users of such tools can 
pass themselves off, or be passed off as expert forensic analysts, based on the data or 
reviews they provide. The outputs of those tools in a proper sense should be correlated 
with supporting random manual analysis of the same data sets to verify the efficacy of 
the tool in use. An investigator that does not have these skills will be unable to provide 
that secondary control and therefore his results will be seriously in question without 
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this. This holds true only if indeed the circumstances of the analysis are properly 
revealed, which unfortunately for the furtherance of the profession is not always the 
case (Livio, 2010; Carvey, 2007a; Ball, 2004). 
 “A forensic analyst will carry out several careful steps in an attempt to retrieve any 
potential information from a seized computer system. Much of the data that is examined 
is data that would not be typically viewable to the average user, such as deleted and 
hidden files. Most evidence is found in the files of the computer operating system itself, 
stored on the hard drive, storage devices or media” (Thomas and Peterson , 2008, p. 4). 
The challenge therefore is to provide a proper reasoning that if the average person 
cannot see the data that is being presented, how do we know it is truly the data that was 
on the device under investigation. The tyke or Nintendo effects are most dangerous here. 
A proper analysis would produce a reasoned explanation of how files had been either 
rebuilt or recovered, along with the methodologies applied in that process. As the 
availability of properly professional forensic investigators grows, and therefore the 
ability of both sides of an argument to provide an expert testimony to support their 
particular argument increases, the chances that unsound conclusions from tyke or 
Nintendo forensics will be challenged, fortunately increases (Livio, 2010). 
5.6 Reasonable doubt 
 “In Taylor v. Texas, the testimony by the expert showed that he used a contaminated 
hard drive from a prior case to make a mirror image of the appellant’s drive. 
Furthermore, the expert formatted Taylor’s drive by accident when attempting to 
prepare the destination drive” (Meyers et al, 2004, p. 5). 
 Here we have perfect examples of the two greatest “sins” of forensic capture. Both of 
these are simple but technically unforgivable governance errors and by being brought 
into a court case, and therefore remaining as public record for us to reason here show 
that even a claimed expert knowing that he has contaminated a case, by going forward 
seemingly did not expect a challenge. Earlier, the first “sin” of using contaminated 
working storage to perform the analysis of the captured data was introduced. The fact 
110 
 
that this occurred, and that it was brought out in the case, provides to us the 
understanding that a properly briefed, or at least forensically aware opposing council 
thankfully was present. Whether or not the data was indeed corrupted by the residual 
data from the previous activities is not actually questioned in the case. It is merely the 
possibility that it may have been that destroys the credibility of the so called forensic 
expert. As discussed in Section 1.7, a forensic tool in any guise will at least attempt to 
piece together data to provide as coherent a story as possible for the investigator to 
follow through, and any suggestion that totally unrelated data could have driven a 
conclusion to a different end is such that the data may as well not be there. The further 
(forensic) incompetence of the investigator in this case is then highlighted by the very 
basic precaution that he failed to take in using a write blocking device.  
5.7 Write blocking 
Essentially, the two activities of a data storage device are that of reading and writing. 
There are some housekeeping activities that move data around but in fact even these are 
just compound read and write operations. In the early personal computer systems, and in 
many cases commercial systems, in use around the nineteen seventies, data storage 
devices were simply magnetic tape devices that did not then contain on board index 
facilities. A data storage device, until it was loaded into a working state, could not be 
properly categorised to contain live, and potentially useful, or merely redundant data. 
Generally, outer containers were physically marked or labelled, but not in much greater 
detail than a relative volume number marking, to enable rapid retrieval from storage 
cabinets. A physical label would read for example, [Tape 7 Wednesday Backup, Floppy 
14a System Restore] etcetera.  
Reliability of systems in those early days was not that which we expect today, and 
system and application errors, it could be argued were more frequent than we expect in 
the current stage of the computing evolution. Every data storage device therefore, was 
supplied with the ability to physically identify it as a candidate to be used in a “read-
only” state therefore only allowing read operations. The choice of whether that 
identifier was used and the data protected from accidental overwriting or not was finally 
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in the hands of the operating system, but in most cases if an operating system 
recognised the physical state as read only, it complied.  
The first floppy disks had a hole in the mount of the sleeve to identify them as read or 
write enabled. The cassette tapes used by earlier mainframe and later mini-computers to 
distribute software and upgrades had snap off tabs at each corner to signify they should 
be not overwritten. The ubiquitous magnetic tape reels had what were known as “write 
rings” in the back face to identify their ability to be overwritten or not. Even today, the 
data storage devices known as “thumb drives” or “USB memory sticks” have in many 
versions retained a tiny sense switch to prevent their accidental overwriting. With the 
advent of hard drives explored in Section 3.15, the ability to physically switch to read or 
write mode was not so simple. The efficacy in the computer system of the hard drive 
was to provide storage for many differing operations and so the facility to prevent the 
writing of data in some areas but allow it in others, was left to the controls embedded in 
the computer operating system itself. One of the main advantages of the embedded hard 
drive in the personal computer for example was to provide what is known as “virtual 
memory”. That is the ability to mirror the activities of the computer memory out on 
disk, via a pagefile or swapfile; this, in essence enabled the computer operating system 
to seem to have much more working memory available than it in fact had. The operating 
system therefore had to have the ability to decide for itself when to protect a particular 
piece of data write activity or not. Read-only switches on hard disks generally became 
redundant, and the researcher has not seen a physical facility to enable/disable write on 
a hard disk on new devices since the late 1980s.  
The forensic investigator then, in using a file system to access a data storage device, in 
the absence of a read/write switch cannot absolutely rely on the operating software to 
protect the disk. This is because the design of file system software holds the ability to 
both read and write. Two forensic solutions then are possible to protect the target data 
environment. First the file system software is modified to only allow read operations, 
but this would bring challenges. Primary of those challenges is that the software being 
used to read the data would be different to that which was used to create it, and as we 
discussed with Locard in Section 1.4, this could be questioned. Second, and more 
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reliably, the physical communication of, and with, the drive be modified outside of the 
data environment so that write commands can be physically blocked, but not changed so 
as to mirror the actual software used in the creation. It is this latter option that is the 
basis of any modern forensic data capture, and the reason that the term technically 
unforgiveable was used earlier in this chapter. These devices, known as “write blockers” 
(figure 35) exist solely to interrupt the write process in a file system during capture 
(Hamilton, 2009).  
 
Figure 35 Write Blocker Hardware 
Basic process testing prior to any data capture, which we will provide for in Section 6.6, 
for first responders is to test attempted writing to a disk using a write blocking device. 
The file system should be seen to accept the write command, properly respond to the 
request and then examination of the target device later should show that the write 
operation (usually a confirmed format or delete command) has failed to complete. If the 
analyst in the Meyers et al (2004) case who overwrote the primary evidence disk had 
used a write blocker, it would have been physically impossible to overwrite that primary 
evidence device. Even if that analyst had used a contaminated capture area, he could 
have returned and re-imaged or bit-copied the target device at a later date. The failure to 
use such a basic tool shows that we were indeed presented with a poignant example of 
Nintendo, point and click or tyke forensics (Jones, 2008; Carvey, 2007a; Ball, 2004).  
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5.8 Investigation 
Palmer (2001) suggests that the primary focus for civilian and military forensic 
investigators is not so much a drive to prosecution, but service availability or mission 
continuity. The argument being that the commercial and military goals are to provide 
the senior management with sufficient credible and trustworthy data on which to base 
mission decisions. This totally supports the argument that the commercial investigator 
does indeed need substantially different skills than in the public prosecution and 
investigative services. Not all investigations in the commercial sector are designed to 
lead to prosecution, or are indeed a criminal investigation. Forensic investigators can be 
used in many cases to help understand the particular failure of a computer system, or 
series of events that in fact led to a non-computer related crime or failure in other areas.  
Mendell (1998) suggests that computer forensics is no different to traditional forensics 
We are provided with the analogy that if a homicide investigator found a knife at a 
crime scene, he would not expect that a knife expert be brought to the scene. The knife 
would be carefully captured and taken back to sterile forensic laboratory conditions. 
Mendell provides that the responder would then be required to gather any other related 
evidence and note the circumstances at the scene. Such procedures, are similarly 
required for computer forensics investigators, and that crime scenes themselves should 
not be used as the investigative platform (Mendell, 1998). To provide a better reasoning 
for the non-technical reviewer, if a computer is found to be at the centre of a particular 
event or series of events that is causing either a criminal or commercial concern, it 
would be totally inappropriate to use that computer system itself to actually perform the 
forensic analysis of relevant data. The system itself could be corrupted, either 
deliberately or accidentally, diverting the actual integrity of an investigation, or it could 
contain vital information in areas of its operation that would be overwritten by its use as 
an investigative platform (Meyers, 2005). Mendell (1998) also further argues computer 
crime investigators focus too early on the technical details. Such arguing supports inputs 
to the triage process that a first responder training curriculum would encompass much 
more than purely the data capture. It also supports common arguments that the 
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commercial awareness of an investigator is paramount if he is to be useful in a private 
sector role.  
Mendell’s (1998) prescription for investigations starts with three simple steps, namely; 
gather the general facts, establish that there is a need for an investigation and preserve 
the evidence. Arguably we see a simple piece of advice, given in the best of reasoning 
that could be so wrongly interpreted. This wrongful interpretation could create havoc in 
an investigation. Specifically, most research shows that the establishment of need 
should not be in the hands of an investigator. The investigator should be there as a 
witness of fact to the proceedings of the investigation. If we are asking an investigator at 
such an early stage to provide opinion as to the potential voracity of the investigation, 
then we can only expect that opinion to be based upon less than coherent assumptions, 
rather than established fact. Good forensic practice will require an investigator to 
establish, in the face of a large amount of relevant data, or the inability to acquiesce the 
systems under review, proof that basic supporting data to underpin a continuation of 
capture exists (Guidance Software, 2004). This could be a rudimentary search for a 
particular incriminating phrase or set of credit card numbers on a hard disk, to a series 
of electronic mail exchanges to prove at least suspicion of connection or interchange 
with a particular electronic mail or computer address. This is the very least that any 
expert opinion of need for a continuance of investigation should be based upon. Indeed 
in a parallel world, that of traditional forensics, there are recent calls to challenge the 
reliability of forensics disciplines that deliver opinion purely on one piece of evidence 
such as a partial fingerprint (Spadanuta, 2010). 
 
5.9 Hacking or investigating 
”Legitimate security researchers are at risk of being criminalised as a result of the 
recent amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990. We welcome the Minister's 
assurance that guidance on this point will appear later in the summer, but urge the 
Crown Prosecution Service to publish this guidance as soon as possible, so as to avoid 
undermining such research in the interim” (SCST, 2006, 2.45). 
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This text is introduced here to highlight the dilemma that professional forensic 
investigators have in many countries, as well as the challenges that less than 
professional tykes may present going forward. In reviewing the data on a computer 
system, as well as recovering data that has been purposely deleted, an investigator can 
be said often to be viewing what has been properly and intentionally removed from 
view. In many cases it is the designated target data, namely the personal and 
professional musings and activities of the person properly under investigation. In almost 
as many cases perhaps, people connected to that business process may also have their 
activities and thoughts revealed purely because of the contact they have had with that 
computer user or computer system (privacy.org, 1993). The laws in many countries 
have evolved, certainly in the last few decades, to protect us from the improper abuse of 
information that occurs by the inappropriate access to either our systems or data, as 
previously challenged in Section 1.12. These laws are properly constructed to protect 
the innocent. In many cases, because the speed of evolution of the information 
technology under question, these laws have not allowed for commercial investigation or 
indeed in some cases public investigation of crime and fraud. A debate continues, which 
would extend too far beyond the reach of this Thesis, that merely by recovering data 
from a target disk in a system in the UK, we may have breached the “access without 
consent” provisions of the Computer Misuse Act (Great Britain, 1990) and thus could 
be liable to prosecution (Sapphire, 2007).  
5.10 Doubt and opinion 
A landmark trial, in what was expected by industry experts to be simple to prove guilt, 
was lost because the defence argued an effective Trojan claim (Leyden, 2003). The 
technical director of respected security consultancy IRM, Nigel Barrett who appeared in 
the case as an expert witness for the prosecution, agreed with the assessment of many 
that the judge had set a precedent which would have to be overturned if the profession 
were to continue to be able to reliably argue from a provision of factual analysis of 
forensic data.  
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”This is a setback because it opens the floodgates to Trojan arguments, not just in 
hacking cases, but in the prosecution of paedophile cases" (Leyden, 2003, p. 1). 
Barrett told The Register  
"It's very difficult to counter the quite simple argument that someone else did it and ran 
away. We had hoped to show that if someone else did it they would have left footprints 
and that, in this case, there weren't any. It's difficult to prove something hasn't 
happened, the case is likely to prompt a review by police of how evidence is put before a 
jury in computer crime cases” (Leyden, 2003, p. 1). 
In highly complex cases, this use of a jury to decide on the reasonable probability that a 
crime was indeed committed and the extent to which the proof has been shown is 
arguably solely attributable to the oratory quality of the prosecution expert witness. 
Quite often, the complexity of the forensic process, and the inability to prove 
conclusively a certain artefact existed in a certain state causes doubts to be easily 
introduced in the arguing process. 
“Parties on both the defence and prosecution side of the case floated the opinion that 
complex computer crime cases might better be tried before a panel of experts, rather 
than a jury. However juries are frequently asked to consider complex cases involving 
fraud. Also since changes in the rights of a defendant to trial by jury could only by 
authorized by Parliament this proposal is more a debating point than a practical 
suggestion” (Leyden, 2003, p. 1). 
The Register is a primary source of computer security opinion, and discussions continue 
there since this case, as to how the law should evolve to support proper function of 
factual forensic arguing such cases. There are parallels to be drawn in the commercial 
sector of such analysis. Consider where a company has subjected a particular 
environment to forensic analysis to provide a knowledge or circumstance of a particular 
event or series of events. Should it then be proper that a forceful or persuasive manager 
be able to redirect the findings or output based on the introduction of doubts in the 
guarantee of conclusions of the expert (Livio, 2010; Ball, 2004; Meyers et al, 2004). Of 
course one would argue this should properly not be the case, but the business world is 
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not generally black and white, and business is transacted based on risk and probability 
of success. Properly, the inputs of a forensic analyst should be taken as purely that, 
input to the overall business decision making process. A practiced forensic analyst will 
therefore consider the outputs, and be able and ready to provide an opinion of relevance 
as to the reliability of the data he has uncovered in relation to the case in hand. Should 
that opinion then be challenged in the light of other circumstances or artefacts, it is 
usually that particular risk analysis process of the business that decides the outcome of 
an investigation. The investigator, as a professional, will move on to the next task.  
”Research into IT security in the United Kingdom is high in quality but limited in 
quantity. More support for research is needed—above all, from industry. The 
development of one or more major multi-disciplinary research centres, following the 
model of CITRIS, is necessary to attract private funding and bring together experts 
from different academic departments and industry in a more integrated, multi-
disciplinary research effort. We recommend that the Research Councils take the lead in 
initiating discussions with Government, universities and industry with a view to the 
prompt establishment of an initial centre in this country” (SCST, 2006, 2.44). 
5.11 The Profession 
The profession of Information Security is as large as the use of information. One of the 
specialist disciplines is that which is under discussion here, that of data forensics. The 
redaction of this research and production of this Thesis intends that by adding to the 
body of knowledge and research that is being called for by the Select Committee and 
Eurim, more support will be garnered for the furtherance of the data forensics 
profession (SCST, 2006; Eurim, 2004). In the meantime however, it is evident that the 
extent of pure academic research in this area is surprisingly low. Opinion suggests that 
one of the reasons for this is that the profession is not one that has evolved over a long 
time, such as the medical or legal profession (Manunta, 1996). The data forensics 
profession is one which has been forced into existence by the underlying lack of basic 
security controls as a primary driver in the information systems revolution. This Thesis 
discussed the right for data forensics to be called a profession in Section 1.11. In a 
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simplistic fashion the evolution of the data forensic profession could be likened to the 
banking protective security specialisation, where the need for secure design and 
installation of cash safes and vaults only became apparent when the money started to be 
stolen. 
To reinforce the need for professionally trained and qualified investigators to be more 
readily available to the commercial sphere, we see the clamour in light of the disclosure 
discussions in the USA.  
5.12 Discovery and forensics models 
“The US has already shown the way with two cases -Zubulake v. UBS Warburg and 
Coleman v. Morgan Stanley where the courts awarded damages of $29 million and $1.5 
billion (yes "billion") in damages because the companies were unable to produce 
electronically stored data in a timely fashion and for continuously coming up with new 
data stores even after their counsel had certified the completeness of already disclosed 
ESI (electronically stored information)” (Kelman, 2009, p. 1). 
Whilst this is not evidence purely of the need for an experienced investigator, it is very 
good evidence of the need for a proper process of discovery. As more and more data is 
gathered and archived by companies, their ability to retrieve it in a timely and consistent 
fashion is repeatedly brought into question.  
Mendell (1998) offers simple, yet sound advice in determining the entry point to an 
investigation, suggesting that a computer crime, and importantly the investigative 
process around a computer crime, has three distinct stages, a beginning, a middle and an 
end. Whilst this may seem to be an obvious statement to make, to ensure that work and 
analysis efforts are properly guided, the investigator must clearly understand at which 
stage he is entering. Mendell also suggests that in most cases in his experience, the 
investigator will be brought in at the end of a computer aided crime. There is a 
recommendation that the use of tools to ensure timelines are correctly portrayed, and 
this verifies another requirement in the catalogue of training needs that have evolved 
from this research. 
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The proprietary (to the tool suppliers) methodologies of forensic data investigation lend 
themselves readily to the systematic process that is needed to provide for documented 
evidence that a thorough and coordinated data discovery process has been undertaken. It 
is timely therefore, to introduce formal modelling of forensics practice. Presented in the 
International Journal of Digital Evidence in 2002, an Abstract Digital Forensics Model 
was described:  
“Drawing from the previous forensic protocols, there exist common steps that can be 
abstractly defined to produce a model that is not dependent on a particular technology 
or electronic crime” (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
The writers argued that the basis of the model was to determine the key aspects of the 
protocols they had outlined as well as introducing and cementing pieces of the 
traditional forensics deliveries. The paper used in particular the protocol for an FBI 
physical crime scene search. It went on to argue,  
“This proposed model can be thought of as an enhancement of the [DFRW] model since 
it is inspired from it” (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Here the writers are referring to the Digital Forensics Research Workshop, an American 
organisation that claims “DFRWS is dedicated to the sharing of knowledge and ideas 
about digital forensics research” (DFRW, 2001, p. 1). 
The paper suggested some key components of a forensics model:  
1. Identification – recognizing an incident from indicators and determining its type. 
This is not explicitly within the field of forensics, but significant because it impacts 
other steps (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Figure 36 Forensics Model Component 1 
Clearly, the first responder has to triage a suspected scene to ensure that the correct 
artefacts are indeed captured. Understanding the relevance of the artefacts to any 
continuing investigation is critical. 
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2. Preparation – preparing tools, techniques, search warrants, and monitoring 
authorizations and management support (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Figure 37 Forensics Model Component 2 
The criticality of preparation was discussed already in Section 3.12 (contamination), 
simple activities such as ensuring the sterility of capture devices is of paramount 
importance. 
3. Approach strategy – dynamically formulating an approach based on potential 
impact on bystanders and the specific technology in question. The goal of the strategy 
should be to maximize the collection of untainted evidence while minimizing impact 
to the victim (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Figure 38 Forensics Model Component 3 
Once again, triage is clearly critical. Whilst the paper was written before the ubiquity of 
cloud computing and some of the more geographically distributed databases actually 
started to appear, the concept of recovering data from large data entities that could not 
be acquiesced was already being considered. Although this references the “victim”, it 
can just as easily be applied to a target network entity or company. 
4. Preservation – isolate, secure and preserve the state of physical and digital 
evidence. This includes preventing people from using the digital device or allowing 
other electromagnetic devices to be used within an affected radius (Reith et al, 2002, 
p. 1). 
Figure 39 Forensics Model Component 4 
As outlined in Section 3.5, the effects of EMP radiation or interference from static 
electricity to any seized devices can have enormous repercussions on a case, as well as 
bringing into doubt the voracity of any professional gathering of evidence. The 
discussions on using write protection devices and understanding the state of data during 
capture is important. Once again, Reith et al here assume (because their work is 
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produced with the public sector in mind) that the devices in question will be removed 
from their environment on the authority of the investigation, which is not the automatic 
case in commercial investigations. 
5. Collection – record the physical scene and duplicate digital evidence using 
standardized and accepted procedures (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Figure 40 Forensics Model Component 5 
This is the essential part of triage that a first responder absolutely must be comfortable 
with. Section 6.5 (first responder) will detail the exact types of procedures that should 
be taught and tested, but in general the discussions that have already been presented 
around evidence contamination and reproduction of evidence are at play in this 
component as outlined in Chapter 3. 
6. Examination – in-depth systematic search of evidence relating to the suspected 
crime. This focuses on identifying and locating potential evidence, possibly within 
unconventional locations. Construct detailed documentation for analysis (Reith et al, 
2002, p. 1). 
Figure 41 Forensics Model Component 6 
Clearly, the first responder must be more than a technical expert, he should naturally 
understand how important supporting artefacts may be in an investigation, and the 
potential for seemingly unconnected items to bear relevance to the case. As an example, 
in an early investigative case which the researcher was involved in, the suspect had 
stolen intellectual property, and a civil search warrant had been issued in favour of the 
company that employed the researcher. A rudimentary key system for passwords had 
been employed on the seized systems which although advanced for the time was not 
completely secure. Upon triaging the systems it became obvious that without access to 
the passwords we would have had to spend so much longer on site to gather what may 
be relevant evidence as we were not able to interrogate the systems in question 
immediately. Whilst we were starting the capture process, a supporting official, there to 
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ensure our safety, switched on the television in the living room of the house. The 
official commented on the strange channel names displayed on the TV set, and there 
were our passwords. Arguably this, at a time when many television sets were still of the 
manual twist channel change type, could be described most aptly as an unconventional 
location, and an example of one skill that the Thesis means to outline as being 
important. This could better be termed the skill of curiosity. 
7. Analysis – determine significance, reconstruct fragments of data and draw 
conclusions based on evidence found. It may take several iterations of examination 
and analysis to support a crime theory. The distinction of analysis is that it may not 
require high technical skills to perform and thus more people can work on this case 
(Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Figure 42 Forensics Model Component 7 
It is possible for a professional forensics investigator to be dismayed by the inference in 
this step that the analysis may require less technical skills than other areas (Jones, 2008; 
Ball, 2004). It does however support arguments that the importance that should be 
placed upon the quality and depth of technical knowledge required to perform proper 
reconstruction of recovered data is indeed, even in the profession, not properly 
understood. 
8. Presentation – summarize and provide explanation of conclusions. This should be 
written in a layperson’s terms using abstracted terminology. All abstracted 
terminology should reference the specific details (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Figure 43 Forensics Model Component 8 
Another area dealt with in the discussions on presentation in Section 6.9, is that of how 
to get highly technical concepts across to the layman. 
“The predominance of our current forensic analysis methodologies leave examiners 
woefully behind in seemingly never-ending game of catch-up with those committing 
computer crimes. As intrusions and other computer crimes continue to increase in 
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sophistication, forensic examiners need to grow beyond their current toolkits and 
innovate in their methods of forensic data collection and analysis. The age of "Nintendo 
forensics" has drawn to a close” (Carvey, 2007a, p. 4). 
Attempts to provide a lay description of forensic methodologies, may actually for some 
people confuse forensic issues with the threats of malware. Information security 
generalists when discussing forensics do little to help clarify. Consider the extract 
below, where we suddenly find ourselves in the realm of viruses; 
“The traditional forensic analysis methodology has been to unplug the system, remove 
and acquire a forensic image (bit-by-bit, exact copy) of the hard drive, and then analyse 
the acquired image using a file-based approach, within both the active file system as 
well as unallocated sectors. As the systems themselves become more sophisticated, the 
examiners tools have struggled to keep up, allowing for automated searches, as well as 
running anti-virus scanning applications” (Carvey, 2007a, p. 7). 
It is certainly pertinent to argue that the shift in evidence gathering today in the 
commercial sector at least is moving from being able to physically switch off a system, 
to having to capture from a running system, and therefore make subjective decisions as 
to what to capture. This can be a requirement for partial capture from a greater size 
networked system than is practically possible or geographically reasonable to capture 
(Jones, 2008). This then is a very difficult concept to clarify to a lay person, we 
sometimes will perform certain actions but cannot be clear as to when we will or will 
not. 
9. Returning evidence – ensuring physical and digital property is returned to proper 
owner as well as determining how and what criminal evidence must be removed. 
Again not an explicit forensic (Reith et al, 2002, p. 1). 
Figure 44 Forensics Model Component 9 
Whilst this Thesis has not particularly dwelled on the conceptual differences between 
the traditional physical forensics world and that of the data forensic analysts, here is one 
really important difference. The fact that a forensic analyst can have what, for all intents 
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and purposes, is an exact facsimile of the original data, and yet not deprive the proper 
keeper of access to, or the ability to further modify the original is paramount. This is 
potentially one of the most complex issues to deliver in understandable terms to lay 
practitioners of the law and commercial investigations. Crime or nefarious behaviour 
can continue to be committed unless the actor is deprived of the primary means by 
which to do so. To compare, if a murderer is not deprived of the weapon found in their 
possession the ability to continue to commit crime is not diminished.  
5.13 Evolution 
The advent of the commercial Internet and World Wide Web during the early nineteen 
nineties meant that it was so much easier to share exploits and more importantly ideas 
than had previously been possible with dialup modems etcetera,. Free, or at least at sunk 
cost, of an Internet link communication, meant that spreading of information was no 
longer something that carried a cost of a telephone call, stamp or modem connection 
fee. Electronic mail meant that not only did the primary recipient of a mail 
communication see that idea, but also any person who then was copied on a reply or 
forward of that mail. The originator no longer was needed to be involved in the mass 
dissemination of the idea.  
The possibilities of exploits being abused for criminal or nefarious intent therefore 
became greater as their knowledge sometimes spread outside of the intended recipient 
audience. In the bulletin board systems of the nineteen eighties and similar shared 
repositories on ARPAnet curious technologists and enthusiasts would share with each 
other on peer invite only discussion schemes, their thoughts and current exploits 
(Raymond, 2000). Operating system failures would be discussed and source code 
glitches analysed, usually from the purely technological curiosity learning standpoint. 
From these discussions practitioners would evolve ways in which to identify particular 
failure scenarios, or look for patterns in allocation dumps (Cornwall, 1998). By looking 
at the data held in memory when an application (system or user) failed, it was usually 
possible to understand at what stage in the process the application had been, what data 
feeds and outputs were at play, and in most cases the particular instruction that caused 
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the failure. These were the early forensic analysis procedures being built. As more and 
more the audience for these analyses grew, so did the predictable and repeatable series 
of steps taken to do that analysis, or in other words, procedures. As these discussions 
evolved from closed clubs in university networks or members only computer societies, 
increasingly, to open discussion forums on the Internet, the self-regulating peer sharing 
controls devolved massively (Raymond, 2000).  
What started to become evident was that seemingly innocuous hacking exploits, when 
tagged with social engineering techniques reviewed in more detail in Section 2.4.7, or 
other code failures, could now become predictable and dangerously systematic failures 
injected in application processes used to control all manner of systems. The forensic 
community was not as quick to open up discussions, perhaps because of the generally 
regarded elite nature of the profession. Maybe this is also attributable to the fact that the 
few practitioners available at that time were too busy dealing with this emerging activity 
from the expanding criminal hacking community. 
 “Many of the hosting organisations, such as banks, other financial institutions and 
healthcare organisations, are taking more strenuous measures to protect themselves (in 
part due to regulatory requirements, rather than their own initiative), yet they are still 
being successfully penetrated. As the defences around these castles are being built, the 
attackers are increasingly turning their sites [sic] on the target-rich environment of the 
relatively under-protected home users” (Carvey, 2007a, p. 5). 
A central theme to this research and to the challenge presented by the emerging 
profession of data forensics, is that the growing dependence upon forensic tools is 
important to understand. The emergence of the Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard requirements (PCI-DSS, 2008) across commercial card processing entities 
world-wide, and the enforced forensic data analysis after any reported breach requires 
that so many more data forensics specialists be available. The standard (PCI-DSS, 2008) 
provides for management and monitoring, including certification for larger card 
processors and merchants. If an entity is found to have breached the standard and 
exposed card data, the scheme can require a complete data and network forensic 
investigation. This is suggested, by this research, to be the single most important factor 
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in the recent growth of the need for data forensic analysts world-wide. Under the 
scheme each company is required in certifying, either by self or an appointed assessor, 
(dependent on transaction numbers) that they have timely access to such an expert in 
case of a data breach. Controversially, a compliance assessor is required to be 
accredited by the PCI DSS council (PCI Standards Council, 2006), where a data 
forensic investigator is not, adding to the potential for tykes, point and click or Nintendo 
experts to grow in number. This researcher suggests that merely taking technical 
expertise on particular computer systems and using that to perform data forensic 
analysis is bound to be fraught with problems, not least those types of issues outlined so 
far in this Thesis. Examples of such problems are detailed earlier, such as the 
destruction of evidence, the contamination of data and the accidental erasure of target 
systems. 
 “In the 1990s, many computer intrusion incidents were committed by pranksters, joy-
riders on the Information Superhighway, bent on causing mayhem because they could. 
Loading the Trojan horse application 'du jour' on a system and opening and closing the 
CD-Rom drive tray became more than a nuisance for many system administrators and 
helpdesk technicians. However, the increase in online banking, online shopping, and in 
short, more and more people taking their lives online has lead to an economic drive and 
financial goal to these intrusions” (Carvey, 2007a, p. 5). 
The growth in the need for forensic practitioners is in part predicated upon the shifting 
patterns of the criminal fraternity. The underlying pressure therefore in working with 
this research subject is to ensure that the advice offered around the education, training, 
governance and certification of practitioners is relevant not only to the perceived need 
today, but also caters for the emerging challenges of the profession, as far as they can be 
predicted. 
5.14 Hashing 
”further data reduction is automated through the use of libraries of cryptographic hash 
tables for both 'known good' and 'known bad' files, the key word here being 'known'. 
Increasingly, malware authors are creating custom and even new versions of their 
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tools, and some have even created point-and-click interfaces that allow for the 
automated creation of the custom malware. On a regular basis, forensic examiners see 
examples of Trojans, backdoors, and worms that are not recognized by name, or even 
as malicious in nature, when examined by over 30 separate anti-virus scanning 
applications” (Carvey, 2007a, p. 7). 
This clearly is again focusing on the discovery of malware. Introducing the concept of 
hash tables for files however is relevant at this point. The very existence of such 
repositories shows that there is indeed a sharing of knowledge amongst professionals. 
Carvey introduces for us the two primary reasons to have them, “known good” and 
“known bad”. Simply, hashing is used predominantly in forensics to remove the 
“known good” files from lists of files that are run against string and number searches. 
The majority of image files on a personal computer as of the release on the newer 
Microsoft Windows [Windows-XP, Windows7, etcetera] systems will be attached to or 
delivered to a large amount in data terms, of known good applications [Microsoft 
Windows, Microsoft Office, Adobe etcetera]. The matching of the exact content of the 
files is important to the examiner to be able to remove a great deal of resident 
application image data from any searches that need to be performed. This is made 
possible by knowing if they match a known good signature, then they have not been 
tampered with since release from the manufacturer. Also introduced is the 
corresponding “known bad” concept, where malware or malicious files that have been 
previously identified have been catalogued and a cryptographic hash circulated within 
the data forensic community. These hashes are useful in dealing with traditional virus or 
malware files and they support the rapid identification of malicious files. It is relevant to 
note in the paragraph above that the writers of such malware are obviously well aware 
of the ability of forensics tools to do such rapid review and are attempting to circumvent 
by creating unique or random signatures and therefore defeat the efficacy of hashes 
against them. 
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5.15 Summary of concerns and challenges 
This chapter summarised some of the underlying concerns and challenges in the 
profession today. It visited the noteworthy poor performance of some forensics 
investigators to date, it investigated some of the dependencies upon the tool sets 
currently in use, and more importantly attempts to amalgamate the often contradictory 
advices from the various experiences in the field. The profession is now being 
challenged from many sources and the sometimes slipshod manner in which 
investigations have been performed, as evidenced in the chapter, arguably can no longer 
be allowed to continue. Noteworthy is the age of many of the references, showing both 
that this is an aged problem, and, more importantly that it has yet to be resolved. 
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6  Training & Research 
Throughout this Thesis there are calls to censure the tykes or Nintendo forensics 
investigators. There are examples of data recoveries providing non-existent files, or 
what experienced practitioners term basic procedural failures. This chapter will 
summarise an outline curriculum for investigators and analysts, along with certification 
challenges to allow for at least a common base of knowledge to be tested before 
providing forensic outputs. Necessarily much of the data is built from current tool 
manufacturer proprietary courses, and those courses now evolving as the need grows in 
the industry. The summary attempts where possible to ensure that any training remains 
vendor neutral to provide independence of solution. 
It is logical that to hold anyone accountable to a standard, the standard should be clear 
and commonly held to be relevant to the considerations being applied. Data, IT or 
Computer forensics is a wide field, and has at its base the understanding of how 
information moves around computer systems and networks, how it can be stored, and 
the various staging points it can be held at. As with many other professions, if it is to be 
called one, it has branches that specialize and areas that require expertise from very 
specific areas of study (cryptography, printer technologies, electronics etcetera) 
(Manunta, 1996; Simonsen, 1996).  
Taal (2007) argues that there is a lot of money spent on services in the private sector as 
they are seen as the experts in the field. Taal also interestingly suggests that using an 
Internet search engine, such as Google search is the manner by which to uncover the 
amount of companies supposedly expert in the field, and presents at the same time the 
challenge of who therefore determines the level of expertise and how is it tested. That 
work follows on to argue that not all investment in private sector skills is wasted, stating 
that there are very good companies around and claiming that some of them have fully 
certified consultants. Unfortunately for this research, there are no references to the 
certification process or bodies under review. The study concludes that sometimes it is 
more cost effective to engage the services of the private sector investigators than to train 
people up internally. We can assume therefore, that this call for training is pointed at the 
public sector, referring perhaps to a specific governmental institution. In rounding off it 
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is stated that defence lawyers are seeing the benefits of introducing forensics experts, 
and this by inference, increases the need for more forensic experts to be trained up. The 
PCI requirements for forensics analysis support this conclusion (PCI, 2009). 
In 1993 Fay made inroads in formally describing the challenges that are perceived in 
this (or what least then was) emerging field. Fay cited that (traditional) security 
professionals were intimidated when they learn computers are involved in the 
commission of a crime, and this stemmed from their belief that they would be unable to 
solve any such crime as it would be beyond their ability. Fay argued that this was not 
true and traditional investigative skills are brought to bear in this as any other 
investigation, quoting statistics that even in 1993 were being used to quantify the need 
for computer forensics professionals. The FBI reported then (in 1993) that the average 
computer assisted embezzlement netted $450,000 whilst theft in person averaged 
$19,000. What was brought into play was the concept that in information crime, 
manufacturing companies were just as liable to financial fraud as the banks. A 
comparison with current statistics would not be relevant to the argument being 
presented here. Understanding that in 1993, the PC was in its infancy, computer crime 
would almost certainly have been committed in the main against large corporate 
computers, hence the astounding ratio of the numbers presented, clearly a call for action 
at that time. The US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) report released in 
2008 made similar calls in its paper on the need for process and governance in the 
computer forensics field (US-CERT, 2008). By referring to computer forensics as a new 
field in 2008, this paper suggests that all the work of people like Fay and others was 
seemingly ignored at least by the US government CERT researchers producing that 
paper. 
The first step an investigator should take is to avoid jumping to conclusions, an astute 
computer investigator will always question the viability of the evidence and the 
assumptions made around it. Important is also the ability to recognize one may be 
heading down a wrong path or towards as dead end is a valuable skill that investigators 
should attempt to develop (Mendell, 1998). 
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6.1 Rewards 
Sennewald (1981) argued that for the public investigator, the rewards are in the sense of 
achievement when a criminal is taken into custody at the successful resolution of a case. 
For the public sector, the emphasis of the work is the successful prosecution of an 
offender. The frustration levels, even in 1981, were obviously rising as the number of 
successful prosecutions were increasingly being overturned at appeal. These reversals, 
based on what was described, somewhat tersely as “liberal interpretations of the law”, 
and the “wrist slapping sentences” were even then creating a climate of dissent for the 
professional investigator. Sennewald concluded in his text that the satisfaction for the 
professional investigator should be found in the investigative process itself, not the end 
result, describing this as the means – not the end. The discussions around the challenges 
centre on various levels of frustration, based upon an earlier premise introduced in those 
discussions, that the primary objective of an investigator in the private sector is to 
protect the organizational goals, and not necessarily end in prosecution. Sennewald cites 
an example of closing down a counterfeiting operation where the very fact that the 
operation ceases, is enough of a result. In other words a psychological reward for the 
investigator. Another example offered is that of successfully uncovering the falsification 
of travel expenses during an investigation, culminating in the firing of an employee, 
arguing that this outcome provides job satisfaction for the investigator. O’Hara (1994) 
brings into play the concept of corpus delicti, or the proving that a crime was 
committed. This requirement obviously does not always exist in a private sector 
investigative role, but it would be a potential end goal of many investigations if the 
intention was to prove that the required outcome of an investigation was met. This is in 
many cases purely a desire to prove that something actually happened, albeit in a data 
sense rather than physical. There is a great deal of information available in the legal 
sector around tests for burden of proof. The data collated in this research suggests that a 
simple transposition of some of the lighter concepts from a rudimentary commercial or 
data law primer would suffice to be included in the training catalogue (Ball, 2009).  
As the automobile provided a swifter means by which criminals could move around and 
as such extend their cover of criminality, so in a similar manner the computer will 
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provide new avenues for them to venture into (Mendell, 1998). This gives us a direction 
in the training requirements that requires us to build in flexibility for the investigator to 
take on new skills that must complement current skills as computer crime crosses or 
expands into different or new areas of the information environment. An example could 
be the shift from skimming of credit card magstripe data as a card is read, to the 
interception of the Europay, Mastercard, Visa (EMV) standard data itself as the UK 
card issuers moved from magstripe to EMV authentication methods (EMVCO, 2009; 
McCue, 2008) 
Supporting discussions around the training and use of toolsets: 
 “ These tools and services have become heavily relied upon by law enforcement and 
with the lack of proper evaluating processes in place for tools and services individuals 
and companies without the appropriate qualifications, understanding or enough 
experience are unfortunately being relied upon as experts in the field of computer 
forensics” (Taal, 2007, p. 53). 
Unfortunately there was no specific reference in the paper towards any research that 
would suggest what an appropriate qualification would be. Whilst the ideas and 
challenges are well presented and are very useful to discuss, the lack of references to 
enable us to expand the data at origin is distracting. This is a pity as the arguing was 
very convincing, and reflects the views of this researcher very closely. 
6.2 The need 
This Thesis and indeed extensive personal experience of this researcher in the sector 
strongly supports the call for formalised training for private sector first responders, 
investigators and eventually persons who we could term as evidence presenters. 
Forensic tool suppliers have a natural predication to offer training. This is by the very 
obvious fact that without training being available, the uptake of their tool could be less 
than others who do offer training. Companies such as the producers of Encase - 
Guidance Software and Forensic Tool Kit - Access Data, do offer training that is 
naturally heavily tool focused, and is patently biased towards using the particular 
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vendors tools (Access Data, 2010; Guidance, 2010). Whilst it is probably the better 
option than nothing, this training can be very expensive and singular in the overall skills 
offered. Nigel Jones in a paper at Cybercrime Forensics Education and Training 
conference (CFET) in September 2008, uses the descriptions point and click forensics 
and Nintendo forensics (Jones, 2008). The term Nintendo Forensics has been used 
extensively already, but it is useful to re-emphasise here to add weight to the challenges 
being levied at the professionalism of investigators overall and the availability of tools 
in the market as opposed to formal training of the profession. 
Underlying principles of evidence capture, gathering and proper evidential procedure 
are followed and taught in tool based training generally. In most cases it can be argued 
the aim is to further the use of specific tools, rather than produce good quality output of 
students. Indeed it is possible that a student could attend a commercial tool based 
training course for a week, understand nothing and still gain the successful completion 
certificate. Whether this is possible with the recently emerging tool-agnostic trainings 
being offered by training suppliers is not clear, however the large numbers of 
certifications in the short periods described would suggest a significant pass ratio 
(Section 1.11). In the commercial training experience of this researcher, this happens 
because there is neither on-going evaluation, nor end of course practical examination in 
any of the leading training courses. It would perhaps be better then, to claim that these 
certificates are indeed attendance rather than proficiency certificates. Such an end of 
training attendance certificate can still however be very valuable. In most private sector 
forensics areas it is the best and perhaps the only challenge an employer may have as to 
the suitability of a person to perform evidential capture and examinations. Guidance 
software, the creators of Encase, which is the most pervasive tool set do offer an 
industry peer based certification Encase Certified Examiner (ENCE, 2010; Guidance, 
2010). This researcher is a certified ENCE as well as previously an accredited trainer 
for the Guidance Software Encase Elementary and Intermediate Field Edition course 
set. General peer opinion received over the course of working with Encase is that 
without the Encase product knowledge, and use of that specific Encase tool to undergo 
the extensive practical examination, success and therefore ENCE certification would 
most likely not be probable. Discussions with peers at the CISO summits and the 
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London IT Security Forum suggest that the two other leading industry certifications of 
ACE and PCFE (Section 4.3) had similar expectations, and both offered boot camps 
intended to end in a certificated analyst on the last day of the training (MISTI, 2012). 
Again, it must be stressed that carrying such a certificate shows at least an intent to 
learn, but without formal examination and peer review does not meet the criteria we are 
expanding here. 
We are informed that there are no mechanisms in place to assess experts or a formal 
process to follow when engaging with them, arguing further that people who have 
worked in law enforcement automatically are granted a right of passage to expert status 
and nothing is based on skills or capabilities (Taal, 2007). Further there are calls for a 
professional body to register the experts in the field and for that body to regularly check 
accreditation of members. We will discuss later why that concept of a register, which in 
fact had been implemented in the UK for the forensics profession as a whole was 
disbanded in 2009 (Sommer, 2011). Taal stats that Members should be: 
“personally financial liable for false reporting similar to that of private investigators 
field” (Taal, 2007, p. 64). 
Taal further arguess that the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (Great Britain, 2001) is 
to be used to support claims for this fiscal censure. Taal summarises very well and the 
text as a whole is useful to consider here as we investigate the needs of a training 
catalogue: 
“above the most important thing… Cannot call yourself an expert if you have all the 
experience in the world and lack the basic understanding of computer science” (Taal, 
2007, p. 64). 
It is the experience of this researcher that a basic understanding of computer science is 
more likely to end in an incorrectly formulated investigation than anything else , and it 
is hoped that quoting Taal at this point, does not take this important text out of context, 
thereby diminishing the overall message of the need for a rounded experience set. The 
arguments laid out in this chapter qualify a need for in-depth expertise with extensive 
detailed experience of the application. Further there is a clear requirement for an 
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understanding of the software environment under investigation. Take for example a 
description of the overall module aims of the Kings College MSc. course  
“The stated aim of the module is “to provide students with a solid foundation to 
understand the concepts involved in both computer forensics and cybercrime” (Overill, 
2008, p. 2). 
6.3 Required skills 
Overill (2008) does emphasise the solid foundation, and is underpinned in the rounding 
call by Taal (2007). The required skills for the proposed entry point into the profession 
would probably then not be able to be met by a recent under-graduate. Perhaps leaning 
more towards a specialist (System, Network, Application) with underlying academic 
qualifications. It is suggested here that a strong requirement is some years actual 
practice on the type of systems under investigation. Similarly it is clear that there is a 
need for enough practical knowledge not only to recognise the system or application, 
but also enough analytical skill to formulate reasoned opinions and theories. This 
knowledge then is supposed to be gained through a formal course of study. 
Mendell (1998) suggests that investigators, who are not necessarily natural cynics, 
should learn scepticism as a survival skill, also arguing that social psychology is an 
integral part of their work. As part of the work that they perform, looking for reasons 
behind malicious behaviours, the investigator learns a skill of “reading between the 
lines” (Mendell, 1998, p. 92). In discussing this behavioural analysis there are certain 
factors that an experienced investigator would be looking for; people who never take 
vacations, political extremists or financial struggles, evidenced in the data captured. It is 
clear that Mendell has extensive experience particularly in fraud, and the experience 
that this researcher had gained as a Certified Fraud Examiner (ACFE, 2010) supports 
this advice. Some of the particular details are useful to succinctly highlight that a 
crossover between the fraud examiners and forensic analysts is natural. This gives us 
many other potential channels to suggest further research in at a later time. 
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Since investigation is essentially an art there has to be room in the study of the 
profession to allow for the process of intuition, described as being;  
“the sudden and unexpected insight that clarifies the problem where progress by logic 
and experiment has been end-stopped” (O’Hara, 1994, p. 23). 
A suggestion that the “hunch” is well known as being an attribute of investigative work. 
The argument continues further putting the case for intuition in reminding us that in 
many cases an investigator can come to a point where; 
“plodding work and deductive reasoning” are not working and the best one can hope for 
is a break using “intuition or chance” (O’Hara, 1994, p. 23). 
A description of the learning aims of the Kings College MSc. module neatly rounds off 
the expectations;  
“At the end of this module a student is expected to understand computer crime, together 
with its social and legal implications; understand the techniques for computer and 
network forensics; understand, and relate the above points to, the UK Computer Misuse 
Act and related EU legislation” (Overill, 2008, p. 2). 
What is interesting and potentially different to other MSc. courses dealing in specialist 
areas is that this module is not delivered as a formally examined lecture or laboratory-
based course (Holloway, 2010). A decision was made to provide it as a reading course 
ending in a dissertation and supporting oral presentation (Overill, 2008). 
This Thesis will now attempt to build on the compiled arguments and bring to bear a 
suggested curriculum outline for forensic investigators. As previously described, the 
inputs for these suggested training areas are culled from a series of sources, such as 
current industry training offerings, training course supplier offerings as well as 
experiences discussed with peers as part of the research for the Thesis. 
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6.4 Curriculum outline 
Before laying out the four areas, it is important to consider that underlying the main 
suggested areas is a grounding knowledge level which could simply be called “basic”. 
Many course offerings involve the skills listed below, but in different configurations. 
For example, the PA Consulting information security training arm build their courses 
with the aim of a specific categorisation of investigator or skill, to enable a certificate to 
be granted at the end (7safe, 2012; GIAC, 2012). As a result the specific items listed 
below will indeed appear multiple times in their course schedules dependent on which 
specific certificate the attendee is looking to obtain. Where a training is offered as a 
specific skill, as in the case of IT Governance Ltd, we see a structured approach leading 
to a build-up of knowledge, rather than training to pass a specific hurdle (IT 
Governance, 2012). The sections below are categorised to most closely resemble such 
an approach. A similar vendor, QA provide a specific basic skills course, and take great 
care in ensuring that the prospective student understands it is a non – certified course 
(QA Training, 2012).QA training claim to be the “UK’s leading learning company” 
(QA Training, 2012, p.1). In the examples of tool vendors, this approach is a little 
different as they have structured curricula aimed at progressing towards specialised use 
of that particular tool. Indeed the Guidance Software website prevents you from 
viewing later training in the series without confirming by a click button that you would 
have the necessary understandings gained by the previous course (Guidance, 2012). The 
Infosec Institute, which interestingly offers the temptation of a 93% pass rate and two 
certifications to be gained from the same course, offers training using open source tools 
and has basic skills as one of the first study areas. It lists around thirty specific study 
subjects most of which appear in this section (Infosec Institute, 2012).  
This section then, in laying out a suggested curriculum for forensic investigators has 
attempted to cull inputs from all sides, and produce a structured learning path that could 
be applied, and proficiency in each area tested consistently, no matter which learning 
tree route a professional has followed to achieve the stated knowledge level.  
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To be certified at a basic level in the field of computer forensics, it is suggested then, 
that the following skills are mandatory: 
1: To be able to describe to a lay person what constitutes (or can be held to constitute) 
digital evidence. It is expected that the subject would be confident in discussing the 
various states of information (in transit, at rest, printed, electronic etc.), the differing 
protocols used in representing computer data (ebcidic, ascii) and the various 
presentation methods (binary, octal, hexadecimal etc.). The candidate for any end of 
level test would be expected to be understood and able to describe the differing usage of 
protocols and presentation methods at a rudimentary level, and be able to differentiate 
their various usages. 
2: A basic understanding of the make-up of a modern computer system, its primary 
components and the inter-dependencies is also required. It is expected that the student 
would be able to describe the specific components of a system, such as Central 
Processing Unit (CPU), Input Output (IO) bus, Network Card, Video Card and so forth. 
The fundamental differences between an Operating System, Firmware, and Application 
Software is also expected to be able to be simply described.  
3: Basic authentication and authorization concepts would be expected to be understood 
and able to be articulated. The student would be able to describe the interaction between 
a user and the system, and also be able to differentiate between the differing account 
types such as User, Programmer, System Administrator and Maintenance for example. 
6.5 First Responder 
The first actual peer examined certification level proposed is that of First Responder. 
This certainly requires an understanding of what data devices and systems may be 
relevant to an investigation, as well as the potential use that an examiner may make of 
them. Also it is critical that the responder be able to set the scene for an investigator, so 
performing a basic description of the environment of capture as well as any salient facts 
that may potentially have relevance is key.  
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A simple example as presented briefly earlier (section 5.2) will add understanding. 
During an investigation a first response investigative team entered an area of interest 
and found many systems that had password controls. The target was either unwilling or 
unable to cooperate, essentially denying all knowledge or memory of any such 
passwords. A potentially time consuming data capture process of all the discovered data 
devices was started, which based on previous experience, could in all probability only 
later prove that all the devices were encrypted with passwords that could not be 
bypassed simply using the few specialist tools available at the time. On switching on the 
TV, as a diversion whilst waiting for some captures to complete, one of the team was 
surprised by some on screen naming for the channels. The on screen channel names it 
was found, after trying the strings in the password challenge screens, were actually the 
passwords to each device. The learning being that any device that is in a target area may 
be relevant to the future resolution of the investigation. Any such device should not be 
discounted from adding to the evidence stack. Being able to do on the spot investigative 
analysis of the required capture is therefore also an important piece of the first 
responder training. 
So, in summary the main task that is attributed to a first responder is to secure the 
complete evidence set to allow a forensic investigation to be properly applied. This 
involves ensuring a proper chain of evidence and a proper acquiescence if relevant of 
the computer system under investigation. To be able to properly accomplish these 
challenges the following (figure 45) is suggested to be rudimentary knowledge, and is 
formed from the experience in teaching and attending courses in computer forensics of 
the researcher. 
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• An understanding of types of digital evidence and how computers work  
• An understanding of Computer Forensic Methodology  
• Knowledge of basic make-up of the File Allocation Table (FAT), New Technology 
File System (NTFS) and other relevant file systems  
• The ability to create a case file and how to preview/acquire media  
• The ability to perform a data acquisition using a Linux boot disk 
• Understanding and examination of Mac disk and file system structure (specialist) 
• How to conduct basic keyword searches using various tools 
• How to analyze file signatures and view files using common tools 
• How to restore evidence in chosen tool sets in a forensically sound manner 
• How to archive files and data created through the analysis process  
• How to verify the evidence file created in various tool sets 
Figure 45 First Responder Curriculum 
Without extrapolating each item, the items presented in this category would provide for 
a rudimentary series of skills to ensure that proper evidential process can be followed 
and the ability to recognise the systems and data presented would enable the proper 
triaging of evidence for further investigation. 
6.6 Evidence Preparer 
The second, and probably longer and more intensive training curriculum and 
certification route is that of evidence preparer (figure 46). This is not, in most 
commercial investigative environments a task that would be the only work a person 
would do, but given its critically to the proper dénouement of an investigation, it is a 
specific skill set that should be trained, tested and importantly, certified. The training for 
this area would ensure that the person would be able to attest to the sterile work areas, 
proper evidential process for the recovery of the various data to a workable format. 
Required also are the skills to perform the occasional integrity checks of the toolset and 
data devices to ensure proper response to integrity
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rudimentary skills for this specialisation, based upon experience of teaching and 
performing forensic investigations. 
• The ability to create and use logical evidence files, versus physical files  
• How to locate and recover deleted partitions and folders in disk and file systems 
• How to export files, directories and entire volumes using recovery tools 
• How to recover artefacts such as swap files, file slack, and spooler files using 
tools 
• How to identify, rebuild and recover printed and faxed pages in various systems 
• Hardware and software RAID technology, acquisition and examination 
• Principles of encrypted data recovery, and associated challenges 
• NTFS data recovery (possibly using a variety of tools) 
• Linux partition recovery using specialist or open source tools 
Figure 46 Evidence Preparer Curriculum 
In this preparation role, the knowledge of how files and systems are related and how the 
different artefacts that can be found on a system are connected together. There is a need 
for understanding what recoveries may be possible, and how to ensure that any recovery 
from a deleted area is done transparently such that it can be repeated and reviewed by 
peers. 
6.7 Investigative Analyst 
The third qualification and peer certification area is probably the most intensive and 
repetitive area of training, that of investigator, or investigative analyst (figure 47). Entry 
into this training should not be attempted until a work experience level is attained to 
ensure that a proper grounding of the relevant computer system concepts is displayed. 
This requirement and experience level obviously will differ as to the specialist type of 
computer environment envisaged to be trained against, but in general, a minimum 
working experience of two years as a Microsoft Windows system administrator for 
example would be a prerequisite for Windows investigations training. Similarly 
Electronic Mail investigations would require consequent levels of experience 
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maintaining Electronic Mail systems. Specialisations in each area could be accumulated, 
and repeatable skills training such as proper evidential procedure and data integrity 
would not be required to be repeated. Any student completing a course would certainly 
be taught to use the various tools in common use, but would also be required to 
demonstrate a basic understanding of the basis upon which any tool draws a conclusion, 
such as the recovery of data from a file slack area. Experience is critical because the 
understanding of the outputs of many tools is aligned with an expectation that any 
interpretation of results by those tools, such as re-joining fragmented file structures, or 
recovering file headers for deleted files can be properly described outside of the tool set 
by the investigator. As a simple analogy, if one uses an electronic calculator to perform 
a calculation, it is usual to have a basic understanding of the expected magnitude of the 
outcome to ensure one has not put the decimal point in the wrong place during data 
entry. 
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Skills that are generally expected in this area include: 
• How to conduct keyword searches and advanced searches using GREP (for some 
tool sets) [global search for regular expression and print -sic] 
• Examination and understanding of the Microsoft Windows Registry  
• Compound file types, and their uses and formats 
• How to identify files using hash values and building hash libraries  
• How to identify Microsoft Windows (usually XP onwards) artefacts such as link 
files, recycle bin, and user folders  
• Detailed analysis and recovery of Microsoft Windows event log files 
• Manual recovery of artefacts such as swap files, file slack, and spooler files  
• Analysis of NT File System (NTFS) artefacts within Microsoft Windows  
• Understanding Linux / UNIX operating and file system artefacts and their 
recovery 
• Macintosh OS X® operating system artefacts and recovery 
• Artefacts associated with peer-to-peer file-sharing applications such as 
BitTorrent™, LimeWire™ and BearShare 
Figure 47 Investigative Analyst Curriculum 
This is obviously a more specialist area and requires in depth knowledge of the systems 
that would be studied for forensics. It edges into areas where tools are not always 
available or seen to be working, such as in a partial disk recovery or corrupted data 
areas. It also starts to involve connectivity concepts so that a series of events that may 
involve data coming onto or heading off a target system can be replayed or at least 
properly described. 
6.8 Mobile devices 
Before this Thesis goes on to describe the fourth main training area, one emerging 
specialist area, that is worthy of separate note here is the recovery and analysis of data 
from mobile phones (HDForensics, 2010; MSAB, 2010). As the data on mobile devices 
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grows, and the features gap between personal computers and mobile devices shrinks, 
there is an obvious growing need to recover data from these devices, and their 
difference of use patterns suggests a different methodology of data capture and analysis 
(Legault, 2011). Without diverting the basis of this training section, that of the four 
major areas suggested, it is useful to highlight some of the specific additional skills that 
will be needed to specialise in this area, perhaps at the level of researcher above. These 
additional areas come from analysis of the offerings of specialist companies 
(HDForensics, 2010; MSAB, 2010) (figure 48). 
• An understanding of mobile phone network protocols and key service providers  
• Differences in the major phone types and architectures 
• The ability to acquire and examine SIM cards using tools 
• Understand in depth the mobile phone data storage architectures 
Figure 48 Mobile Devices Curriculum 
The movement from the corporate work bench or user PC to mobile media means that 
more and more of the target data for a private sector investigation is potentially resident 
on a mobile device. Also, where chains of communication are involved in understanding 
a particular series of events, there is a high probability that at some point a mobile 
device will be involved.  
“…so fraud examiners have no other option but to consider evidence from them when 
investigating fraud in the workplace” (Legault, 2011, p. 2). 
In many cases, it is expected that a specialist in the field would be injected, as the 
knowledge is very specific, but in the case where there is no such help, training above 
would provide the rudimentary skills needed to properly evidence mobile data traffic. 
There is also extensive discussion on the relevance of SMS messages and the value of 
SIM data, for which the summary overview provided in Fraud Magazine, is certainly 
recommended (Legault, 2011). 
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6.9 Data presenter 
Finally, the reporting and presentation of evidence is the most often overlooked, and 
arguably the most important area that calls for training, that of data presenter (figure 
49);  
• Preparation of reports and evidence for presentation  
• Presentation skills 
• Charting skills 
• Visual analysis mapping tools 
• Cross-examination training 
• Logical arguing 
Figure 49 Data Presenter Curriculum 
As this can be something that an investigator never has to do, it is not suggested that all 
forensic investigators follow this module, but if at any point the output of an 
investigation is to be presented or defended, then this module should prove useful. 
Because this research is concentrated on private sector investigations, and as most such 
cases do not actually end up in litigation, it may seem overkill to provide intensive 
training in the presentation and defending of evidence. If a private sector forensic 
investigation evolves into criminal litigation, the whole of the excellent work that has 
gone before could be destroyed by a lack of preparation for or understanding of the 
judicial process. It is arguable that irrespective of whether a victim of a crime, or indeed 
a suspected perpetrator is getting; “their day in court” it is the ethical duty of the 
investigative team to process the evidence as though they were (Cavanagh, 2008, p. 1). 
6.10 Public-private partnerships 
To provide a brief understanding of CITRIS, that is referenced below; 
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“the Center [sic] for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society 
(CITRIS) at Berkeley, have been instrumental in providing a bridge between policy, 
industry and academia” (Dillon, 2006, p. 2). 
The Select Committee debated at various junctures the opportunities for public-private 
cooperation in training and certification (SCST, 2006); 
 “It is notable that while the private sector partners supporting CITRIS include major 
companies in the IT and telecommunications industries, companies from manufacturing, 
energy and other sectors also contribute. As computing becomes ever more pervasive, 
more and more private sector companies—for example, those providing financial 
services—rely on IT security, and will have an interest in sponsoring research into IT 
security. There is therefore an opportunity to attract a wide range of private sector 
partners, with diverse interests, to support a major research initiative in this area” 
(SCST, 2006, 2.38). 
So, we can extrapolate from the Select Committee discussions that the collaborative 
research proposal is on the table, and yet the only partnership that the Select Committee 
could find as an example is that of a US university, albeit a prestigious one. Perhaps this 
could be the most distressing evidence that research into, in this case, the greater subject 
of information (or IT) security is so poorly supported by academia in the United 
Kingdom. The inference that could also be drawn is perhaps that without private sector 
funding research would not happen. This suggests a poor indictment of how research 
specialisations are chosen, especially where potentially, national information interests 
could be in jeopardy. The Select Committee report did not include any obvious desire 
for IT security to take a place in the national curriculum (SCST, 2006). Strangely 
neither was there any suggestion of a specialist government department focus being 
needed to drive the furtherance of the subject. 
Sennewald (1981) concluded his discussions of the differences between public and 
private investigators in pointing out that his intention is not to dwell on the differences 
between the two specializations, but that with an increased understanding of where the 
common interests and goals lie, the possibility for communication and working together 
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more cooperatively is heightened. Perhaps even in 1981, Sennewald knew that without 
extensive private sector funding, the public and private sector would continue to depend 
purely upon practical field experience. More importantly we would depend upon 
software manufacturers tool biased trainings to drive the furtherance of the profession. 
Arguably the expectation was that little research would become available to actually 
prove a need for a deeper knowledge base, and an emerging need for expansion of the 
body of knowledge in the delivery of the forensics expertise. 
6.11 Training and research summary 
It is reasonable to conclude that further specialised training is absolutely necessary, and 
it will have to be modular to enable differing levels of expertise to be brought to bear at 
the correct point in the evidence gathering and analysis process. Having argued in this 
chapter the need for formalised and consistent training, we have explored an outline 
curriculum for investigators and analysts, along with examination challenges to allow 
for at least a common base of knowledge to be tested before providing forensic outputs. 
This Thesis also argues four main areas for training to be applied, and a confirmation of 
expertise be tested at each. These areas cross over some of the course subject areas 
offered by forensic software companies currently. This chapter then, in laying out a 
suggested curriculum for forensic investigators has attempted to cull inputs from all 
sides, and produce a structured learning path that could be applied, and proficiency in 
each area tested consistently, no matter which learning tree route a professional has 
followed to achieve the stated knowledge level. The above curriculum allows for tool 
neutral training to provide independence of solutio
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7 Certification and Oversight 
This chapter expands upon the depth of training required, and explores how the 
professionals once trained could be peer certified and censured as necessary to retain an 
integrity of delivery within the profession. It explores parallel organisations that have 
faced and in some cases met such challenges, as well as exploring examples of good or 
bad practice to be taken into account when building such a framework for forensics 
investigators. 
Having introduced the concept of ethical duty in Section 3.2, it is timely to re-examine 
certification and importantly oversight in somewhat more detail. This need for oversight 
has evolved in the research as a subsidiary requirement that is now also being expanded 
in this Thesis. Just as there are specialist areas that differ in the training needs, discussed 
in Chapter 6, there should be specific certification aligned to the areas of specialisation 
to avoid any challenges that the certification could be too generic.  
To balance the discussions, an interesting argument against conformity;  
“Spanning the realms of art and science, and dealing as we do with human frailty, 
computer forensics examiners are aided by instinct and gut feeling-skills which don’t 
lend themselves to checklists” (Ball, 2004, p. 5) 
The claim that gut feel automatically prevents the use of checklists is perhaps a little too 
rigid. An opposing view; 
“.. the forensic analyst needs to begin under a concrete method and finish so” 
(Angelopoulou, 2007, p. 5). 
This need for a concrete method, as it is described here, is at the heart of one of the 
main recurring subjects of this research, and indeed of experience of the researcher, that 
of repeatability. If a method is to be used to perform a forensic examination, it should 
be, certainly according to Angelopoulou (2007) at least, something that can be described 
in a formal manner, essentially allowing the method of working to be reviewed as well 
as the obvious challenges to any outputs that may be made. 
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Even as far back as 1995 the debate for standardisation was running; 
 “standards are a blessing and a curse” also “They should describe that which is the 
minimum acceptable level of performance”.  The passage continues, “standards can 
serve to impede progress and limit creativity” (Pollit, 1995, p. 3). 
It is interesting that this dichotomy of arguing for and against a common certification 
standard, within the research conducted for this Thesis, arises each time the discussion 
leans towards the private sector. When highly experienced forensic analysts are asked to 
agree that they would commit to being held to such a standard, opinion is clearly 
divided, or at least the peer community canvased by the researcher.  
Meyers (2005) clarifies that the need for professional or formal industry recognition of a 
field of forensic investigation is becoming more apparent as the defence becomes more 
technically sophisticated. It was predicted in 2005 that the recognition of the field by the 
American judicial system and the underlying methodologies was not long from being 
formally appreciated, likening the need to that which has been understood by other 
forensic disciplines such as financial fraud analysis (Meyers, 2005). 
In the conclusion of an earlier work;  
“The inevitable fact that technology is becoming more intertwined in the daily life of the 
individual will lead to an increase in court cases where computer evidence is a vital 
component. Because the judicial system is having difficulties in mandating and 
interpreting standardization for computer forensics, it becomes the responsibility of the 
scientific community to assist in this endeavour” (Meyers et al, 2004, p. 9). 
Here clearly then there is a call for the scientific or more importantly academic 
community to support the efforts in standardisation, research and training.  
“In other fields of study, (e.g., accounting and financial fraud investigation) there are 
methods used to ensure that the practice is credible and reliable, and that the 
individuals claiming to be professionals have met a certain certification criteria” 
(Meyers et al, 2004, p. 10). 
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Without opening the profession debate again, we do see that there are similarities of 
need with other professions (Manunta, 1996; Simonsen, 1996). The call is clear to reuse 
wherever possible the experience and expertise that has been brought to bear in other 
professions, with the aim creating a regime of credibility and reliability of output. 
The example of the Certified Professional Accountant (CPA), where a professional 
association of experts provide for a series of examination standards running against 
strict peer reviewed criteria is useful. A strong case is made for the fact that there are 
two things that bring credibility to practitioners in the field holding this certification. It 
can be shown, by this examination process that a holder of the credential has been 
certified to have a certain period of experience in the field and that his skills have been 
tested by formal examination (Meyers et al, 2004). Discussions that both these criteria 
for recognition are missing from the field of data forensics suggests that there is a need 
to call for a debate on the relative validity of doing something similar for the data 
forensics field. If agreement is then reached, the extent of the required experience and 
examination standards can be considered in greater detail. Given that there are already 
many fields using independent certification in similar areas, it has been useful to use 
these experiences to gauge the progress and validity of the research (ASIS, 2009; ISC2, 
2009; PCI Standards Council, 2006). 
Within this section dealing with the issues of certification and oversight, a great deal of 
insightful arguments are most clearly formulated by the work of Meyers et al (2004). 
This Thesis has found general alignment with the work of Meyers et al, and indeed 
supporting practical experience of the researcher strongly supports the absolute need for 
formal recognition of the profession. Any standard to be formulated must have an 
understanding that it will evolve as the profession evolves, and it should allow in its 
governance for that to happen effortlessly. A standard that cannot change is worthless 
(Meyers et al, 2004). In addition to a requirement for detailed analysis of each phase of 
the computer (data) forensics process, and subsequent alignment of delivery procedures, 
it is clear a standard must remain practical. Similarly it is worth emphasising that if a 
standard becomes impractical to deliver against, it will wither. The area of search and 
seizure, obviously is an important topic the standard will have to cover. The forensic 
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analyst will need very different skills in the various points of the forensics process. This 
Thesis suggests, that the modularisation or dissecting into categories of training and 
certification is the most expedient manner in which to proceed. This direction is echoed 
in other research: 
“Accordingly, the certification may need to be broken down into several qualifying 
examinations, since not all persons in the field will participate in all of the investigative 
phases (e.g., search and seizure, analysis, examination, etc.)” (Meyers et al, 2004, p. 9). 
7.1 Expert witness 
It is relevant to discuss further at this point the specialised area of expert witness, which 
although a slightly different skillset and delivery from that of a data forensic analyst, 
does carry many forensic capabilities and expertise challenges to warrant its inclusion 
here. The title of expert in any field is difficult to certify or quantify. In data forensics it 
is doubly so because the field has no formal training regime, no accepted independent 
professional qualifications, nor indeed a recognised educational progression. Many 
argue that an expert is recognised in the forensics profession as someone having related 
skills in the area under review, such as networks, operating systems or application 
software, as well as a number of years of experience in practicing those skills (Jones, 
2008; Carvey, 2007b; Ball, 2004; Meyers et al, 2004). Preceding discussion predicts 
that the challenges to this means of credibility assertion will increase as the number of 
failed investigation and improper conclusion grows and become published. The 
discussions are clear in also reminding us that the introduction of a certification and 
educational challenge to data forensics experts may not automatically and immediately 
resolve the quality issues and unsound conclusions. The most obvious outcome of the 
education process is that that the number of such challenges should fall. Many predict 
that if current so called experts are all required to pass through a consistent 
qualification, examination and certification process, it is highly probable that the ranks 
of said experts will dwindle initially (Carvey, 2007b; Meyers et al, 2004). This 
prediction is founded on the belief that there are practitioners who would not pass peer 
review, an obvious assumption is that these failed experts would therefore be removed 
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from the peer assessed expert lists and no longer practice. An interesting review of the 
efforts of the UK Forensic service to establish a register of experts is offered by 
Sommer (2011). We see a very detailed background history of how a register of experts 
was achieved, and then disbanded as the forensic science body lost funding. Indeed the 
body itself is being disbanded in 2012 (Sommer, 2011). 
An interesting side effect of having to certify even if one was previously classed as an 
expert, would be, that cases both in the public and private sector that have relied upon 
conclusion, or even opinion, based on testimony or reports from now “uncertified” 
experts, could be reopened or even nullified (Sheldon, 2011; Spadanuta, 2010; Meyers 
et al, 2004). This Thesis would also suggest that cases which have depended upon 
previous, now proven to be flawed or unsound tool sets should also be reviewed where 
the outcomes have been based solely upon the tool set in use and not any otherwise 
corroborating evidence. A similar challenge has been laid at the field of fingerprint 
forensics, after the widely publicised error that was produced by the FBI. Their 
fingerprint specialists had managed to correlate a partial finger print found at the scene 
of the 2004 Madrid train bombings with those prints taken from file of an Islamic 
lawyer resident in Oregon, USA (Spadanuta, 2010). Being able to resolve these issues 
may be somewhat difficult, given that when the data was processed and presented there 
was no formal or expected methodology, but it may be relevant to at least pursue cases 
that are presented as unsound under review by the newly certified, and therefore newly 
trusted, experts. Again, significant advice from the same report, quoting Dr. M. 
Risinger, law professor at the Sefton Hall University School of Law, USA: 
“… what you used to convict people 20 years ago really wasn’t as reliable as you 
thought it was” (Spadanuta, 2010, p. 2.). 
7.2 Related acts 
In any profession, a knowledge of surrounding legislation and standards is essential, and 
during the research project many references were found to various UK legislations. It is 
pertinent therefore, to assemble a summary list here to provide some view of the scope 
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of the work of a forensics investigator within the support of criminal and commercial 
prosecution: 
Theft Act 1968 & 1978 (Great Britain, 1968; Great Britain, 1978a).  
The Theft Act in the whole provides definitions for the removal of or depriving a person 
of property. It covers areas such as false accounting and provides a definition for 
dishonesty. 
Theft (Amendment) Act 1996 (Great Britain, 1996a). 
The amendment provided better definitions for obtaining services by deception, 
amongst others. It also provided the definitions and offence for making off without 
payment, which can be useful to an investigator. 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (Great Britain, 1981). 
This Act allows an investigator to support council in discovering intent of crime in the 
main. It provides useful support in cases where evidence of an offence is not clear in 
commission, but may be clear in intent. 
Telecommunications Act 1984 (Great Britain, 1984). 
This was the forerunner of the Communications Act 2003 which provided for 
prosecution of improper use of telecommunications networks and services (Great 
Britain, 2003). It defined the extent of the communications network, and importantly 
included the use and ownership of devices intended to be used dishonestly in this 
regard.  
Public Order Act 1986 (Great Britain, 1986). 
Whilst mainly providing for issues such as riot and disorder, the Act is helpful in cases 
where harassment or creating intentional distress is under investigation. It also provides 
definition for provocation and fear of violence, useful in stalking cases and such like. 
There are also significant sections on racial hatred. 
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Protection of Children Act 1978 (Great Britain, 1978b). 
Whilst an extensive act, the main support for council here is that of the area of child 
pornography. It is very helpful in providing clear guidance on what can be considered 
illegal. 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 & 1964 (Great Britain, 1959; Great Britain, 1964). 
This Act (1959) and Amendments (1964), provide very useful definitions of what can 
be considered illegal in this sphere. In many cases it can be difficult for an investigator 
to truly understand whether the production of images or data in a forensic recovery 
could be considered actually performing an illegal activity. The statements of 
clarification around intent help greatly. 
Data Protection Act 1998 (Great Britain, 1998a). 
Clearly the recovery of data that identifies a living individual falls within the boundaries 
of this legislation. It is important therefore for the investigator to understand the legal 
requirements of protection and transfer of that data. 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Great Britain, 1998b). 
Whilst much of this Act provides for the clarification and implementation of European 
conventions, it is important for the investigator to understand how any tribunal or 
review body may be tested as to how and why data was gathered on an individual. 
Defamation Act 1952 & 1996 (Great Britain, 1952; Great Britain, 1996b). 
These Acts are useful in helping an investigator understand if he is dealing with libel or 
slander. It also allows the investigator to consider if there is the possibility of innocent 
dissemination, that is the passing on of information without true intent to defame. 
Importantly the concept of privilege, that is acting under instructions or in the public 
interest could be used as defence. 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Great Britain, 2000). 
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This Act can be very useful to an investigator looking for corroborative data to provide 
support for forensically recovered information. It also can be used to challenge, in 
defence or against expert witnesses in the public sector where more information is 
expected than has been provided.  
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (Great Britain, 1997). 
This legislation is particularly useful in cases where stalking is suspected. It also 
provides legal cover for investigators who are themselves being threatened by actors 
under investigation. 
This list was tested for relevance against similar lists complied by Jahankhani (2007), 
Taal (2007) and Mitchel (2007). 
To summarise, the duty of a forensic examiner is to properly preserve, analyse and 
present any relevant data under his control. The need for standards to control that duty 
as well as rigorous review requirements within the profession, have been discussed. 
This Thesis has examined calls for certification, or the requirements for providing proof 
of expertise in the understanding of the underlying architectures of the systems and 
applications they will be required to critique. There is clearly strong argumentation for a 
requirement to be able to properly describe the functioning of any forensics tools they, 
the practitioner will use. There are also calls to provide knowledge into the 
understanding of how the tools they are using are working internally. This could be 
argued to overextend the abilities of the majority of practitioners and could be regarded 
as an unnecessary skill for anyone but a forensic tool designer or tester. Preservation 
and analysis support procedures are similarly suggested, supported  by a call for training 
and certification in these areas. 
A call to action, which has been a valuable driver for this research; 
 “Although the problems of computer forensics can be correlated with the field being in 
its infancy, it is time to take decisive actions. Computer forensics, as a field, has 
experienced events that should never be repeated (e.g., lack of standards and peer 
review). In order for the field of computer forensics to mature, there must be a national 
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system for certifying individuals who claim to be professionals. The continued lack of a 
professional certification, investigative standards, and peer reviewed method, may 
ultimately result in computer forensics being relegated to a “junk science,” as opposed 
to a recognized scientific discipline” (Meyers et al, 2004, p. 11). 
What is clear from this passage is that the potential for cases to go wrong on a more 
regular basis is high (Livio, 2010; Yorkshire Post, 2007; Ball, 2009; Carvey, 2007a ). 
Whether or not the national versus international argument in terms of certification is the 
aim, is not a focus of this research. In either case, what we are to conclude from all 
these sources is that we would see less failures of proper process or plain tool misuse if 
there were an appropriate governance system (Jones, 2008). 
7.3 Educational need 
In the call for education in the field, amongst the stronger advocates that this research 
has found are Oja and Davidson; 
“ There is mounting pressure for institutes of higher education to fill society's need for 
qualified IT forensics practitioners. Some of the more suitable candidates for providing 
such education are those departments that already have a history of teaching the 
subject of IT security. Many of the technical issues that are of relevance to IT forensics 
are already covered in the normal IT security curriculum. However, IT forensics is 
clearly a broad subject that should span far more than relevant technical procedures 
and tools” (Oja and Davidson, 2008, p. 1). 
Similarly, one UK university that has been prominent in the advancement of technical 
computer forensics research is the University of Glamorgan. Dr Andrew Blyth, 
principal lecturer, Glamorgan University Information Security and Computer Crime 
course, and reputedly a frequent expert witness (Warren, 2007), is quoted; 
 " We need to have some system in place that lets us differentiate between people who 
are trying to deceive people, and people who are experts in this field and might not have 
a relevant qualification" (Warren, 2007, p. 1). 
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Markedly, a suggestion by Blyth that there may be so called professionals out there that 
are deceiving people through their activities and manage to continue because of a lack 
of accreditation, oversight or indeed both. A compelling argument for the reason that 
the take up of the forensics profession and education being greatest in the UK and 
America is that the majority of available training is also only available in English. 
Clearly and perhaps significantly, most of the available literature in IT forensics is in 
the English language (Oja et al, 2008). It would be worthwhile to present the challenge 
that we should consider the fact that the majority of system and application software 
that will be reviewed and therefore understood by practitioners in the Western 
Hemisphere is also in the English language. Therefore, a lack of deep understanding of 
that language no matter which language data was being stored on the computer, could 
have negative outcomes for any investigation, given the potential complexities and mix 
of the recovered data. There are also further discussions emerging, based on the need for 
understanding of double-byte and reverse presentation (right to left, vertical) 
presentation languages, but these have been omitted from this Thesis for brevity 
(MSDN, 2011). 
7.4 Association 
Button (2005) in a presentation of the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board 
argued that there are many inter-connected facets that must be available to ensure the 
integrity of the rounded delivery of an association, listing various higher, post-graduate 
and vocational courses, a code of ethics as well as a review board for membership. The 
association should be considered a “professional association”. In this case the argument 
is neatly presented, firstly for formal training both at an academic and professional 
level, secondly professionalization of the field and finally the certification against a set 
of peer criteria. Obviously, the requirement for on-going management of an association 
aligned to a set of peer ratified standards is also discussed. 
In reviewing other professional associations journeys towards certification, oversight 
and peer review, it is worth understanding the International Information Systems 
Security Certification Consortium (ISC2) evolution. Initially, the ISC2 set out on a path 
158 
 
of providing an international standard for information security managers in the IT 
profession. This certification was the Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional (CISSP), and the description provided by ISC2 is as follows; 
“The CISSP was the first credential in the field of information security, accredited by 
the ANSI (American National Standards Institute) to ISO (International Standards 
Organization) Standard 17024:2003. CISSP certification is not only an objective 
measure of excellence, but a globally recognized standard of achievement” (ISC2, 2009, 
p. 1). 
This researcher sat for the CISSP examination in the Hong Kong University in 2002, 
successfully completing the examination. This fact alone provides some situational 
evidence of the extent of the reach of the consortium as well as the international 
availability of a relevant and independent certification in the field at that time. As the 
computer security profession matured, the ISC2 found that one size did not fit all in the 
growing information security world, and released specialised certifications relevant to 
particular disciplines in IT security. Some argue that this was a profit driven change and 
as such challenge the independent value of the new certification (Clement, 2008; 
Simmons et al, 2007). These discussions around the independence of the certification 
body give a very strong direction towards the care that needs to be taken in organising 
certification and governance. This Thesis outlines repeatedly the need for training to be 
aligned to the certification process, and is clearly emphasised; 
“The relation between ISC2 (the non-profit side) and their training arm is dubious at 
best. When a certification body becomes a training entity often time that entity will lose 
their focus on what is the most important which is the certification itself” (Clement, 
2008, p. 1). 
Another non-profit organisation, aligned to professional needs is the American Society 
of Industrial Security (ASIS). For many years the only offering by ASIS was the 
Certified Protection Professional (CPP), first awarded in 1977 (ASIS, 2010). Later the 
certification regime was expanded to include Professional Certified Investigator (PCI), 
and Physical Security Professional (PSP) in 2002. This was described as being a result 
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of the ASIS membership and committees having understood that specialisation in the 
industry was creating differing certification needs from employers (ASIS, 2009). Both 
organisations ASIS and ISC2 depend upon peer nomination of entrants, and also for 
submission of questions for the certification exam. Both have documented ethical 
standards by which the entrants have to agree to abide, but in neither society has this 
research uncovered any expulsion for failure to abide by those ethics. Contrarily, there 
are some heated discussions around the lack of such expulsions (Mortman, 2009). The 
important signal for this research is that there must be a continual review process of the 
relevance of the training, examination and association governance. This if any 
professional association is to remain useful and credible to the professionals it serves. 
The example of ISC2 and ASIS adapting their certifications, and therefore underlying 
educational offerings both present proof that it can be done. This may be supporting the 
claims that both are seen to be leading associations, at least by board certified numbers, 
ASIS having over 8000 and the number of CISSP and other certifications claimed by 
ISC2 to be over 71,000 (ASIS, 2010; ISC2, 2010). 
 “…a series of five interviews with Swedish legal experts and computer forensic 
professionals were conducted from late 2006 and into 2007. Among the interviewees 
were both the Swedish law enforcement departments; the public prosecutors office and 
the police, and private Swedish IT-companies. Despite differences in the legal systems, 
the results from the literature study and the interviews did not differ significantly. One 
point where the results do nevertheless differ is whether criminology should be 
included; it is often a part of the literature but the interviewees did not regard it as 
important. Somewhat unexpected was the fact that the answers between the interviewees 
differed depending on whether they represented the public legal system or the IT 
industry. One question that clearly divided these groups was whether teaching ethical 
issues of the subject should be included or not“ (Oja et al, 2008, p. 2). 
We gather from this confirmation that a formalised training curriculum is once again 
seen to be a critical part of any professional approach to forensics. The private sector 
does not seem to see a need for the teaching of criminology, which would suggest a 
leaning towards technical failure investigations being more normal than events of 
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criminal intent, but that may be attributable to the way the passage can be read. Also 
what may be of interest is the division of the focus groups on the question of ethics. 
Unfortunately the data presented clearly states there was a definite split of opinion, but 
it is not made clear which side, private or public sector leaned which way (Oja et al, 
2008). 
7.5 Oversight 
Potentially, one of the most credibility affecting differences between true professional 
societies and industry bodies that offer certified membership, is the membership 
oversight. Clearly in the execution of task, an investigator does have need for clear 
guidelines from which to approach the examination. Investigators in corporates, in 
general, rely upon the premise that the company owns, or at least has a right to monitor 
and manage, and therefore has unfettered access to all the data on its systems (Livio, 
2010; Wesche, 2002; privacy.org, 1993). Investigators have been seen to act without 
any moral or ethical constraint in the pursuit of information gathering against a 
supposed miscreant (Livio 2010; Ball 2009; Rasch, 2006). In support of the challenge 
against private investigators not being held to the same exacting controls as the public 
sector, there are claims that not all investigative actions that are legal can be 
automatically assumed to be ethical (Grobler and Louwrens, 2006). It is clear that 
commercial, or private sector investigations can often be based on a “hunch”, suspicion 
or sometimes mere curiosity. These investigations are therefore presented in stark 
contrast to a police (i.e. magistrates) search warrant, which in the UK for example 
specifies exactly the boundaries that any investigation must remain within. Such 
warrants would also provide the clear foundation of the reason for search or seizure 
(WTWU, 2009; ACPO, 2007; Meyers et al, 2004).  
 “There is a need to distinguish those bodies that accredit courses, training providers 
and qualifications against publicly accepted criteria from those that award individuals 
with accredited certificates or other forms of qualification that demonstrate a level of 
competence and/or knowledge. Accreditation is essential if there is to be universal 
acceptance of the quality of training and qualifications – although there are 
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qualifications that are universally accepted on the basis of the reputation of the 
controlling body (such as ISACA). Only with formal accreditation are qualifications 
likely to be seen as having worth. It can also ensure that standards, once achieved, are 
maintained. Equally, some qualifications will require robust CPD programmes to 
ensure those with the qualification maintain their competence over time “ (Eurim, 2004, 
paper 5, p. 4). 
The passage by Eurim give us clear commitment from the tone of the wording that the 
certification of professionals in whatever form absolutely must incorporate a review 
process. This to ensure that any certifications granted are maintained in some way for 
currency to the current environment. Similarly: 
"Every form of crime that goes before a court has a computer involved in it in some 
way, so it is imperative that we find a way to sort this out," …"We need to arrive at a 
body of data that experts need to know, we need a body of practice that shows what 
experts have done in the past, a set of formal qualifications that people should have - 
and the co-operation of the courts to recognise all of that" (Warren, 2007, p. 1). 
The preceding excerpt highlights a suggestion that the formal challenge against the lack 
of standardisation and certification in the computer forensics profession was brought 
about by the forensics professionals themselves. It is notable that they were trying to 
form a specialist side arm of the register of forensics professionals which was allied 
purely to the practice of computer forensics (Warren, 2007).  
On the subject of the differences between certification and oversight in the public and 
private sector, Oja et al in 2008 brought out some interesting results. We are given the 
conclusions of extensive research on the value of academia in the building of the 
training and therefore progression of the profession. One of the outputs was that 
learning institutions that already had IT security focus in their curricula were better 
placed to extend that into data forensics (Oja et al, 2008). This Thesis concurs that a 
system of certification in modular form, to allow specialisation to occur, supported by 
continuous learning or feedback processes is key. The research outcomes of this Thesis 
also support the requirement that any body that manages the oversight must have the 
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ability and commitment to censure members for transgression against the obligatory 
code of conduct. A recent example of such censure can be found within the Certified 
Fraud Examiner realm (ACFE, 2010). It is reported in the September – October edition 
of the society magazine that a Utah resident member had been expelled from the 
society, by unanimous vote of the Board of Regents. The disciplinary measure was 
undertaken based on a proven violation of the ethical code, in this case Article II, which 
deals with honesty (Fraud Magazine, 2011). This ability and indeed performance of 
censure is where this research suggests that the credibility of the process will be most 
validated (Clement, 2008; Warren, 2007; Eurim, 2004).  
The need for adequate and effective response to the terrorist threat is shifting the 
intelligence led forensics landscape at an alarming rate (STC, 2004). In parallel with the 
work of Juhnke (2002), this Thesis similarly makes no attempt towards alarmist claims 
that cyber terrorism is a current major threat. There is however mounting evidence of 
terrorist organisations using information technology to drive their cause (Anderson, 
2008; Payson, 2003). There is certainly evidence on the international front that national 
entities are utilising their knowledge of technology to disrupt opposing powers stability. 
In 2010 it was widely reported in India that the Pakistani authorities had hacked a 
prominent Indian parliamentary members’ website, and warned it was going to turn 
“Indian Cyberspace into hell” (Kumar, 2010). This terrorist development will 
inevitably lead to a challenge as to the restrictive nature of search warrants and powers 
of investigators. It is to be expected we will see calls for similar powers to be granted 
investigators such as those granted to police authorities in specialist investigations of 
national importance (Great Britain, 1981). 
The differences in public and private sector governance are the most critical to be dealt 
with if information sharing is to take place in this important emerging sector of 
forensics. How much data an analyst can properly reveal that is found on a disk if it was 
not expected to be there, and thus not included in the warrant (public) or brief (private), 
is key. This disclosure argument has similar basis, it is suggested, to the argument 
around length of detention without trial (Guardian, 2008). Briefly the detention without 
trial discussion centres on cases where the argument for freedoms are being challenged 
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against the need for adequate time to properly investigate complex and internationally 
dispersed intelligence leads. This research has further highlighted some of the variances 
between the diverse codes of conduct around the international policing arena which 
strongly supports the balancing argument against strict and formalised governance, 
namely that there is no one safe and agreed course of control (ACPO, 2009; FBI, 2007). 
It is clear that the subject is as large as the information processing world is diverse. Ball 
(2004) maintains that law enforcement agencies work on a “good guy / bad guy” 
approach and that they see computer forensics as a secret society. Ball, in providing this 
outline argues that this makes any discussion around the relative values of various codes 
of conduct difficult.  This difficulty further extends the gap between the private and 
public sector in achieving aligned certification and oversight over what is clearly the 
same underlying professional role. 
7.6 Verification 
A critical part of the data from this research has to be the continual calls to the need for 
accreditation and certification in the profession. If we look at the interesting court story 
of Gene Morrison, a self-professed psychologist expert witness, we can clearly see at 
least one perfect example of how the worst can be expected without oversight. The 
defendant held paper degree certificates for a BSc in Forensic Science, a Masters with 
excellence in Forensic Investigation and a Doctorate in Criminology. These were all 
purchased from a website called affordabledegrees.com. Customers could even choose 
their own transcript grades on this site (McVeigh, 2007).  
The qualifications were supposedly awarded by the Rochville University in the US - 
which does not exist as a traditional brick built institute of learning, merely a web 
presence in cyberspace (McVeigh, 2007). Morrison claimed to have learned his skills 
from a retired West Yorkshire detective called John Pearson and Mr X, a member of the 
Czech Republic Ministry of Defence he met by chance on a visit to Prague (Carvey, 
2007a; Warren 2007; Yorkshire Post, 2007). Morrison told police officers he had begun 
an Open University (OU) degree in psychology (forensic). When he was cross 
examined he admitted merely contacting the OU for a brochure and recording some OU 
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television programmes from BBC2 in the 1970s. He is reported to have told the court 
that it looked easier than going to a real university (Yorkshire Post, 2007). Warren 
(2007) on the Morrison case summarises: 
“Last month saw the downfall of Gene Morrison. A conman who masqueraded as a 
forensic scientist and gave evidence in more than 700 police cases, some of them 
involving rape and drink-driving, Morrison, 48, of Hyde, Tameside, was found guilty of 
22 counts of perjury at Minshull Street Crown Court in Manchester and given a five-
year jail sentence. His claims to be a forensic scientist were bogus, and the BSc and 
PhD qualifications he claimed were in fact bought from a university that existed only on 
the internet” (Warren, 2007, p. 3). 
Importantly this brings out the suggestion that this may be more widespread than just a 
one-off occurrence. Within the same article Neil Hare-Brown, managing director of 
QCC, a company that carries out forensic investigations for the police;  
"There are a lot of people involved in computer forensics who have no qualifications at 
all, I would say that between 5% and 10% of the people working in this area are 
incompetent and that has led to problems with investigations. We have been given 
[computer] discs by the police that have been examined by people who have said that 
there is no evidence on them and subsequently found considerable amounts of evidence" 
(Warren, 2007, p. 4). 
Hare-Brown’s comments are endorsed further in the article by Alan Phillips (Warren, 
2007). Philips is the managing director of 7Safe, which according to its press release 
also carries out investigations for the police and certifies, to its own criteria, examiners 
with a course jointly run with Glamorgan University (Yorkshire Post, 2007). Hare-
Brown is reported to have continued;  
"Forensics is a fairly new profession but there are some people who have been working 
in the area for a long time and there are people who purport to be experts in the field 
who do not have qualifications" (Warren, 2007, p. 1). 
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Clearly then there is an expectation that there will be cases where the forensics outputs 
can be brought in to question. One such recent occurrence was in February 2010, in a 
case involving the HMRC: 
“HM Revenue and Customs Barrister made very serious admissions this week in an 
excise duty appeal. In response to complaints made by the Barrister for the Appellant, 
HMRC's Barrister admitted that forensic computer evidence produced by David Lack of 
Pro-vent Computer Security could not be relied upon. He said that examination of the 
computers by a different computer expert had shown that items David Lack had claimed 
to be on the computers were in fact found not to be there” (Curley, 2010, p. 1). 
It is worthwhile to remind at this point, this research is not intended to bring reform into 
the police or national intelligence services use of such tools. Neither is it the intention to 
fuel the debate and examination of ethical or political boundaries that are currently 
under discussion in that arena (Anderson, 2008; Payson, 2003; Juhnke, 2002). The lines 
of governance are often unclear between public and private sector, causing a common 
disparity of accountability between the activities of sworn officers and commercial 
investigators. These two bodies are in essence often performing the same tasks on 
connected cases under differing rule sets. The Morrison case underpins the need not 
purely for paper certification (section 1.11), but also for a supporting code of conduct 
and delivery vehicle of peer certification (Warren, 2007). This code and certification is 
necessary to ensure overarching ethics and morals are part of any commercial 
investigative delivery, if it is indeed to be trusted. Without punitive actions on 
transgressions, any professional body acting on the output of this research, arguably 
would be of little use without the controls to prevent similar conmen such as Morrison 
(Yorkshire Post, 2007) from undermining the reputation of the profession. The 
Chartered Management Institute (CMI) for example, as part of its by-laws, states;  
“Members should be aware that their membership may be placed in jeopardy if formal 
notification and evidence is received by the Institute implying a breach of any section of 
the Code. If any such complaint is received, it is subject to detailed investigation within 
the Institute’s agreed disciplinary procedures“ (CMI, 2008, p. 3). 
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7.7 Register 
As this Thesis moves forward to tabling a code of conduct or set of ethical standards, 
each of these important considerations start to take a place in the eventual governance 
model. What was not envisaged in the initial aims of this research, was a register of 
members, although it is probably implicit in any such certification of professionals, it 
was not a specified research goal.  
“According to Alan Kershaw, chief executive of the Council for the Registration of 
Forensic Practitioners, it is early days but a start has been made. The case of Morrison 
very clearly demonstrates the need for a register. The problem that there has been in the 
past is that there has been no lead body in this area, but now we have defined the 
current competence and started to put people on the register. People applying to go on 
the list are assessed on their past casework by assessors who themselves have been 
assessed on their casework" (Warren, 2007, p. 4). 
Kershaw further reported that the forensics council, even though it was not a private 
sector professional certification and governance body, had been having some success. 
He called the council a shining light for the forensics industry, presenting the industry a 
challenge to emulate, warning that there were some people unhappy with the level of 
exposure those challenges brought (Home Office, 2007). Kershaw used an interesting 
term saying that some people had responded to the challenge by “scurrying off into the 
darkness” (Warren, 2007, p4). The following extract also seems to agree that 
professional challenge is an acceptable manner by which to formulate standards of 
behaviour, using actual cases rather than theory alone. 
 “Conversely, when computer forensics evidence has been contested, it has provided the 
foundation for evaluating what, why, and how those issues should be considered when 
creating computer forensic standards and certifications for the U.S. federal and state 
court systems” (Meyers et al, 2004, p. 2). 
The challenge therefore is how to design and drive an effective certification and 
governance body. Where does the greatest need stem from, and which arguments are the 
strongest to ensure its appropriate use and insertion into this emerging profession. The 
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preceding data seems to be suggesting that a history of contest against current practice 
and current outputs is a good starting point, perhaps using the argument that when 
something can be proven to have been wrongly performed, there is material argument to 
correct it. Meyers in a 2005 article as a part of a call for certification in the US system 
cites Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) number of incidents per year 
growth as an argument for needing greater forensics capabilities, or at least more 
specialists (Meyers, 2005). Whilst the argument is strong, in providing the need for 
some consistent forensics review it offers little further support in attempting to have us 
understand why that rise would be attributable to incidents requiring forensic 
investigation. It could also conversely be argued that because more incidents are 
actually being seen, there is little need for the forensics in those cases as they are 
already in clear view. This is not the only logical conclusion, but without clarification, 
any similar argument could be attempted based purely on this data, so it has not been 
relied on as a differentiator for this research. It is nonetheless useful in its clarification 
of the obvious need at some levels for proper and consistent forensics investigations. 
Warren (2007) reports that there is a strongly expressed view that the moves to create a 
system similar to the expert witness program of the General Medical Council are 
nothing short of a "shambles". Dr Andrew Blyth said; 
"What we need is a professional body that registers people and checks their 
accreditation " (Warren, 2007, p. 1).  
That registration and certification view is supported by Dr Andrew Jones, the then head 
of the Security Technology Research Group at British Telecom:  
"At the moment I think the system for the registration of expert witnesses and the way 
that the courts use technological expert witnesses has to be defined” (Warren, 2007, p. 
1). 
Interestingly, Jones is also quoted as having related that there have been cases where the 
accused have themselves been the expert witnesses on the case (Warren, 2007). This 
situation is not one that has been explored in this research, but may become one of the 
discussion topics in the regulation of the professional body. At first sight there would 
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seem to be no issue in defending oneself if the necessary skills were present, but if the 
investigation turns to a criminal prosecution, then it is suggested that there may be some 
challenges in allowing this course of action. Jones further argues that the need to resolve 
this lack of registration and certification is growing, and that whilst most of the cases 
that have gone wrong were ones that involved expert witnesses from the medical 
profession, it is only a matter of time, before one involving computer forensics is 
uncovered. 
7.8 Certification and oversight summary 
In summary regarding certification and governance, this researcher supports the Eurim 
call to task the Skills Councils with the rationalization the “jungle of qualifications 
currently confusing employers, observers and students” (Eurim, 2004, paper 5, p. 5). In 
making such a demand and argument for such rationalisation, Eurim underpins the need 
for the work being undertaken by this researcher. More importantly the calls suggest the 
potential use of this research in providing some grounding for a professional governance 
regime in computer forensics. 
Having previously explored the training required, this chapter has suggested how the 
professionals, once trained could be peer certified and censured as necessary to retain an 
integrity of delivery within the profession. By using parallel organisations that have 
faced and in some cases met such challenges, as well as exploring examples of good or 
bad practice to be taken into account when building such a framework for forensics 
investigators, there is now need to explore the governance around such a membership. 
169 
 
8 Conduct and Governance 
What has remained central and obvious throughout this research is that any society that 
sets out upon a determined delivery path must have objectives and controls to govern 
that delivery. Without the ability for example, to censure or challenge members, any 
society quickly loses the values that it sets out to maintain. This chapter explores some 
of the underlying needs for that society structure and how it should be governed, 
populated and perhaps funded. 
To summarize the arguments for a code of conduct and ethics being proposed, they 
would be as follows: 
The ethical underpinnings of any profession are those of truth and consistency 
(Manunta, 1996; Simonsen, 1996; Kultgen, 1988). Each professional may have a 
slightly different nuance of the ethical boundaries across which they are unwilling to 
step. These boundaries can be founded on education, societal values or religion, but any 
professional in the agreement to be held to a set of values must be able to clearly 
articulate what those personal understandings are. That professional must also be able to 
demonstrate a consistent application of those principles in their working routines. 
In considering how we would define truth, this research reviewed the consensus theory 
of truth and more importantly, the correspondence theory of truth (Kirkham, 1992; 
Russell, 1912). What was evident was that was the consensus theory of truth was not 
appropriate, given that using such a theory it would be assumed that the argument rather 
than the facts would have more bearing on the data. The correspondence theory suggests 
that for something to be regarded as true, the items under discussion must be proven to 
be related and in existence. For this research, the data must exist, must be reproducible 
and appear the same to any other observer.  
This researcher believes, whilst taking into account the discussions around whether this 
arm of security is a profession or not  that a professional code of conduct has to consider 
the fact that the ethical boundaries in different cultures may waiver against a defined 
norm (Manunta, 1996; Simonsen, 1996). So, even if the professional standards are in 
variance from territory to territory, perhaps they may shift based on local professional 
170 
 
ethics, but they should never conflict with other territories. We must also allow for the 
understanding that even ethics may be “situational” (Brennan and Johnson, 2004). The 
code of conduct for the data forensics profession absolutely must define appropriate 
process for reviewing and adapting as needed, the underlying guidance and rule set that 
the investigator must sign up to and work within.  
In order that a proper accreditation scheme be made available, there should be adequate 
representation from the various fields of academia having an interest in the outcomes, as 
well as clear understanding of the varied cultural emphasis that will have to be included 
in the setting of procedure (Konza, 1998; Kultgen, 1988).  
The consultation over private sector E-Crime skills issues, and in this case data 
forensics should identify those bodies relevant to the discussion and more importantly 
what they bring to the table. As a preliminary action the process should seek to build 
and populate a sample grid to illustrate the potential cross-referencing of those 
communities expected to develop and pay for relevant courses, materials and 
assessment routines (Eurim, 2004). The research suggests that the following extensive 
but not exhaustive list of interested parties might therefore include, as also suggested by 
various sources, but mainly the Digital Forensics Specialist Group (Forensic Science 
Regulator, 2008): 
1: Public sector agencies that are currently providing roles in the area, such as skill 
councils, agencies such as the forensic regulator as well as the Digital Forensic 
Specialist Group itself.  
2: Course and Qualifications developers, for example ISC2, BCS, ASIS, Guidance 
Software, Access Data limited. 
3: Current course providers; University of Glamorgan, University of East London, 
Royal Holloway College (London), Northumbria University, Open University and 
others.  
If the interested parties above are then brought into the consultation process, what 
actually would this process be looking to ratify. Many experts in the field of computer 
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forensics have reservations about the introduction of a process of accreditation. What is 
argued is that the greatest issue is of the difficulty of the process itself (Jahankhani et al, 
2008). There is common agreement that there should indeed be an accreditation and 
governance board set up, but what does not seem to be commonly agreed is who should 
actually lead it, and by suggestion govern. There have been variously calls for such a 
body to be led by universities, by government, by their peers or jointly by universities, 
government and businesses (Jahankhani et al, 2008).  
8.1 Leadership 
To be led by academia, the concern is that those who have worked in the field for many 
years without academic qualifications may find that in order to (continue) to be 
recognised as experts in the field and fully accredited they may have to achieve some 
formally recognised academic qualification. This would be in addition to their 
experience, which Jahankhani et al claim most are against. This is in fact exactly the 
route that this researcher is undertaking, not in this case purely for the purpose of 
eventual accreditation, but to hopefully become one of the bridges between the two 
(academic and private sector) communities. The outcomes of this research and 
discussions in the field suggest that accreditation will rely upon effort in both areas 
(study and practice).  Further, educational qualifications allied with commercial or 
practical experience would possibly enable somewhat higher levels of accreditation than 
the entry level, but would not necessarily be the only way in which to achieve the same 
level of certification. It would be difficult for someone for example to properly analyse 
and perhaps challenge or support a forensics research paper if they had never written 
one, or similarly, discuss the file extensions on a Microsoft Windows File system if they 
had never seen one. Honorary certifications and grandfathering are therefore suggested 
not to be appropriate in such an accreditation scheme (Britannica, 2010; ISACA, 2010). 
It is to be understood of course that the initial membership of any scheme, i.e. the 
founding membership could not be certified in the first instance as no approved certified 
members would exist. 
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If the effort were to be government led, without set standards the situation will be no 
different from what we have at present (Jahankhani et al, 2008). Unfortunately by not 
providing any reference background for this conclusion it is difficult to analyse where 
the challenge is coming from. It is the experience of this researcher that the only area 
where there are indeed clear forensics standards are in the public police sector where 
practitioners of the forensics profession do tend to have common criteria and guidelines 
for execution (FBI, 2007; ACPO, 2007). It is important to clarify that this Thesis does 
not conclude a need for government intervention, as we have seen many cases where 
standards have run out of control once in the hands of government, in our UK case, of 
the cabinet office (Elliot, 2007). There is a strong suggestion that in the case of 
government intervention, it should also involve those already working in the profession 
to give it [Government] some direction. We are reminded that there is a certain amount 
of reticence to leave the issue purely to the profession, suggesting that this is where the 
fault lies currently, and therefore in need of change.  
In concluding that the final and arguably most palatable option would be a joint 
partnership with government, universities and businesses, we are warned, however, that 
that a great deal of joint effort will be required (Jahankhani et al, 2008). 
As a result of deeper study of the actual accreditation process used in other societies, an 
accreditation for organisations themselves, as well as the actual practitioners, may also 
need to be considered (ASIS, 2009; ISC2, 2009; PCI Standards Council, 2006). Lim 
(2008) in arguing for a certification scheme for management consultants, suggests that 
purely by certifying, consultants would be recognised as being qualified, competent and 
credible, yet the certification scheme would not be designed to cover the technical and 
domain knowledge of the consultants. This certification would then seem to be geared 
towards a club membership, much like the Guilds critiqued by Adam Smith, rather than 
the qualified and competent claims (Kennedy, 2007). Without any examination or peer 
review, there can be no measure of quality or consistency of delivery. This potential 
failure of the scheme is an important input to the forensics accreditation argument. 
Importantly, a very valuable rounding off statement, that in spirit absolutely must be 
captured in any proposed code output from this research:  
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“Membership of a chartered professional body implies that a duty of care is accepted 
by every one of its members in fulfilling their professional management responsibilities. 
The Institute’s Code of Professional Conduct and Practice, which is binding on all 
members of the Institute, sets out the professional standards of conduct and 
competence, as well as the personal values, which members are expected to exemplify. 
It therefore encapsulates the 'essence' of a professional manager“ (CMI, 2008, p. 2). 
8.2 A Suggested code Of Conduct and Testing 
This sectio outlines in a very basic fashion the simplistic type of code of conduct that 
could be used to begin dialogue within the private sector. The chapter explores a 
starting attempt to test joining such a scheme and the learning that can be used in 
building guidelines for a forensic code.  
In the search for a similar problem solution, that is a profession needing to build and 
deliver a new certification scheme, the research came upon the newly designed British 
Computer Society (BCS) Chartered IT Professional (CITP) (BCS, 2009). There was a 
belief that following the process for this certification would give strong support and 
direction for the manner in which the forensics governance body could be designed. In 
addition, the BCS had advertised a desire to support the E-Crime initiatives of other 
bodies and was looking to set up a Forensics Specialist Group, for which the researcher 
believed to be able to both add value, as well as integrate this research into (BCS, 
2008). The comprehensive registration process is designed to gather enough information 
about an applicant’s work and career experience, as described by oneself and one’s 
peers to enable the BCS membership board to be satisfied the entry criteria are met, 
again very useful considerations for similar appraisal processes. It had been some years 
since the researcher was in fact a member of the BCS, having let membership lapse on 
working abroad, so another interest was to understand how the society had modernised 
and adapted to the changing face of the commercial sector, and the internationalised 
nature of the modern computing environment. Clearly an important factor to be 
considered in developing any future code for IT professionals. 
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The application for CITP status was submitted with a full curriculum vitae and a 
covering letter explaining reasons for interest and current circumstances. These were 
that the researcher was changing employment so would submit peer references from the 
current, not new employment. This was a diversion from the stipulated requirements. A 
peer reference form was subsequently sent by the review panel to the referee submitted, 
and importantly for the research to learn from, with no mention to the candidate that this 
had happened. An important learning therefore was gained, as will later be included in 
the proposed governance model, in that any accreditation or certification regime should 
ensure communications are of the highest standard and constant.  
Surprisingly, the researchers referee, rather than the accreditation administration 
reported progress, and only by this side communication could the actual commencement 
date of the review process could be ascertained. The communication from the society 
was erratic, and finally after some weeks the process highlighted that the experience 
described by the referee was now out of date and there was a break in the employment 
under review. The whole application was therefore halted. What were the important 
overall leanings for the Thesis from this exercise? 
 Firstly, the evaluation criteria for the peer reviews were very clear. The referee was 
properly supported with examples of response and levelling for the submission. Actual 
examples were provided in the submission notes to ensure no confusion. 
Secondly, the admission process to the grade was clearly defined and the supporting 
application forms were properly marked up and readily available. There were solid 
experience requirements, properly stated goals of the review process and candidate 
expectations were clearly set. 
Thirdly, the fees and overall admission criteria were well documented and met peer 
expectations of the experience levels to match such a grading. 
Finally, and for this Thesis the most important learning, any scheme will be judged in 
some manner by the administrative excellence. In this case the rigidity of the rule set for 
submissions requires an exact match of the process designers’ view of a submission, and 
seemingly any variance against that view causes an automatic refusal. The 
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communication of progress was slow and impersonal, and given that this was a 
voluntary code, one would have expected a more personal feel to the process, another 
important driver for any forensics accreditation process. The rule set that had been 
created for the administration of submissions would, by this experience seem to be 
inflexible and not adequately tested with exception cases, another input for the eventual 
data forensics accreditation process. By the actions of this process, the society has 
presented itself to this researcher as a society that does not seem to be flexible, 
responsive to change or exception. A truly important learning for the proposed forensics 
accreditation process is that it has to be a welcoming society, where membership brings 
alignment to like-minded peers in a governance model that is fair, exacting, but flexible 
to the varied membership circumstances. In reviewing the outputs of this research, in 
the drive towards submission it is especially pertinent to now add that in early 2012, the 
BCS approached the researcher at the exact mail address it had denied the application in 
2009 and asked if the Chartered IT Professional (CITP) process was known and would 
there be interest in applying for certification. 
In searching for other similar processes to understand if these basic failings were 
specific or common, the researcher embarked upon two avenues of certification with the 
Certified in Risk and Information Systems Control (CRISC) designation from the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) (ISACA, 2010). Firstly, 
the researcher was a regular presenter at ISACA events and was well known in the 
International ISACA brotherhood. When the CRISC certification was released the 
researcher was one of the early certified members and went through the registration 
process without need for a certification examination by peers. What was required 
though was peer CRISC approval of my skills, experience and ethics to provide that 
grandfathering (Britannica, 2010). Given that any such certification developed as a 
follow-on to the work of this research would expect initial membership to be formed 
without examination, the number of candidates and level of peer control provided for 
the first tranche of CRISC professionals was closely followed for this research. The 
secondary review of the CRISC membership used the failings of the Chartered IT 
Professional (CITP) process as a test for improvement against the learning’s already 
held. A direct report of the researcher was due to depart for Australia towards the end of 
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2010, who had expressed an interest in CRSIC certification. As the grandfathering 
program was coming to a close we agreed that the application could be made from 
Australia after migration, thus providing similar broken employment circumstances as 
the researcher had shown in the CITP application above. By agreeing to be the primary 
sponsor for the direct report, the researcher was able to monitor closely the application 
process. The process passed through the application, confirmation and reports from 
referees without hitch, and the candidate is now certified. Proof then that an 
organisation that understands the transient and international nature of employment can 
deal with migratory careers.  
Finally, to be truly non-partisan, the researcher discussed with peers the most stubborn 
certification or membership process that had been embarked upon, in order to really 
understand what advice could be derived. Far outside the sphere of Forensics, or indeed 
computing came repeatedly the firearms certificate process. Whilst this may seem a 
strange area to come up, many security professionals do have military or agency 
backgrounds and therefore are likely to be familiar with firearms and use them at least 
recreationally. A candidate in the researchers office was identified as wanting to be so 
certified and the forms were duly downloaded and filled in (Cambridgeshire Police, 
2012). All together the process was well documented, the online help for the forms 
process was very well done and the forms were regarded by the various peers involved 
in the review as appropriate and not over-burdensome. The responses initially to the 
application by the colleague were relatively prompt, and the referees sections were 
concise enough to offer character reviews in confidentiality. Overall the data capture 
was very good, and taken as valuable input to any membership and certification process 
that may follow this research. What was concerning was the follow-up or administration 
once the application was accepted. Approval is dependent upon two main areas, a 
confidence that the subject is appropriate to own a firearm, based on character 
statements and past records, and secure storage of any firearms. What should have been 
a simple process to check the correct installation of a firearms cupboard in a home 
became a prolonged three month confusion of administrative and personnel issues, 
caused by various factors, importantly with no one owner for resolution. Once again, 
this important learning has to remain at the forefront of the administration of any 
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society, code or register. The administration is what the member and users of the service 
actually see, and the perceived quality of the certification and value of membership will 
be based on that opinion.  
8.3 Code 
So, proposed here is a rudimentary outline code of conduct, drawing heavily on the 
structure of the British Institute of Management, now the Chartered Management 
Institute (CMI). The code of conduct supports all levels of the profession as well as 
deriving support for new and prospective entrants into the field (CMI, 2008). The 
research, in analysing the failures and successes of similar organisations has been 
interesting to see two main avenues of codes, be they named ethical codes, professional 
codes or codes of conduct. As previously discussed there are clearly two formats that 
seem to be prevalent. The first is the shorter succinct bullet style with appended 
interpretations (BCS, 2011; IISP, 2012; ASIS, 2010). The second somewhat lengthier 
and descriptive within the text itself (CIPR, 2012; CMI, 2011; ITI, 2012).  
General peer opinion, and indeed strong opinion of forensics professionals is that most 
if not all will belong to at least one other IT professional body and repeating common, 
or worst case agreeing to perhaps conflicting codes would seem to have little added 
value. The code presented below therefore has attempted to simplify the items that 
would seem specific to the forensics profession, or those that would have a direct 
bearing on the credibility of an expert in this field. Discussion of why the item is 
included and how the validity could be reviewed using a larger audience is offered at 
each point. The Code of Conduct (CoC) is presented as a single item in appendix B. 
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A Code of Conduct 
A Forensic Investigator will: 
• Strive for factual representation and thoroughness of output at all times. Present 
any outputs without prejudice or personal opinion, unless opinion is requested, 
where I will plainly report as such. 
Figure 50 CoC item 1 
Discussion: It is important that the analyst present only the facts, as has been 
discussed, and once the facts are presented, then be prepared to offer an opinion if 
requested. The failures that have been highlighted in this Thesis, of incorrect, 
incomplete or pure fabricated data show that there is not only an educational need, 
but for the intended conduct of an analyst to show clear intent. 
Review: The more data that is made available, whether confidentially or openly to a 
society intending to implement such a code would help understand the relative level 
of failure that is attributable to a lack of this commitment. 
• Act only within their area of expertise. Where certified or accredited to that level 
this will accompany any report. 
Figure 51 CoC item 2 
Discussion: In an area such as forensics, there is clearly a need for expertise and 
arguably experience. This thesis has shown that failures in the process have been 
attributable to a lack of expertise, or the inability of a user of forensics services to 
understand the level of expertise of the expert provided.  
Review: Clearly, the stronger the profession becomes, and the more the propensity 
towards certification and registration grows, the ability of the profession a s whole 
to “self-certify” will become evident.  
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• Maintain my education and experience to the best of my ability in the field. 
Figure 52 CoC item 3 
Discussion: As has been shown in this Thesis, the forensics profession is moving at 
a relatively fast pace relative to other professions. The growth in use of computers 
and the shifting Internet and social media landscape require that professionals are 
constantly re-educating to keep pace.  
Review: If the process of certification, registration and membership does indeed 
proceed, then the educational levels of members will be better able to be tested as a 
group for relevance. The common experience of that membership body will provide 
the impetus for future education, as well as experience sharing across the sector. 
• Act lawfully at all times and work within any agreed ethical boundaries for a 
particular investigation. 
Figure 53 CoC item 4 
Discussion: As mentioned many times in this Thesis, the legal challenges that 
analysts face are legion. Purely to have an analyst understand the various acts that 
may be relevant to the work in the UK alone, as we have shown is a major task. The 
law is not always the arbitrator of ethics, again as discussed, and what is important 
is that an analyst can hold up to conduct he deems ethical. 
Review: To test the implantation and validity of such a clause it would be important 
to take a base understanding of where the operators in the field currently set their 
limits (law vs ethics) and see if it is possible to provide guidance to new entrants 
using that levelling. 
• Provide wherever reasonable as much support as possible to the furtherance of 
others in the profession. 
• Encourage any fellow practitioners not committing to such a code to consider 
doing so. 
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• Provide support for peer certification or accreditation based on common criteria. 
Figure 54 CoC item 5,6,7 
Discussion: The three clauses above have been left together for discussion as they 
relate to similar requirements of the profession, that of training and peer 
certification. The intent is not that this code becomes a manner in which to provide a 
society of self-admiration of experienced professionals. The intent of this work is to 
provide for clear and transparent standards of training, certification and behaviour 
that members and entrants can be held accountable to by the actors using their 
services. 
Review: Clearly the success of such a scheme will be held against the potential for 
the profession to grow, not only in size but in reputation. Any society that provides 
proper training, clear growth paths and avenues for censure of members must surely 
mimic those that have gone before. The review of the appropriate level of this code 
therefore will be the stated intent of membership, once a society is found to desire to 
work with it and move forward, hopefully after publication of this Thesis. 
This Code of Conduct has been shared with peer investigators, along with the request 
for feedback about national, or international memberships as well as the amount of 
detail that would be expected in such a code. The feedback was unanimous that the 
more detail that was provided the harder the code would be to translate, interpret and 
importantly confirm collusion with. In particular, as discussed the recent release of the 
updated code by CMI has caused some searching discussion amongst peers, given the 
expansion from earlier versions (CMI, 2011). The discussions have all centred around 
what the perceived added value has been given the growth in number of words used. 
There arguably has been little expansion of the subject areas of the code, nor any 
specific items that were not at least implied in the previous code, discussion therefore so 
far has been to have seen little added value, opinions are obviously divided. Similarly, 
in discussing the previous research surrounding certification and more importantly 
censure of forensics professionals, many were in conflict with the suggestions of Oja et 
al (2008) that inputs were generally split around tighter governance. Within the peer 
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group canvassed, this researcher found that agreement was unanimous in stating strong 
governance and censure would be needed. 
In summary, this section set out to suggest the simplistic type of code of conduct that 
could be used to begin dialogue with actors in the private sector. We have explored 
other schemes and some of the challenges and positives found. Presented above 
therefore are the principles of such a code. As discussed, review amongst practicing 
forensics investigators around the globe provides for as simple a set of words as 
possible to ensure the code is simple to understand and interpret. It also has been 
unanimous in voice that repeating clauses from other affiliated memberships would add 
little value. Defining how that affiliation would proceed or be administered has not been 
the focus of this research. 
 
8.4 Conclusions & Further Research 
Hagan (1997) warned the researcher that care should be taken to avoid generalizing 
beyond the level of data that has actually been gathered. 
Earlier the Thesis discussed the so called “Matthew effect” in being mindful of that path 
of clique worship. The areas that have been used for this research have been kept as 
varied as reasonably possible. Opinion and argument has been gathered from Academia, 
Government and importantly the wider commercial sector. Very pertinent advice, in this 
case an excerpt from Kerlinger (1973). 
“The report should be so written that the reader himself can reach his own conclusions 
as to the adequacy of the research and the validity of the reported results and 
conclusions” (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 416). 
The need for a code of conduct and a method of accreditation and censure against that 
code is clear. The research presented highlights the diversity of opinion around the 
actual delivery vehicle in the private sector. What is outstanding then is the consultation 
process by which the private sector can provide itself and the users of commercial 
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forensics services a degree of confidence in the quality and level of confidence that can 
be placed in a practitioner. 
Saunders et al (2003) use the thoughts of Tranfield and Starkey (1998) to argue the need 
for research to underpin the progress of managerial practice, arguing that the process of 
research needs to engage with the theoretical and practical side of management practice 
in order that the profession can progress. The problems addressed by research should be 
culled from a mesh of both theory and practice, rather than a single view. This presents 
the hurdle of getting the correct level of rigour in the research process to balance 
between theoretical and practical needs. This has become a subject of much debate 
(Saunders et al, 2008), and that challenge has been used as a constant check and balance 
throughout the arguing in this Thesis. 
It is the contention of this research therefore that the information security profession, 
and in particular the branch of data forensics is evolving to the point of needing controls 
outside of the organisation. This research has looked at other professions, as well as the 
experiences of some of the current forensics practitioners in the commercial sector as 
well as the private sector. As with any new profession, there have been errors, some of 
them very public, but also many purely internal to the organisations being served. The 
interface between the public and private sector, across which there is a reliance in many 
cases upon the integrity of data is not clear or indeed defined. Purely private sector 
investigations are, in many cases, being poorly served by well intentioned, but 
nonetheless dangerously under-trained and poorly equipped practitioners.  
Data forensics is a growing profession, with a marketplace that is massively expanding 
not only in reaction to the proliferation of computers, but also the crimes being 
committed on them. Growth is being driven as well by industry standards such as PCI-
DSS requiring forensic support. The problem of not defining how the qualitative 
measures will be agreed, nor how experts can work together or in opposition to each 
other will inevitably produce disagreement and erratic professional behaviours. The tool 
sets available and evolving skill gaps do little to challenge these quality and 
accountability failures. It is not surprising that we are producing “Nintendo Forensics” 
examiners, (Carvey, 2007a), or improperly named professionals or experts who have 
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little actual understanding of the various methodologies and procedures involved in 
producing the outputs. 
To revisit the objectives we described at the outset of this Thesis: 
• Ensure that the final output provides appropriate background to the subject of 
Computer Forensics; 
• Analysis of related and non-related codes of conduct in similar professional 
evolutions; 
• Review of current similar training / certifications (added during research); 
• Provide that actual industry experience not just academic research is included. 
• Test viability of code with peers. 
We have certainly discussed in depth the background to the profession, and clarified 
both the proper and improper activities of actors in the field 
Reviewing similar codes has helped us understand the values that such a code should 
instil, as well as experience of others in using those codes in practice 
There has been extensive reporting of the training available in the trade and detailed 
discussion of how that is and perhaps should be structured and verified. 
The Thesis is balanced between Industry and Academic input and review. 
Finally, extensive discussion and review has been undertaken to ensure the code was 
both viable and useful. 
The research for this Thesis, does indeed qualify the urgent need for accredited 
impartial training for professionals, a certification and accreditation scheme for actors, 
as well as certified tools. The quality and choice of tools argument was not a stated 
research area for this Thesis, but obviously plays an important part in the overall 
delivery of a solution. Research across other societies that had introduced similar 
controls also supports an argument that there cannot be consistency, integrity and more 
importantly trust within the data forensics community and its customers, without a code 
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of conduct to allow practitioners to affirm their commitment to sound and defendable 
forensics practice. 
A formalised training and certification scheme, a managing body and peer review 
process will show that the computer forensics profession will indeed meet the 
requirements of a profession (Manunta, 1996; Simonsen, 1996; Kultgen, 1988). 
It is expected that this work has given at least an overall understanding of the challenges 
the industry faces, as well as some insight into how this researcher and peers are arguing 
that the confidence in the profession and indeed its professionalism can be heightened. 
As part of the proposed consultation process, the Thesis includes a peer reviewed code 
of conduct statement to drive further discussion, and form a basis for evolution of the 
profession.  
8.5 Summary and recommendations for further research 
As with any research, there will always be trailing questions when the Thesis is 
published. A major concern that recurs through this Thesis is provided as a challenge 
for the future, how to govern the private sector forensics profession without regulating it 
to the extent that the public sector has faced. A secondary challenge, stemming from the 
sometimes parochial or nationalistic nature of the public sector, is should such 
governance be national, or indeed international if it is to provide for recognition 
between peers in an international delivery environment. 
Necessarily this Thesis has glossed over some areas that really need to be closed before 
any substantive changes can be made in the evolution of the profession. There exists a 
real need to create a certification body for the various tool sets currently in use, but 
more importantly those that will come into the market in the future.  
The research set out to identify what practitioner training and certification requirements 
might be to enable a broader confidence in the commercial sector, the inputs being that 
the tykes were giving the expert practitioners a bad name. The research has proven it to 
be glaringly so. There is a growing need for an increasing number of data forensics 
practitioners to support areas such as data loss prevention, Payment Card Industry 
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standards and Personal Data Protection breaches. The evolution of regulation both in the 
public sector and within areas such as the financial services arena have extended the 
number of resources beyond their delivery capability. This is probably the greatest 
difference between the public and private sector. Drivers in the public sector are quality 
and governance, whereas the usual priorities in the private sector are speed of delivery 
and least cost of resource.  
So to summarise the discussions presented in this chapter, it was stated that central 
throughout this research was the clear requirement that any society that sets out upon a 
determined course must have objectives and controls to govern that course. Without the 
ability for example, to censure or challenge members, any society quickly loses its 
values that it sets out to maintain. It is hoped that by exploring some of the underlying 
needs for that society structure and how it should be governed, populated and perhaps 
funded, there has been sufficient argument to provide for a way forwards. 
The research did not set out to highlight the massive chasm between the needs of the 
profession and the lack in any sizeable terms of a formal forensic education response in 
the academic offering. If the educational institutions do not react in a more consistent 
and coherent manner to this growing need for properly educated and trained 
professionals, the code suggested and any society that evolves can itself have little 
effect on the problem. It is notable that the only country seemingly producing properly 
trained forensics professionals at an acceptable rate is China (Hayes, 2012; Si, 2011; 
Krekel, 2009). Oft repeated is the suggestion that the skills they are being taught and 
certified to, are being put to uses that we would not agree to under our suggested code 
of ethics, namely intelligence gathering and disruption. The call therefore is to the 
educational masters of this country to formulate a resolution to this massive skills 
training gap in our profession in the UK. 
Finally, the aim of this research was to understand the need or otherwise of the forensics 
community in the UK for a code of conduct and perhaps a certifying body. Whilst 
national organisations such as the British Computer Society and the Chartered 
Management Institute are held up as exemplary vehicles to do so, the research has led to 
the suggestion that an international body such as the Information Systems (ISC)2 
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(International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium), or ASIS (the 
American Society of Industrial Security) may in fact be a better means to achieve such a 
goal. This is because it provides for a non-profit international recognition of its 
certifications, currently in the information security profession, to which this Thesis has 
shown, data forensics is a branch. 
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Abstract: 
The amount of electronic data that is held about individuals and their actions is 
staggering. Much of the data believed to have been deleted by that subject is 
recoverable. Forensics tools to enable the recovery are legion, and importantly, vary in 
consistency and reliability of result.  
Visible or recovered, it can be fed into investigative tools which also vary immensely in 
reliability, consistency, quality and indeed price.  
Conclusions and inferences drawn from the use of these tools can be morally, socially 
and commercially damaging for the individuals or entities being investigated.  
A common ethical problem is managing the discovery of confidential data that is 
irrelevant to the case at hand. Often wrong inferences are drawn not purely because of 
the lack of experience of the investigator, but also because of the simplistic operation of 
the toolsets. 
Whilst strong guidelines exist in the public sector for the proper handling, analysis and 
reporting of computer evidence, very little guidance exists in the private sector. 
  
My research outlined in my presentation, will provide examples of challenges in 
extrapolation, operator understanding and tool use, argue a proposal for a code of 
conduct to ensure correct and repeatable process is followed, along with a suggested 
outline for the creation of the supervision of conformity to that code in the private 
sector.  
 
  
 
Background 
The advent of computers into the everyday world has brought with it many benefits. 
There is hardly a profession that has not gained either efficiency or precision from the 
use of computers. Early predictions as to the value of computers to the masses and the 
incursion of the ubiquitous personal computer into our homes are laughable as we look 
in retrospect. The founder of the greatest computer empire so far is reputed to have 
stated that "I think there is a world market for maybe five computers". The then second 
largest manufacturer of computers, Digital Equipment Corporation Chairman and CEO, 
Ken Olsen in 1977 stood up and announced "There is no reason anyone would want a 
computer in their home".  
Knowing now what we do, that the majority of homes in the industrialized world not 
only has access to a computer, but is also almost certainly connected to the Internet, it is 
easy to see that these predictions were so badly formed. What is clear, however, is the 
growth of the use of computers has brought with it some unwanted side effects. It is a 
sad fact that almost every scientific advance brings with it both a positive and a negative 
side. Take the splitting of the atom, that absolute wonder of science brought us 
unlimited free power, but also brought us weapons of mass destruction that had been 
unimaginable before their harnessing of its power. Look at the combustion engine, a 
marvelous solution to the needs of transportation, but also a medium for transport of 
even better weapons. Finally, and I could draw upon legion examples, look at the 
wonders of flight, so efficacious in moving people and goods around the world, but also 
a new way to rain death upon populations. 
To return to the subject of my studies, the computer, and more importantly it’s use and 
abuse. As the power of computers grew, from the earliest tabulators, arguably produced 
by IBM in 1924 - the Type IV, that for the first time could actually subtract values as 
well as add, to the intermediate LEO (Lyons Electronic Office) which is also arguably 
the first real multi-processing commercial system, to today’s cloud computing, where 
  
 
the amount of processing power and storage is potentially unlimited, the benefits to the 
good and the bad were equally visible. 
To understand the potential of a computer to offer itself to both good and bad, it is 
probably useful to understand the basic make-up of what we all take for granted. A 
computer is a collection of electronic parts that work together to store and process 
information in a predictable and repeatable fashion. The nerve centre of the operation is 
the central processing unit or CPU which provides calculations on information 
presented. It does this by manner of a series of decision gates, at its most rudimentary. 
The information or input and output is channelled to and from the CPU down a series of 
pathways known as IO busses. These busses can (in the simplest terms) direct the 
information to either storage medium, visual display, or network connection. The 
decisions as to where to send the information, and indeed what to do with it when 
presented at the various decision points is controlled by operating system software. This 
software is common across all similar hardware setups and is usually maintained by 
either a systems specialist in a larger enterprise, or by a system “user” in the case of 
most personal computers. The ability of the maintainer to modify the actual workings of 
this software is usually very limited. Given a computer, with an operating system, for 
the machine to do useful work, it is necessary to use an “application”. An application 
can be something like an office suite, which provides for word processing, spread 
sheets, presentations and the like. An application can also be more specific and singular 
in purpose, such as an Internet banking system, or a payroll calculation engine. These 
applications are more likely to be bespoke to the task, and therefore more specialized in 
their maintenance and usage. All of the activities above, because of the nature of 
computers, can be expected to make some changes to input, and therefore produce 
output. It is this output that is the basis of value of the machine, and the focus of most 
nefarious activity in the realm of computing.  
As well as providing a background to computing, it is also worthwhile to provide a brief 
overview of the discipline of forensic science. Since man first walked the earth, he has 
  
 
used the skills of analysis and reasoning allied to curiosity and experience to better 
understand the happenings in the world around him. We see representations of early 
cave men using animal tracks and droppings to understand if an animal was nearby and 
likely to attack for food. We are told of evidential deduction both fictitious and factual 
that lead to criminals being apprehended in the days long before formal police forces. 
We see all around us people using facts and experiences to piece together a picture of 
what has happened in a particular situation. The science of criminal forensics has long 
been a specialization in the police force. Forensic science now even has its own 
regulator in the UK, to ensure the conclusions that are drawn by its practitioners are as 
sound as possible. There are many methodologies in use to provide the science, but the 
one most pertinent here is the “Daubert test” (Daubert 1993). Daubert states that any 
theory used to provide an opinion in forensics must; be generally in use in the forensic 
community, that it has been peer reviewed and tested, and where specific, the predicted 
reliability and error rate is reported. There is also an important theory of crime scenes 
that will become evident as to its importance as we progress. The Locard principle, 
which argues that any person entering a crime scene will take something with them, as 
well as leaving something behind, and every contact leaves a trace. “Wherever he steps, 
whatever he touches, whatever he leaves, even unconsciously, will serve as a silent 
witness against him. Not only his fingerprints or his footprints, but his hair, the fibres 
from his clothes, the glass he breaks, the tool mark he leaves, the paint he scratches, the 
blood or semen he deposits or collects. All of these and more, bear mute witness against 
him. This is evidence that does not forget. It is not confused by the excitement of the 
moment. It is not absent because human witnesses are. It is factual evidence. Physical 
evidence cannot be wrong, it cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly absent. Only 
human failure to find it, study and understand it, can diminish its value" (Locard in 
Chisum & Turvey 2000).  
Forensics, the American Heritage Dictionary (2000) describes as, “the use of science 
and technology to investigate and establish facts in criminal and civil courts of law”. 
Hayley (2002) describes computer forensics as “… the analysis of information 
  
 
contained within and created with computer systems and computing devices, typically 
in the interest of figuring out what happened, when it happened, how it happened, and 
who was involved. “  Taal (2007 p62) outlines some useful theories into the evolution: 
“Computer Forensics is a field that developed from the introduction of new technology 
which is readily accessible, affordable and heavily depended upon both in the home and 
businesses [sic]. 
 
Back in the days when the World  Wide Web was in it’s infancy, and its creator was 
still working at CERN in Geneva, there were discussions being had around the need for 
training investigators properly. Stanley (1991 p427) calls for “ an educationally sound 
concept of incremental training in computer crime investigation, together with a suitable 
syllabus which has application on a national and international basis.” He argues that the 
international nature of computing even then made the application of national boundaries 
a farce in the investigation of computer crime. He then also sensibly calls for discussion 
what exactly makes up a computer crime, and calls for a proper and commonly accepted 
definition of computer crime. It is worth remembering that his is many years prior  to 
most countries enacting computer crime legislation. Fay (1993 p154) also calls for a 
better definition of computer crime. He suggests that the lack of such a definition adds 
to the difficulty of prosecuting it. He suggests a start point would be  “a computer is 
used in an act, or an act is committed against a computer to steal money, services, 
property or information for invasion of privacy, extortion and even committing a 
terrorist act.”. He also wisely suggests that when an investigation is being progressed, it 
helps to know who the criminals are. 
The Crime Scene 
In traditional terms, a crime scene is usually able to be physically segregated and 
cordoned off until the investigating office is happy that enough evidence has been 
gathered, or that there is no further use in segregating the area. We imagine things like 
  
 
shootings, suicides, armed robberies and bombings as crime scenes, all well defined 
areas and bounded by assumed relevance to the criminal event. The crime scene that a 
computer forensic investigator is faced with is rarely so well defined. Usually an 
unexpected event will cause either a suspicion or claim that data may be available on a 
computer system to prove or disprove the particular event, or series of events. A first 
responder in a computer forensic investigation is generally the computer user or system 
operator of that system. To provide a parallel, it is not dissimilar to the victim of a 
violent crime being asked to cordon off their understanding of the crime scene in case 
evidence of the crime be available. This is the first area that I question in my research, if 
proper evidential procedures are expected to be followed, and indeed they must if 
proper investigative procedure can be depended upon, then evidential first responders 
absolutely must have proper and relevant training. This training would encompass the 
proper seizure of computer systems, relevant media gathering and evidential triage. I 
will discuss each of these concepts in turn. 
Seizure: Any device that is used to capture data evidence must be certified as free from 
contamination. Just as in traditional crime forensics the scene of crime responder would 
use gloves and sterile receptacles to gather evidence so should any data devices or 
containers used in computer forensics also be sterile. In some cases, where electro-
magnetic interference is a concern, such as in areas of high voltage or microwaves, then 
EMF shielded carriers may need to be used. Properly trained and aware first responders 
would be fully au fait with the need in such cases.  
Traditionally, when media was delivered from the factory, it was contained in anti-static 
bags, to ensure that any on-board electronics could not be contaminated by static or 
other electronic discharges, it is good practice to maintain this method of transport for 
ny media that could be affected by static or other discharge. 
Media: In most forensic captures, there will be the potential to make either a search 
based extraction, for example from a large server farm, or in the case of a single or 
small system full disk capture. The media used should be certified (and there are legion 
  
 
discussions as to what this would entail) clear and malware free. Whilst the research has 
not concentrated upon targeted malware, as this is a different subject area, it would be 
worthwhile looking at methodologies for future use to certify media as being as free of 
contamination as is reasonable to expect. 
Triage: As we will see in the training and certification section, the aim of the first 
responder is to categorise evidential capture in the most effective manner. This can be in 
the form of urgency for example where data is likely to change or be overwritten, or in 
some cases where the devices are in a state of decay. It also should classify any 
reasoning for using search techniques to selectively extract relevant data in the cases 
described above. 
 
The Evidence 
All data gathered during an investigation has value of some kind. It is the duty of the 
investigator to provide reasonably argued conclusions as to the relevance of the data 
being presented. As I have outlined, data moves around the computer systems in 
different forms at different times, but usually will be at in a reproducible and recordable 
format when it is on a data storage medium of some type. Dependant upon the type of 
device, this may be a one time copy that the investigator is presented with, such as in 
the case of a volatile media such as solid state (memory) or even a snapshot stored to 
disk as in the case of network traffic. It is important to the investigative process that 
wherever possible, the original or primary copy not e used for any analysis, but a copy 
is used. This has two benefits, if the investigation has to be restarted, to follow a 
different path, then the slate can be wiped, but also in cases where there is a defense, the 
defense investigation has exactly the same data to work from as the challenger. 
Evidential process is central to the challenges that my research is presenting. What 
constitutes due process has to be properly defined and agreed by interested parties 
before any evidence collection or triage is performed. It is generally accepted that any 
  
 
data device prepared for investigative capture should be in the most reasonable state of 
acquiescence possible. Traditionally this has meant for disks or hard drives that the 
system in question was either idle, or indeed switched off. Systems that have power 
applied cannot be ever assumed to be truly acquiesced as error management routines as 
well as system cocks still continue to function either by means of batteries on board the 
machine, or by trickle power such as in a standby state that most televisions nowadays 
have. Public sector guidelines, as for example the ACPO guide or FBI guide [ref] have, 
in the past, instructed first responders to immediately kill all external power supplies 
and or disconnect hard drives from the system board to ensure no contamination be 
possible. As systems have moved to more intelligent disks, and indeed memory chip 
only devices that lose their contents when powered off, guidelines are having to be 
revisited. Overall, the advice now must be reformulated to provide triage at first entry, 
rather than all-off as in the past. Of course, triage takes time, and we all have seen the 
movie clips of hackers zapping disks in microwaves and degaussing pads being run up 
and down the front of systems (ref war games). This also brings in the second challenge 
that my research is presenting, the validity of evidence presented based on physical 
proof or testimony. In the perfect world, any evidence presented to a deciding authority, 
remember we are talking about guidance for the private sector here, would be safely 
stored in EMP protected containers, copied in a bit stream copy that can be replicated as 
many times as needed without recourse to the original, and Files or data entities 
presented would be in their readable state. The reality is that most systems in the current 
information era are “always-on”, in that the ability to shut them down, or indeed 
postpone their operation is very limited, so a first responder has to make an executive 
decision wither before the evidence is seen, or at first sight as to what data could be 
gathered to support the case under investigation. Having decided this, the training I will 
refer to in the training section will help that person in becoming singular minded in 
gathering what data is needed for that task, any ancillary data that may be relevant, and 
most importantly the circumstances of the capture. If you accept that many systems just 
cannot be acquiesced, perhaps because they reside in a different town, or in many cases, 
  
 
continent, then the data gathering has to be very carefully bound with supporting data 
that can be used to frame that capture. To provide an analogy, the first responder, may, 
in the case of newer technologies, never be able to produce what is colloquially known 
as the smoking gun (reference), or indeed a body to prove the crime, but there may be 
enough circumstantial data in evidence to show a reasonable case that the crime was 
committed. It is this understanding that is critical for any further discussion on evidence, 
the problem of placing a person or a computer in a certain series of event with 
reasonable certainty. Again, to provide an analogy, with no witnesses to a car hit and 
run crime, the only evidence that will be available is that there is a body (the victim) , 
fragments caused by the collision, that will point to  either a particular type of car, or if 
the car is found, a specific car, and a reasonable series of circumstantial arguments 
about the habits of the owner or regular driver of that car. Other circumstantial evidence 
can then be researched to narrow down the likelihood of improper conclusion. If 
evidential procedure, and triage moves further towards snapshots of live data which 
cannot be reasonably reproduced, then any investigation that depends upon the skills of 
the data gatherer to properly capture and store relevant facts is deeply reliant upon the 
qualities not only of that gatherer, but the training and expertise he brings to bear at that 
crucial point. 
 
  
 
The Laboratory 
Evidential contamination is the single most worrisome trend in computer forensics. 
Because of the simplistic nature of the various tool sets and the lack of certification or 
accreditation of their use, any private sector investigator providing evidence to any 
degree must be challenged as to the sterility of the evidence work bench. Data devices 
as described before, can be re used multiple times to provide work areas for the 
investigation. Data that has previously resided on these devices can “bleed” into an 
investigation, and as such contaminate the evidence. It is goods evidential procedure to 
reset the data media contents to a predicted pattern (usually 1-0-1-0) to ensure this 
cannot happen. Good practice requires a peer confirm the clean before evidence is 
loaded for review. 
Prior to using any tools, the expected outcome of a series of calibration tests should be 
applied to the tool set. This is usually a search on a known environment as well as an 
extract and recovery of known state data points. This provides a last check that the tools 
about to be used are still repeatable in effect. Any outputs of tools that cannot be 
verified by a secondary check should never be relied upon as sole means of evidence. 
Tool operators that do not have an understanding of, for example, the file system that 
the tool set is rebuilding or extracting from should not be allowed to provide evidence 
that has not been verified by properly experienced peers. 
I introduced in the evidence section the concept of selective data gathering for first 
responders, that is the capture of data, that according to their or collective experience, 
would be relevant and useful to the investigator. It is critical that the investigator 
understand that process, and also that there is sufficient handover of intent between the 
gather and investigator, to ensure that methodology of thinking be understood. The 
disparity of data devices available to the investigator in the field to capture from and to 
mean that a proper thought process has to be applied both to the evidential trails. i.e. 
being able to show that the integrity evidence has not been compromised since capture, 
and also that reliability of device and credibility of capture are not brought into 
  
 
question. Many researchers have quoted the “Nintendo” forensics methods, where 
analysis of forensic data is done with a common off the shelf toolset (COTS) and 
conclusions and inferences are drawn buy the output of the tool that are outside of the 
knowledge boundaries of the investigator. Whilst I do agree that an investigator should 
not rely solely on a tool to draw inferences or conclusions, I do challenge the naysayers 
to provide a better solution. Whatever underlying systems and mechanisms are used to 
provide support to the investigative process, the forensics community will always be on 
the edge of innovation, doing things with systems and data that were never in the initial 
specification. Take recovering deleted files for example in the Microsoft Windows 
environment, a simple file delete by a user merely shifts the file pointer to the 
wastebasket, something that we all have praised at least once in our journey with the 
delete key. To properly delete a file you need to use the shift delete function, which 
destroys the pointer from connection to a directory. Because file operations are 
expensive in terms of efficiency in computer operations, the actual data is just left 
where it is, not cleaned, this is the simplest clinical description of file operations on 
windows and leaves more questions than answers, but this paper is not about windows 
files systems, so sorry, go to Wikipedia if you need more. The fact that the data is still, 
at that point in an undisturbed state, we can also expect many artefacts that accompany 
the file to be also similarly undisturbed, so a nirvana for recovery. Again, to drag back 
into the annals of computing history, disks were small, so data areas would be 
overwritten relatively quickly, and as such programmers did not worry about swathes of 
data being left around to recover. As disks grew larger, the expectation of data being 
overwritten quickly dropped, and as the windows system is designed to grab the largest 
piece of unallocated disk space, smaller files, notionally the ones we look for as 
evidence, had very low probabilities that they would be overwritten. There is a side field 
of forensics that includes residual magnetic patterns of data enabling recovery in some 
cases after data areas have been overwritten up to five or more times, but this is very 
specialised and a distraction for this paper, nonetheless important in the knowledge 
bank of anyone attempting a recovery though. As systems followed Moores law [ref] 
  
 
and multiplied in size, the rotational speeds of disks did not keep up and the disks 
became sever limitations of speed. Creatively, system programmers decided that to 
enable fast writing to disks, instead of continually asking for small chunks of data areas 
to fill, they would ask for one large area and just stream data down into it. Various 
algorithms were designed to optimise this against wasted space, which an investigator 
has to understand, but importantly, this created another nirvana of recovery known as 
file slack, where the data are was reserved by a program, data was written into that area 
until the program had finished then the file was closed. If the program hadn’t filled the 
file, data from the previous use of that disk area was then captured in time until a 
program deleted that file and the cycle was restarted. Whilst this is a simplistic 
explanation, similar effects can be found in volatile memory, it is an important outline 
of the knowledge an evidence analyst or investigator needs to display when he is 
challenged to describe why a telephone number found in a seemingly non-connected file 
directory structure for example could in fact be contributory proof of a particular event, 
when in all probability all the tool set would state is that it found the number in slack, 
linked to a previous incarnation of a file that may have been in a relevant area to the 
investigation. 
Presentation 
 
Whatever the skill level of a forensic investigator, analyst or researcher, it is highly 
probable that their effort will have to be presented either to a peer community or a panel 
of deciding actors. The strength of their conclusions and the proper analysis and 
reasoning of their outputs will be a critical factor in the value of their work and indeed 
the positive conclusion of their intended goals. Most, but not all investigations are 
begun because there is a suspicion or evidence of a nefarious event that is having, or has 
had negative effects on the current state.  Most investigations require many hours of 
painstaking analysis of data, long question sessions with peers around alternative 
  
 
theories, and most importantly challenges both in the defensive sense as well as the 
credibility of methods used to provide a conclusion to some body or other. It is 
unfortunate then that there is not a common methodology or even a suggested format for 
presenting investigative outputs. That there is no industry standard to describe the 
investigative process in use, or indeed the methodologies used. My research has found 
that many supposedly watertight conclusions of relatively simple evidential analysis has 
been dismissed because of improper presentation of facts, less then professional 
drawing of conclusions, or simple misunderstanding of the investigative process. There 
is, in most areas of post graduate study, for example, a course requirement to undergo 
research and presentation or report writing modules before a student can be admitted, or 
indeed begin study. Why then, in an area that is so important to, in many cases, the lives 
of people it touches, absolutely no formal education for the presentation of forensic 
evidence in the private sector. The presentation skills module, will of course be best 
presented as an optional module, being given its own certification as not every 
investigator will either be comfortable or be required to present evidence. This area is 
the one piece of research that has strikingly different aims to that of the forensic 
regulator’s work. For the public sector investigator, the presentation of findings is rarely 
one of persuasion, it is almost always a pure presentation of facts, which will be 
interpreted, in most cases by another expert, sometimes defence, but often prosecution. 
The private sector investigator is usually in a position where they are expected to 
produce a factual recount of the activities performed, and then provide an “expert” 
opinion as to the relevance of items found. The training for this then is by necessity 
diverse. Formal presentation of detailed facts and the ability to answer questions based 
purely on the facts and not embellish with any opinion is a difficult skill to teach, and 
my research suggests one that is not generally available in the sector. This then is an 
area that will require detailed analysis before I am able to confidently state that the 
methodologies and skills chosen to drive the training will have the desired outcomes. 
Secondly, being able to offer an analytical step though artefacts in an investigation, 
draws upon not only skills, but also underlying knowledge of the system in review. My 
  
 
research shows that this is one area that, whilst critical to the proper execution of an 
investigative review the measurement and teaching of these skills can be best handled 
elsewhere for example through Microsoft system training, Oracle database 
administration training, ISC(2) security training etcetera. 
  
 
Training 
My research and indeed personal experience in the sector strongly supports my calls for 
formalised training for private sector first responders, investigators and eventually as 
introduced already, presenters. Companies that that have a natural desire to offer 
training such as Encase and FTK , do offer training that is tool based, but it is very 
focused on the particular vendors tools, and whilst it is probably the better option than 
nothing, can be very expensive and single minded. Underlying principles of evidence 
capture, gathering and proper evidential procedure are followed and taught, but in most 
cases the aim is to sell tools, not produce good quality output of students Indeed it is 
argued that a student could attend a commercial tool based training for a week, listen to 
nothing and still gain the completion certificate, which in most areas is the best 
challenge an employer may have as to the suitability of a person to perform evidential 
capture and examinations. Guidance software, the creators of Encase, which is the most 
pervasive tool set, do offer industry based certification (ENCE) but, being certified, I 
have to agree with the dissenters that without the Encase knowledge, and using that tool, 
certification would not be possible.  
So, training is necessary, and it has to be modular to enable differing levels of expertise 
to be brought to bear at the correct point in the evidence process. My research concludes 
that there at least four main areas for training to be applied, and a confirmation of 
expertise be tested at each end of level.  
The first, as we have discussed above, is that of first responder. This obviously requires 
an understanding of what data devices and systems may be relevant to an investigation, 
as well as the potential use that an examiner may make of them. Also as we have seen, it 
is critical that the responder be able to set the scene for an investigator, so snapshotting 
the environment of capture as well as any salient facts that may have relevance is key. A 
simple example, during an investigation a “grab squad” entered an area of interest and 
found many systems that had password locks. The user was either unwilling or unable 
to cooperate, so a long drawn out data capture process off all the data was started, in all 
  
 
probability only to find that all the devices were encrypted with passwords. On 
switching on the TV, the channel names were actually the passwords to each device, the 
moral being that any device that is in a “grab area” may be relevant to the future 
resolution of the investigation. Being able to do on the spot analysis of the required 
capture is therefore also an important piece of the first responder training. 
The second, and probably longer and more intensive training is that of evidence 
preparer. This is not, in most environments a task that would be the only work a person 
would do, but given its critically to the proper dénouement of an investigation, it is a 
specific skill set that should be trained and tested (and as we see later – certified). The 
training for this area would ensure that the person would be able to attest to the sterile 
work areas, proper evidential process for the recovery of the various data to a workable 
format, as well as the occasional integrity checks of the toolset as well as data devices to 
ensure proper response to integrity challenges of conclusions.  
The third area is probably the most intensive and repetitive are of training, that of 
investigator, or investigative analyst. Entry into this training should not be allowed until 
a work experience level is attained to ensure that a proper grounding of computer 
system concepts is displayed. This obviously will differ as to the type of environment 
envisaged to be trained, but a minimum of two years experience as a windows system 
administrator for example would be a prerequisite for windows investigations training. 
Similarly email investigations would require similar levels of experience maintaining 
email systems. Specialisations in each area could be accumulated, and repeatable skills 
such as proper evidential procedure and data integrity would not be required to be 
repeated. Any student completing a course would certainly be taught to use the various 
tools in common use, but would be required to demonstrate a basic understanding of the 
basis upon which any tool draws a conclusion, such as the slack discussions above.  
Finally, the reporting and presentation of evidence is the most often overlooked, and 
probably the most important area that calls for training. Because we are discussing 
private sector investigations here, and most cases do not actually end up in litigation, it 
  
 
may seem overkill to provide training in the presentation and defending of evidence, but 
if a private sector case turns into litigation, the whole of the excellent work that has 
gone before could be destroyed by a lack of understanding of the judicial process. It is 
also my argument that whether or not a victim of a crime, or indeed a perpetrator is 
getting “their day in court”, it is the moral duty of the investigative team to process the 
evidence as though they were. 
  
 
Certification and Oversight 
Having introduced the Moral duty clause, it is timely to introduce certification and 
oversight as a requirement that is also being drawn out from my research. Just as there 
are areas that differ in the training needs, there should be separate certification in that 
area. Very quickly ISc2 (ref) realised that one size did not fit all in the information 
security world, and  released specialised certifications relevant to particular disciplines 
in security, although some still argue that this was a profit based change, which is 
strange for a supposedly non-profit organisation.  Similarly. ASIS after many years of 
only having the CPP designation, expanded their regime to PCI,PSP in turn, 
professional Certified investigator and Physical Security Professional (ASIS 2009), 
having understood that specialisation in the industry was creating differing certification 
needs from employers. Both organisations depend upon peer submission of entrants, 
and also of the examination questions for the certification exam. Both have ethical 
standards by which the entrants have to agree to abide, but in neither example has my 
research uncovered any expulsion for failure to abide by those ethics. My research 
suggests this is potentially the most credibility affecting difference between true 
professional societies and industry bodies that offer certified membership, the 
membership oversight. It is important that in the execution of task, and investigator does 
have clear guidelines from which to approach the examination. Investigators in 
corporates, in general, rely upon the premise that “the company owns all the data on its 
systems”. Once this belief is held, investigators have been seen to act without any moral 
or ethical boundary in the pursuit of information gathering against a supposed 
miscreant. Grobler & Louwrens (2006) poignantly argue that not all investigative 
actions that are legal can be automatically assumed to be ethical. Commercial 
investigations often based on a “hunch”, suspicion or sometimes plain curiosity, are 
arguably in direct contrast to a police (magistrates) search warrant, in the UK for 
example, which specifies exactly the boundaries that any investigation must remain 
within.  
  
 
 
On the subject of the differences between certification and oversight in the public and 
private sector, some research done by Oja and Davidson in 2008 (Oja, Davidson 2008) 
brought out some interesting results. Their research drew the conclusion the that subject 
of inclusion of ethics into a forensics curriculum was opposite dependant on whether the 
interviewee sat in the public of private sector. Their further research on the value of 
academia in the building of the training and therefore progression of the profession was 
that learning institutions that already had IT security focus in their curricula were better 
placed to extend that into data forensics. My research therefore concludes that a system 
of certification in modular form, to allow specialisation to occur, supported by 
continuous learning or feedback processes is key. It also supports my claim that any 
body that manages the oversight must have the ability to censure members for 
transgression against the obligatory ode of conduct. This one requirement is where my 
research suggests that the credibility of the process will be most underpinned.  
One critical part of my research output is the accreditation, if we look at the amazing 
court story of Gene Morrison, a self professed psychologist expert witness, we can 
clearly see at least one perfect example of how the worst can be expected without 
oversight. The defendant held paper degree certificates for a BSc in Forensic Science, a 
Masters with excellence in Forensic Investigation and a Doctorate in Criminology - all 
purchased from a website called affordabledegrees.com. Customers could even choose 
their own grades.  
The qualifications were awarded by the Rochville University in the US - which does not 
exist, except in cyberspace.  
He claimed to have learned his skills from a retired West Yorkshire detective called 
John Pearson and a mysterious Mr X, a member of the Czech Republic ministry of 
defense he met by chance on a visit to Prague.  
  
 
Morrison told officers he had begun an Open University degree in forensic or social 
psychology. But in court he admitted really only phoning the OU for a brochure and 
tape recording OU TV programmes from BBC2 in the 1970s. It looked easier than 
going to a real university, he told the court. 
 
So, if I were to summarize the code of conduct and ethics being proposed, it would be 
as follows: 
The ethical underpinnings of any profession are those of truth and consistency. Each 
professional may have a slightly different nuance of the ethical boundaries across which 
they are unwilling to step. These boundaries can be founded on education, societal 
values or religion, but any professional in the signing against a set of values must be 
able to clearly articulate what those understandings are. That professional must also be 
able to demonstrate a consistent application of those principles in their working 
routines. 
A code of conduct has to take into account the fact that the ethical boundaries in 
different cultures may waiver against a norm, but they should never conflict. The code 
of conduct for the profession absolutely must define proper process for reviewing and 
adapting as needed the proper guidance and rule set that the investigator must sign up to 
and work to.  
In order that a proper accreditation scheme be made available, there should be adequate 
representation from the various fields of academia having an interest in the outcomes, as 
well as formal deference to the varied cultural emphasis that has to be included in the 
setting of procedure. In my research output I propose a detailed set of such procedures 
in line with some other codes of conduct from other internationally recognised 
professions. 
 
  
 
The Conclusion 
It is the contention of my research that the information security profession, and in 
particular the branch of data forensics is evolving to the point of needing controls 
outside of the organisation. My research as I have outlined above has looked at other 
professions, and the experiences of the current forensics practitioners in the field. As 
with any new craft, there have been errors, some of them public, but many internal to 
the organisations being served. The interface between the public and private sector, 
across which there is a reliance in many cases upon the integrity of data is not clear or 
indeed defined. Pure private sector investigations are, in many cases, being poorly 
served by well intentioned, but nonetheless dangerously under-trained and poorly 
equipped practitioners. In an evolving profession, with a marketplace that is growing 
exponentially owing to the proliferation of computers, as well as standards requiring 
forensic support, but not defining how the qualitative measures will be defined, it is 
obvious that the entrepreneurial system will produce respondents to the challenge. The 
tool sets available and evolving do little to challenge these evolutions, producing 
“Nintendo Forensics” (Carvey 2007) examiners, i.e. people who have little 
understanding or the machinations involved in producing the outputs.. 
I submit that my arguments, supported in greater depth by my full research paper do 
indeed qualify the need for training for professionals, a certification and accreditation 
scheme for actors, as well as indeed tools, which was not a primary goal of my research. 
My research across other societies that had introduced similar controls also supports my 
claim that there cannot be consistency, integrity and more importantly trust within the 
data forensics community and its customers, without a code of conduct to allow 
practitioners to affirm their commitment to sound and defendable forensics practice. 
Obviously the amount of time here to present my research in detail is limited, but I hope 
that this brief overview has given you at least an overall understanding of the challenges 
the industry faces, as well as some insight into how I and my peers are arguing that the 
confidence in the profession and indeed its professionalism can be heightened. I invite 
  
 
you to provide comment on my draft thesis which I will be happy to share under 
controlled conditions prior to my academic supporters final release agreement.  
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Appendix B 
Code of Conduct 
A Forensic Investigator will: 
• Strive for factual representation and thoroughness of output at all times. 
Present any outputs without prejudice or personal opinion, unless 
opinion is requested, where I will plainly report as such. 
• Act only within their area of expertise. Where certified or accredited to 
that level this will accompany any report. 
• Maintain my education and experience to the best of my ability in the 
field. 
• Act lawfully at all times and work within any agreed ethical boundaries 
for a particular investigation. 
• Provide wherever reasonable as much support as possible to the 
furtherance of others in the profession. 
• Encourage any fellow practitioners not committing to such a code to 
consider doing so. 
• Provide support for peer certification or accreditation based on common 
criteria. 
 
